【導(dǎo)讀】隨著人們生活水平和醫(yī)療條件的提高，人們的壽命逐漸增長，我國開始步入老齡化社會。老年人口的增多，讓養(yǎng)老成為了一個問題。相比城市，傳統(tǒng)的家庭養(yǎng)老模式逐漸瓦解，失去。賴以生存的土地等問題使得農(nóng)村養(yǎng)老問題更為嚴重。要保障農(nóng)村老齡人安度晚年，就必須有。研究解決好農(nóng)民的社會養(yǎng)老保險問題，不僅是保障農(nóng)民權(quán)利。的客觀需要，也是農(nóng)村政治、經(jīng)濟、社會能否穩(wěn)定、持續(xù)發(fā)展的前提。養(yǎng)老保險制度成為了中國農(nóng)村老人應(yīng)對農(nóng)村新形勢的必要條件。探索，可是到目前為止，該制度仍然效果不佳。種方案并存、保障水平參差不齊的發(fā)展現(xiàn)狀，各地區(qū)差異較大。崗位后，有權(quán)向國家或有關(guān)保險機構(gòu)領(lǐng)取養(yǎng)老金的社會保障制度。新農(nóng)保最大的特點是采取個人繳費、集體補助和政府補貼相結(jié)。后的又一項重大的惠農(nóng)政策。從具體來看，新農(nóng)保與老農(nóng)保相比，其優(yōu)勢及特點主要表現(xiàn)在四個方面。新農(nóng)保制度面向的是年滿16周歲、未參加城鎮(zhèn)職工?；攫B(yǎng)老保險的農(nóng)村居民。

　　

【正文】 測量了社會對少兒的負擔(dān)情況，并且將使國家年齡下降。 (5) 總撫 養(yǎng)比 =[（ 15 歲以下人數(shù) +65 歲及以上人數(shù)） /15~59 歲人數(shù) ]100 。這 個指標(biāo)表示了社會對 老少人口 的負擔(dān)情況 。 下面我們將詳細的檢測后三項指標(biāo)。圖 1 顯示了各地區(qū) 65 歲及以上人口的百分比。到2020 年，歐洲和北美大約 15%的人口會超過 65歲。到 2050 年 ,將近有歐洲 30%的人口和北美 20%的人口將超過 65歲及以上，并且十分之一的人口將達到 80歲以上。如圖所示 , 在未來幾年內(nèi)除了撒哈拉以南的非洲地區(qū)的所有地區(qū)的人口將會老齡化 ,特別是 2030 年后會加速 (特別是對于最年長的年齡組 )。在 1900年 ,美國 65歲及 65歲以上人口的比例是 4%,到了1960年這個比例 %,到 1985年上升到 %，而到 2050年 ,將達到 22%。在主要國家中，意大利的人口老齡化是最嚴重的， 65歲以上的人口達到了 18%。到 2050年 ,日本約 42%的人口將會超過 60歲。 原文出處 : 雷 . 人口老齡化社會下的社會保障 [J].經(jīng)濟學(xué)回顧 .18卷 , 第 3391— 411號 , 2020 7月 浙江萬里學(xué)院畢業(yè)論文 我國新型農(nóng)村養(yǎng)老保險制度研究 20 附錄三：外文文獻原文 Social Security in an Aging Society Most of the recent claims that Social Security faces major financial challenges in the years ahead rely on the recognition that the US population is aging. Indeed, the ing retirement of a wave of babyboomer retirements plays a continuing role in calls for ‘reform’ of the program. Part of the justification for the 1983 reforms that included higher payroll taxes as well as phasing in rising normal retirement ages was the perceived burden of caring for a rising proportion of the population above age 65. It is now argued that those reforms did not go far enough because demographic changes over the next 75 years and beyond have rendered the current Social Security program ‘unsustainable’(in the words of many critics and reformers). The oldest of the babyboomers have already reached age 60 , and payroll tax receipts could fall below promised benefit payments in just a dozen years. While most of the public discussion focuses on the babyboomer generation, some reformers argue that the general aging of the population ensures that the problem will not go away when that generation passes on. The total discounted shortfall of Social Security revenues has been estimated at about $11 trillion, of which nearly twothirds es after 2050—by which time almost all babyboomers will have died. Further, as is monly pointed out, the number of workers per beneficiary has already fallen from above 40 in 1940, to five in 1960, and to just over three today。 that number will fall to about two by 2050,after which time it could continue to erode, albeit at a slow pace (CSSS Interim Report,2020). This aging of the population is due to two factors: rising longevity and low fertility rates. Low fertility means that retirees must be supported for longer periods unless the nomal age of retirement risers in step. As this paper will demonstrate, however, those calling for reform have overstated the demographic challenges ahead. While it is true that there will be more aged persons per worker in the future, the total number of dependents per worker (aged plus young) is not likely to ever reach the ratio achieved in 1965. This is because the lower fertility rates imply fewer children per worker, and this is not pletely offset by rising longevity of retired persons. Indeed, as we will show, once the baby boom bulge has passed on, the shape of the ‘population pyramid’(which dispalys the population by age group) changes very slowly. The reason that ‘reformers’ reach the 浙江萬里學(xué)院畢業(yè)論文 我國新型農(nóng)村養(yǎng)老保險制度研究 21 conclusion that Social Security faces growing problems after the babyboomers are gone is because they focus on financial shortfalls, rather than on demographics. If we focus attention on demographics and on our society’s ability to produce real goods and services today and in future, it bees clear that the likelihood that Social Security can face a real crisis is highly improbable, for the simple reason that demographic changes are too small relative to the growth of output that will be achieved even with extremely low productivity increases. We will conclude with some policy remendations that will enhance our ability to care for an aging population, in a progressive manner that will not put undue burdens on future workers. One final introductory ment. In this paper I will not tackle the purely financial issues raised in current debates. This is for three reasons: first , I have dealt with those issues in a number of previous publications ( Wray, 199091, 1999, 2020, 2020)。 second, space constraints prohibit an adequate analysis of Social Security’s financing。 and third, I believe that the financial issues are easy to resolve economically—indeed, the debate about ‘ reforms’ to eliminate the supposed financial ‘shortfall’ is really about politics and not about any substantive economic issues (Wray, 2020 ).I will make only passing reference to financial issues, and will refer readers to detailed treatments. Everyone recognizes that we live in an aging world. This trend is a very unusual experience for the human population—it has probably never happened before on a global scale, although it has occurred for specific populations. There are a number of ways of measuring the aging of a society: (1) Median age: Most industrial countries already have a median age above ’s average age recently reached 40—the first country to achieve that feat (Bloom amp。 Canning, 2020, )。 most developing countries have a median age below 25, and a few have an median below 15 years. However, as I will show, virtually all nations are aging, and the speed of aging is rising. (2) Aging index = number aged 65+ years per 100 youths under age 15. This is the ratio of the aged to the young. By 2030, most developed nations will have an aging index above 100。 Japan will be above 200. This index provides a forwardlooking measure because the young represent tomorrow’s potential workforce, needed to support retirees. (3) Elderly support ratio= number aged 65 + years per 100 persons aged 20 64 years. This gives an indication of the ‘burden’ placed on those of normal working age of supporting the elderly. 浙江萬里學(xué)院畢業(yè)論文