【導(dǎo)讀】我國(guó)中小出口企業(yè)在國(guó)民經(jīng)濟(jì)中的地位和作用………………3金融危機(jī)對(duì)我國(guó)中小企業(yè)出口貿(mào)易的影響分析………………人民幣升值降低了中小企業(yè)出口的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力…………………金融危機(jī)嚴(yán)重地沖擊了勞動(dòng)密集型產(chǎn)品……………………金融危機(jī)使中小企業(yè)生存環(huán)境惡化………………………貿(mào)易保護(hù)主義猖獗，貿(mào)易摩擦加劇……………………加大出口促進(jìn)政策力度，主動(dòng)開(kāi)展跨國(guó)收購(gòu)…………………注重培養(yǎng)金融人才以及獲得消費(fèi)者的信心…………………借此危機(jī)實(shí)行―騰籠換鳥(niǎo)‖的雙轉(zhuǎn)移政策………………………隨著經(jīng)濟(jì)全球化的不斷發(fā)展，首先由美國(guó)次貸危機(jī)引發(fā)迅速升級(jí)為席卷。全球的金融海嘯。同樣，我國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)，特別是中小型出口企業(yè)也遭受了巨大的打擊。濟(jì)的外貿(mào)依存度高，無(wú)疑影響最大就在于外貿(mào)出口方面。導(dǎo)致一批沿海出口導(dǎo)向。型中小企業(yè)瀕臨破產(chǎn)、倒閉，大量員工下崗，也導(dǎo)致如今的就業(yè)困難。國(guó)的貿(mào)易量占出口貿(mào)易總量的近50%。發(fā)展我國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)有極大的幫助。

　　

【正文】 vely little additional credit was allocated to expand manufacturing capacity. On the fiscal side there was significant additional spending for health care, social security, job programs, and subsidies for the purchase of durable consumption goods, from tractors to televisions. Andrew: China39。s stimulus, to date, has been relatively successful. To what do you attribute this success? For instance, were there strong fundamentals in the Chinese economy that contributed to the success of the stimulus? Bottelier: China was in a strong position to launch its stimulus program and the program was highly effective for the following reasons: Because the economy was not overleveraged, as in the United States, all stimulus spending immediately translated into incremental aggregate demand。 thus, there was no need for deleveraging or for increasing private savings. The government39。s overall fiscal position was very strong. After 10 years of intensive reforms, Chinese banks were in good shape and had ample liquidity. The government, at all levels, had much relevant experience with stimulus programs from the years following the 1997–98 Asian financial crisis. Andrew: What is the likelihood that the current, stimulusinduced 32 growth pattern that has spurred this recovery will continue? Bottelier: At this point, growth remains heavily dependent on stimulus induced investment, which is clearly not sustainable, but in the third quarter of 2021 we are seeing more and more indications of a broaderbased recovery. Nonstate investment began to pick up significantly, the property sector is booming again, and consumer confidence has returned as business confidence is rising. Credit expansion slowed after June 2021. Consumer demand remains surprisingly strong. Andrew: What could happen if China does not adjust its stimulus spending? Bottelier: The enormous credit expansion since December 2021 not only has financed statesponsored investment but also has led to excess liquidity in the corporate sector and in the economy at large. Excess liquidity contributed to rapid increases in land and urban real estate prices in some cities, to increased (unsupervised) financial intermediation in gray money markets at higher rates of interest, increased speculation in the stock market, and increased corruption. If nonfinancial enterprises with excess liquidity can profit from financial operations more easily than in their core business, there is a risk that a corporatebased shadow banking system will develop, as happened in the United States in precrisis years. In China39。s oneparty political 33 system, however, the government has regulatory and administrative control instruments—largely through the Chinese Communist Party and the Ministry of Personnel—that the United States lacks. Andrew: Does the Chinese government recognize that its growth model of recent years is not sustainable? If so, how is China addressing these structural challenges facing its economy? Bottelier: China needs to reduce dependence on growth in exports and manufacturing investment. The need for significant structural reforms in its economy is clearly recognized by Beijing and requires changes both on the demand side and on the supply side. A lot of remedial measures are being put in place at both ends. China is significantly increasing budget spending on social sectors—especially health, social safety s, and pension reform, significantly—and is promoting rural and urban consumption growth through a wide range of budgetfinanced subsidies. The problem with consumption in China was not that growth has been slow—China was and is the world39。s fastestgrowing large consumer market—but that GDP grew even faster, causing the consumption/GDP ratio to fall to a very low level (under 36% in 2021). On the supply side, the government has ordered largescale restructuring plans for major industrial subsectors such as steel, nonferrous metals, automobiles, plate glass, chemicals, cement, and textiles, but implementation of such plans will be difficult because 34 of likely opposition from vested interests. The export lobby, which includes many local governments in eastern provinces, and industry groups have considerable power. Andrew: Several observers of the SinoUS relationship have argued that China39。s influence is so great that a G2 (group of two) of global governance between the United States and China is needed. How have Chinese leaders reacted to these calls? Bottelier: China rejects the notion of a G2–type relationship with the United States but at the same time recognizes that the resolution of many global governance problems requires good bilateral relations with the United States. China seems more inclined to reduce dependence on the United States, develop SouthSouth economic relations, and emphasize the importance of Europe as a possible example for economic and currency cooperation in Asia. (Andrew Marble. China,the Financial Crisis, and SinoAmerican Relations[J].亞洲 政策 ,2021,(1):12129) 35 中國(guó)，金融危機(jī)與中美關(guān)系 Andrew Marble 著 李馳 譯 當(dāng)前的全球金融危機(jī)是現(xiàn)代中最嚴(yán)峻的歷史。后續(xù)的危機(jī)，主要是在美國(guó)抵押貸款市場(chǎng)中出現(xiàn)的，已對(duì)亞洲的出口導(dǎo)向型經(jīng)濟(jì)體，包括中國(guó)產(chǎn)生了很大的影響。但是，相對(duì)于其他主要的世界經(jīng)濟(jì)強(qiáng)國(guó)，對(duì)中國(guó)的影響正在強(qiáng)烈和迅速形成。這些不斷變化的經(jīng)濟(jì)，提出 了關(guān)于國(guó)際貨幣體系的未來(lái)問(wèn)題的東道國(guó)，中國(guó)崛起，在亞太地區(qū)對(duì)美國(guó)霸權(quán)的未來(lái)。這問(wèn)與答的提出一個(gè)是由亞洲政策的編輯，安德魯。一位是鮑泰利，高級(jí)中國(guó)研究兼職教授約翰霍普金斯大學(xué)，就對(duì)中國(guó)金融危機(jī)的影響面試和審查了中國(guó)的外交政策和全球地位的影響。 安德魯：自從世界經(jīng)濟(jì)大蕭條以來(lái)這次金融危機(jī)是最嚴(yán)重的。這次危機(jī)是如何影響中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)的呢？ 鮑泰利：國(guó)際金融危機(jī)沖擊中國(guó)和世界后，雷曼兄弟立即在 2021年 9 月垮臺(tái)，而中國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)已經(jīng)有下滑趨勢(shì)強(qiáng)烈了一年多。這個(gè)下跌的趨勢(shì)是，在冷卻過(guò)熱的經(jīng)濟(jì)（ 2021 年第三季度開(kāi)始，針對(duì)國(guó)內(nèi)措施的結(jié)果）和打擊城市的房地產(chǎn)泡沫。對(duì) 2021 年底，中國(guó)的一個(gè)月的月增長(zhǎng)下降接近零數(shù)十年來(lái)第一次。進(jìn)入 2021 年，中國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)基本上是停滯不前，但有希望可以設(shè)計(jì)一個(gè)反彈較快。 3 月，全年增長(zhǎng)世界銀行預(yù)測(cè)為 ％。因此，雖然危機(jī)渡過(guò)的非常痛苦，特別是在出口下降和失業(yè)率方面，中國(guó)渡過(guò)經(jīng)濟(jì)風(fēng)暴已經(jīng)相當(dāng)好了。 安德魯：中國(guó)政府應(yīng)如何應(yīng)對(duì)危機(jī)？ 鮑泰利：一旦政府認(rèn)識(shí)到危機(jī)多么嚴(yán)重，它就會(huì)采取迅速和果斷 36 的行動(dòng)。在 2021 年 11 月初，北京宣布了一個(gè)重大的經(jīng)濟(jì)刺激方案計(jì)劃，并開(kāi)始擬訂其他許多措施