構(gòu)建會(huì)計(jì)誠(chéng)信體系若干問題的研究-wenkub
2023-04-10 01:44:46 本頁面
【正文】 發(fā)生沖突時(shí)，即委托代理雙方的效用函數(shù)不一致時(shí)，會(huì)計(jì)失信就會(huì)產(chǎn)生。根據(jù)財(cái)政部《會(huì)計(jì)基礎(chǔ)工作規(guī)范》的規(guī)定，會(huì)計(jì)人員職業(yè)道德的內(nèi)容主要包括以下幾個(gè)方面：敬業(yè)愛崗，熟悉法規(guī)，依法辦事，客觀公正，保守秘密。（二）完善會(huì)計(jì)法規(guī)制度會(huì)計(jì)誠(chéng)信體系的建立和完善，有其自身的特殊性。在2006年，我國(guó)對(duì)《會(huì)計(jì)法》做了重新修訂，在很多方面都做了改革和完善。那么，應(yīng)該完善會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則和會(huì)計(jì)制度，縮小會(huì)計(jì)政策的自由選擇度，減少主觀選擇度，減小財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告粉飾的空間，適當(dāng)增加財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表附注、鼓勵(lì)企業(yè)披露非財(cái)務(wù)信息、進(jìn)一步完善與嚴(yán)格規(guī)范關(guān)聯(lián)交易的披露、加強(qiáng)對(duì)現(xiàn)金流量信息的呈報(bào)和考核。會(huì)計(jì)法律體系和制度再完善，如果相關(guān)工作人員有法不依或者執(zhí)法不嚴(yán)，法律同樣會(huì)失去監(jiān)督警示作用，因此對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)造假應(yīng)該嚴(yán)厲打擊?？梢愿鶕?jù)會(huì)計(jì)相關(guān)人員不同層次上的需求，給予相應(yīng)的激勵(lì)。對(duì)于會(huì)計(jì)造假上市公司要立刻退市，并對(duì)參與造假的會(huì)計(jì)審計(jì)中介機(jī)構(gòu)要及時(shí)進(jìn)行取締。這樣，可提高會(huì)計(jì)人員在委派單位中的相對(duì)獨(dú)立性，在一定程度上，不受單位負(fù)責(zé)人違規(guī)違法的壓迫，充分展現(xiàn)會(huì)計(jì)的監(jiān)督作用。2．加強(qiáng)會(huì)計(jì)監(jiān)督機(jī)制建設(shè)在企業(yè)內(nèi)部制定財(cái)務(wù)監(jiān)察及內(nèi)部稽核制度，制定企業(yè)內(nèi)部控制制度，嚴(yán)格會(huì)計(jì)核算的基本程序，健全各種財(cái)產(chǎn)物資的領(lǐng)報(bào)和財(cái)務(wù)收支的審批制度，為提供真實(shí)的會(huì)計(jì)信息奠定基礎(chǔ)。加大股東，銀行等財(cái)務(wù)信息使用者和需求者參與監(jiān)督的可能性，包括定時(shí)召開股東會(huì)，監(jiān)事會(huì)，健全董事會(huì)、獨(dú)立董事制度、建立審計(jì)委員會(huì)等措施，維護(hù)中小股東利益。會(huì)計(jì)信息網(wǎng)絡(luò)化是以網(wǎng)絡(luò)技術(shù)為基礎(chǔ)，在互聯(lián)網(wǎng)環(huán)境下實(shí)施會(huì)計(jì)財(cái)務(wù)分析、核算、控制、決策和監(jiān)督等的現(xiàn)代財(cái)務(wù)管理新模式。根據(jù)我國(guó)目前經(jīng)濟(jì)活動(dòng)中會(huì)計(jì)誠(chéng)信問題的情況,和國(guó)外誠(chéng)信制度發(fā)展過程中的經(jīng)驗(yàn)和教訓(xùn),系統(tǒng)的考慮會(huì)計(jì)誠(chéng)信體系建設(shè)，并一步一步去實(shí)現(xiàn)目標(biāo)。WM）著，公允價(jià)值會(huì)計(jì)舞弊新全球風(fēng)險(xiǎn)與偵察技術(shù)，上海復(fù)旦大學(xué)出版社，2010,6[16]O top management turnover is significantly related to the SEC enforcement action after controlling for firmspecific characteristics.I. Introduction Within the past two years investors have been plagued by numerous instances of fraud and scandal in corporate America. Financial scandals reduce investors39。 financial statements.We hypothesize that AAER firms are more likely to be financially distressed and that they more frequently turn to fraudulent accounting practices in an attempt to meet earning expectations. Only after accounting fraud is detected by the SEC does it have a severe impact on the firm. The occurrence of SEC investigation generally signals poor accounting quality to investors, and stock prices can quickly reflect this negatively. A large amount of accounting error indicates that the firm value is overstated, casting doubt about the accuracy of previous financial statements. We hypothesize that boards of directors are more likely to replace management teams due to the following reasons: to recover reputation loss, to guarantee an unbiased SEC investigation, or to satisfy the anxious investors.Agrawal, Jaffe and Karpoff (1999) study firms suspected or charged with fraud during 19811992. Their study includes the following types of fraud: fraud against shareholders, fraud against government, financial reporting fraud and regulatory violations. They do not find systematic evidence of unusually high turnover among senior managers and directors. Even for financial fraud firms, they do not find higher top management and director turnover rates than control firms. Their findings are rather surprising since accounting fraud signals lower firm value and large fraud could be detrimental to shareholders’ interests. Retention of the old management team is not conducive to a smooth investigation by the SEC and may result in significant reputation losses. In this paper we extend turnover analysis to three levels: total management turnover (. Chairman, CEO, President, CFO, Treasurer and Controller), top management turnover (. Chairman, CEO, President) and financial management turnover (. CFO, Treasurer and Controller) over a longer event window (2, 2).Denis amp。 finally multiple events from the same firm may bias the independence of the variables, management turnovers and longterm returns. As shown in panel A of Table I, we have a total of 291 unique firms with their first offense included in the dataset, relatively evenly spread out across the decade. These incidents are not clustered around a few years. To record the management turnover information of these 291 firms, Standard and Poor’s Register of Corporations, Directors and Executives (Register) is used. The position of top management (Chairman, CEO and President), financial management (CFO, Treasurer and Controller) and board during the fiveyear event window (2, 2) is documented. Also documented are their auditing firms, auditing firm turnover, and number of employees.We separately code the turnover for two subperiods (2, 0), and (1, 2). SEC investigation usually goes through the following process: After initial review, if a case warrants further scrutiny, the agency initiates an informal investigation and invites related persons to cooperate by providing documents and testimony. If the informal investigation reveals strong evidence of violating the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, the SEC tends to pursue a formal investigation. Therefore, the investigation period can take place much earlier than the official AAER release date and firms frequently fire their alleged management team during the investigation period. One also has to be cautious in interpreting the management turnover of AAER firms since the gap between accounting fraud and SEC enforcement disclosure can be lengthy. The average gap between the year the fraud was mitted and the AAER release is years while the average length of the alleged fraud period is years. Thus we feel it is important to document the management turnover two years prior to the AAER event year. Likewise, two subsequent years will allow a long enough period for firms to make decisions on whether to keep their existing management
環(huán)評(píng)公示相關(guān)推薦
鄂ICP備17016276號(hào)-1