共享庫(kù)存信息下的供應(yīng)鏈契約設(shè)計(jì)-資料下載頁(yè)
2025-08-25 12:06本頁(yè)面
【導(dǎo)讀】系，實(shí)現(xiàn)信息共享和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)共享，從而使供應(yīng)鏈的整體收益獲得帕累托改善。運(yùn)作模式下供應(yīng)商和零售商期望利潤(rùn)的比較分析，可以設(shè)定雙方協(xié)議中的各種條款和參數(shù)，對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈上的各個(gè)成員企業(yè)都具有激勵(lì)作用。小，各自承擔(dān)庫(kù)存的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，根據(jù)LF博弈理論考察供應(yīng)商和零售商之間。同時(shí)認(rèn)為產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)是開放的，有關(guān)產(chǎn)品的市場(chǎng)銷售價(jià)格、需求分。布和庫(kù)存成本等信息是對(duì)稱的。售商的產(chǎn)品訂購(gòu)量，并據(jù)此制定最佳決策。供應(yīng)商和零售商是風(fēng)險(xiǎn)中性和完全理性的，都根。據(jù)期望利潤(rùn)最大化原則進(jìn)行決策。近年來(lái)，國(guó)際上最近采用種。可以通過(guò)制定一系列供應(yīng)鏈契約，通過(guò)規(guī)定契約的各種條款、以單位產(chǎn)品價(jià)格為Vp出售給零售商R；市場(chǎng)需求的概率分布是已知的。()cdf和概率密度函數(shù)()pdf分別為()Fx和()fx。還價(jià)的成本、轉(zhuǎn)移產(chǎn)品運(yùn)輸?shù)某杀镜鹊龋?。超過(guò)市場(chǎng)需求量的產(chǎn)品庫(kù)存量的殘余價(jià)值為每單。設(shè)單位產(chǎn)品的儲(chǔ)存和保管費(fèi)用為h。存水平為Vq，同時(shí)以單位成本Vc生產(chǎn)出產(chǎn)品；可以生產(chǎn)和管理所有產(chǎn)品的數(shù)量。
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Supply Chain Contract Design Under the Condition of Sharing Stock Level Information Chen Changbin, Yang zhong (Business School, Nanjing University, Nanjing, Jiangsu, 210093) Abstract: In the traditional supply chain, the upstream and downstream enterprises in the supply chain determine the stock level independently, and each bears the risk of stock level。 while in the supply chain which shares stock level information, it can use different stock level information sharing policy and make the upstream and downstream enterprises in the supply chain associate both party’s risk with ine by some supply chain contract, and achieve information sharing and risk sharing. Hence, the whole ine of supply chain will achieve Pareto improvement. By paring and analyzing the supplier’s and the retailer’s profits in the two different supply chain operational conditions, it can design all kinds of terms and parameters in the contract and make the supplier or the retailer gain more profits in the supply chain which shares stock level information. However, in the supply chain which shares stock level information, only one or a few member enterprise doesn’t optimize the supply chain. By designing the profit sharing contract and the risk sharing contract with minimum purchase mitment, it can have an stimulant role for each member enterprise in the supply chain in the information sharing operational condition. 17 作者簡(jiǎn)介： 陳長(zhǎng)彬， 1973 年生，福建惠安人，南京大學(xué)商學(xué)院博士研究生，研究方向：供應(yīng)鏈管理、組織行為學(xué)。手機(jī)： 13770703742 Email： 楊忠， 1963 年生，江蘇海安人，南京大學(xué)商學(xué)院教授，博士生導(dǎo)師，研究方向： 國(guó)際企業(yè)管理，組織行為與管理 。 通訊地址：江蘇南京市漢口路 22號(hào)南京大學(xué)陶?qǐng)@ 2 棟 1222室，陳長(zhǎng)彬 收，郵編： 210093。
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