財(cái)務(wù)管理---責(zé)任管理模式-資料下載頁(yè)
2025-01-09 06:25本頁(yè)面
【正文】 the principal is when he can observe the agent’s effort level directly. ? The worst case scenario to the principal appears to be simply charging a fixed rent. ? The difference between the two ($754) represents the maximum amount to pay for an information system to reveal the agent’s effort. ? The middle, 2nd best solution (incentive patible contract) may not always be the next best thing though! 學(xué)知網(wǎng)（ ）專(zhuān)注于提供優(yōu)質(zhì)的 管理培訓(xùn) 課程與服務(wù) 24 Let’s say that we set the two variables, R55 and R40, to be 18,769 and 11,449 respectively. Effort level Expected utility of the agent E1=6 (18,769189。)+(11,449189。)189。 = 95 E2=5 (18,769189。)+(11,449189。)189。 = 100 E3=4 (18,769189。)+(11,449189。)189。 = 100 Now, the principal is telling the agent NOT to work hard! The $33,159 is actually better than the $33,020 under “incentive patible” contract! Effort level Expected utility of the principal E1=6 Not a feasible solution, agent’s utility 100 n/a E2=5 (55,00018,769)+(40,00011,449) = 33,159 E3=4 (55,00018,769)+(40,00011,449) = 30,855 學(xué)知網(wǎng)（ ）專(zhuān)注于提供優(yōu)質(zhì)的 管理培訓(xùn) 課程與服務(wù) 25 A Few Cautionary Remarks ? This model presented here is a singleperiod model. Multipleperiod (repeated games) can give very different answers. ? There can be multiple principals as well as multiple agents in the model. Such models, however, bee extremely plex. ? Information systems are not considered here. 學(xué)知網(wǎng)（ ）專(zhuān)注于提供優(yōu)質(zhì)的 管理培訓(xùn) 課程與服務(wù) 26 Concluding Remarks ? The Principalagent model is theoretical elegant but mathematically tedious to use. ? Empirical (reallife) evidence seems to support the model well. ? The challenges, in my opinion, include: ? to e up with useful, testable hypotheses。 ? to extend the model to more plex, but real business situations。 ? to encourage researchers to teach newers the basic skill in understanding the model rather than simply to publish in “ivorytower” type of journals.
公司管理相關(guān)推薦
鄂ICP備17016276號(hào)-1