【正文】 team.翻譯：會計欺詐和管理層的人員流動率文摘會計欺詐和丑聞的影響已成為最近幾年的公共政策議論的中心話題。結(jié)果表明：企業(yè)logistic回歸最高管理層的人員流動率密切相關,SEC執(zhí)法行動在控制了企業(yè)特有的特征。2002年7月30日,布什總統(tǒng)簽署了《薩班斯奧克斯利法案》。學術界已經(jīng)討論如何有效防止高管的行為是從事會計欺詐。薩班斯奧克斯利法案的通過,是兩個重大事件的直接后果中列出以下兩段:2001年10月,宣布安然這個能源巨頭,它的盈利被夸大了12億美元。在那一年最高管理層的人員流動率暗示不穩(wěn)的安然。2002年6月25日,MCI世通、第二大長途公司在美國,披露在前五個季度一個38億美元的會計錯誤，這成為了歷史上最大的會計欺詐案件。埃伯斯辭職。這些實例也表明,高級軍官最終負責公司財務報表的完整性。大量的會計錯誤表明,公司的價值被夸大了,懷疑先前的財務報表的準確性。他們不認為系統(tǒng)性證據(jù)異常高的營業(yè)額在高級經(jīng)理和董事。在本文中,我們擴展營業(yè)額為三層分析:總管理層的人員流動率(即董事長,首席執(zhí)行官、總裁、首席財務官、司庫和控制器),最高管理層的人員流動率(即主席,首席執(zhí)行官,總裁)和金融管理營業(yè)額(即首席財務官司庫和控制器)更長事件窗口(2，2)。Mian(2001)研究的選擇和更換首席財務官和發(fā)現(xiàn),一般情況下,在首席財務官失誤是紀律,他們是往往有一種操作資產(chǎn)收益率下降,消極的超額回報,CEO流動率高得離譜。我們也想文檔管理失誤的決定因素的多元邏輯回歸設置。本文的其余部分組織如下:在第二部分,我們描述數(shù)據(jù)的選擇和顯示單變量之間的比較AAER公司和對照樣品。Feroz等(1991)指出,SEC的等級和追求目標根據(jù)成功的可能性。a .示例AAER的數(shù)據(jù)庫被用來提取所有樣本公司在1990 2000年期間。記錄信息的管理層的人員流動率這些291家公司,標準和貧窮。我們分別對兩subperiods營業(yè)額的代碼(2，0),(1，2)。你也必須謹慎的解釋該公司的管理層的人員流動率AAER自會計欺詐行為之間的差距,證交會強制信息披露可能是漫長的。17。因此我們覺得前兩年管理層的人員流動率是重要文件對于的每年AAER事件。如果非正式的調(diào)查揭示了強有力的證據(jù),違反了1934年證券交易法案,美國證券交易委員會傾向于追求一項正式調(diào)查。最高管理層的成分(董事長,首席執(zhí)行官兼總裁),財務管理(CFO、司庫和控制器)和董事會在五年的事件窗口(2，2)是記錄。作為一個表中所示，我們總共有291個不同的公司和他們的第一次進攻包含在數(shù)據(jù)集、相對均勻鋪滿十年的。一個例子是一個組的病例中,成本在前面的財務報表低調(diào),SEC只會追求案例可以證明管理知道或者應當知道通過更好的內(nèi)部控制。所有的公司包括在SEC會計和審計執(zhí)行版本(AAER)1990 2000年期間,構(gòu)成了人口研究。比較AAER公司來控制公司表明,他們更可能陷入財務危機,管理層的人員流動率高得多。金融集團金融營業(yè)額,包括首席財務官、司庫和控制器,更具代表性比CFO營業(yè)額,主要是因為CFO可能不一定是負責會計欺詐。 Denis (1995)文檔,被迫辭職的頂級管理官員們往往有相當明顯的操作性能下降,伴隨著大改進他們的股價表現(xiàn)。他們的發(fā)現(xiàn)而感到驚訝,因為會計欺詐信號低公司的價值以及大型欺詐可能會不利于股東的利益。阿格拉沃爾來說,1981 1992年期間Karpoff賈菲和研究(1999)疑似或因涉嫌公司欺詐。只有在會計欺詐檢測SEC是否有嚴重的影響該公司。什么影響會計欺詐對營業(yè)額的公司的最高管理層?上面所有的例子似乎暗示一個明確的答案。薩利文。斯基林接任首席執(zhí)行官前首席執(zhí)行官Kenneth。很好地隱藏在財務報表,安然已經(jīng)數(shù)十億美元的債務，是由于欺詐會計、非法貸款和伙伴關系。如果會計欺詐行為可能引起管理層的人員流動率,人們可以認為市場機制已經(jīng)扮演至關重要的角色管教錯誤管理。它創(chuàng)建了一個重大的,新的視野和管理制度,對公共會計行業(yè),強加了很多重要的改革公司治理和信息披露要求,而且戲劇性的增加刑事處罰,因為“白領犯罪。金融丑聞降低投資者的信心,影響誠信經(jīng)營。我們使用數(shù)據(jù)來自1990 2000年期間SEC會計和審計執(zhí)行版本(AAER)。s accounting and auditing enforcement releases (AAER) over the period 19902000 make up the population studied. The SEC enforcement program investigates and takes subsequent injunctive actions or administrative proceedings against registrants and auditors who have violated the financial reporting requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Feroz et al. (1991) point out that the SEC ranks and pursues targets according to the probability of success. This is because the SEC has more targets than it can practically pursue and formal investigations are both costly and highly visible. An example would be a group of cases where costs were understated in the previous financial statements, the SEC would only pursue the cases where it can demonstrate that management knew or should have known through better internal controls. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that AAER firms knowingly or intentionally engaged in accounting fraud.A. Sample The AAER database is used to extract all sample firms during the period 19902000. Since there are a large number of firms with multiple offenses, we only use their earliest offense as the event date due to the following reasons: previous events may have a residual carryover effect。 management position.On July 30, 2002, President Bush signed into law the SarbanesOxley Act. This is considered to be one of the most sweeping revisions of the federal securities laws in the past 60 years. It creates a significant, new oversight and regulatory regime over the public accounting industry, imposes many important reforms in corporate governance and disclosure requirements, and dramatically increases criminal penalties for white collar crime. One of the most substantive reforms in the act is that . and foreign reporting panies have to provide CEO and CFO certifications with their SEC filings that contain financial statements. Academia has been debating how effective the act is at preventing executives from mitting accounting fraud. Opponents argue that the act will not have the desired effect because existing market mechanisms are already in place to regulate executive behavior. If the accounting fraud is likely to cause management turnover, one can argue that market mechanism is already playing a critical role in disciplining errant management. Thus the disciplining effects of the SarbanesOxley Act could be less than desired.The passing of the SarbanesOxley Act was a direct consequence of two major incidents outlined in the following two paragraphs:In October 2001, Enron, the energy giant, announced that its earnings were overstated by $ billion. Less than two weeks later it fired Andrew Fastow, its Chief Financial Officer, claiming that he allegedly arranged deceptive and failing hidden in the financial statements, Enron was already billions of dollars in debt as a result of fraudulent accounting, illegal loans, and partnerships. Early in December of 2001, it was forced to file for bankruptcy. Top management turnover in that year signaled the instability of Enron. Jeffrey Skilling took over as CEO for former CEO Kenneth Lay in February