【導(dǎo)讀】2SEC所公布的薪酬規(guī)則以及在162章程中的部分……………………政府章程和薪酬之間的關(guān)系。發(fā)現(xiàn)，企業(yè)員工薪酬的增長率也普遍下降了。多崗位也受到了該章程的影響。我們進一步發(fā)現(xiàn)，在1993年后，許多企業(yè)的獎。Greenspan在國會的講話就批評了當前的薪酬水平在正常的貨幣供給水平。Greenspan的擔(dān)心不是最近才有的。根據(jù)霍爾和Liebman提供的資料顯示：從。現(xiàn)受薪酬影響的敏感度有所增加。提出了股東行動主義上升的理論。酬必須扣除沒有工作效益的那一部分薪酬，并將這一部分薪酬作為國內(nèi)稅上繳。SEC組織透露這個政。墨菲解釋說,SEC在1992年主動將代理權(quán)進行改革的這個舉動是對。國會將CEO的薪酬和股東權(quán)利在參議院進行選票的一種公開叫板。最近,經(jīng)過對公司的審查以后，決定執(zhí)行這項薪酬政策。委員會相信,當扣除。薪酬所產(chǎn)生的影響卻是不會改變的。響的企業(yè)，并從此將其稱為百萬美元企業(yè)?；魻柡蚅iebman用了一個類似于。檢驗這些規(guī)章如何影響了CEO的薪酬，我們研究了以下陳述的五個提議。

　　

【正文】 n data that are truly parable to the post162(m) data. This data limitation reduces the power of our tests. 5. Measures of changes in CEO wealth for changes in shareholder wealth Thus far, we have focused on the sensitivity of annual pensation flows (., salary, bonus, restricted stock, stock options, longterm incentive plan payouts, and other pensation) to firm performance. We have taken this approach because pensation critics have concentrated on these annual flows and because this is the flow that was apparently targeted by the regulations. Jensen and Murphy (1990), Hall and Liebman (1998), Murphy (1999), among others, show that CEO equity and option ownership in the firm accounts for the bulk of the sensitivity of CEO wealth to firm performance. While our prior results indicate that pensation structure and the pensation to performance sensitivity of milliondollar firms have been affected by the regulations, a crucial question to determine the economic impact of the regulations is whether these effects translate into a higher sensitivity of CEO wealth to shareholder wealth. 6. Ownership or shareholder targeting We perform various tests to examine whether our results are sensitive to measurement method or sample selection. Thus far we have focused on the subset of milliondollar firms because they are more likely to be affected by the regulations. We now examine whether the milliondollar effect is due to the fact that milliondollar firms are large firms with mon governance characteristics that make them more sensitive to shareholder pressures relating to pensation. Core et al. (1999), among others, document that governance structure affects CEO pensation. We explore the characteristics of milliondollar firms using an untabulated logistic model and confirm that milliondollar firms tend to be large firms with low CEO ownership. Firms with low CEO ownership are firms where the CEO has less control or where the board is more likely to face investor pressures to increase the alignment between CEO and shareholder incentives. Next, we estimate the models from Table 6 and add interaction variables for (i) firms with low CEO ownership (a dummy equal to one if the CEO39。s ownership is lower than the median CEO ownership for 1993 and equal to zero otherwise), and (ii) firms that have been targeted by shareholder activists using various targeting definitions with data from Strickland et al. (1996) and Wahal (1996). The sensitivity to stock returns increases both for low ownership firms and for both definitions of milliondollar firms after 1993 pared to firms with high ownership or firms that are not milliondollar firms with high ownership. A similar yet weaker pattern is also observable for the sensitivity to EPS. Overall, these results suggest that sensitivities to performance measures increased after 1993 both for milliondollar and low ownership firms. This result is consistent with the notion that 162(m) affected the pay for performance sensitivity and that boards of firms with low CEO ownership increased the pay for performance sensitivity of pensation contracts to align CEO and shareholder interests. We do not find such a result for interactions with the shareholder activist targeting dummy. Overall, our results show that although the governance variables matter, they do not affect our prior results, namely that milliondollar firms have increased the sensitivity of pensation to performance beyond what other firms have done following the enactment of 162(m). These results are not tabulated for brevity. 7. Concluding ments The objectives behind the adoption of the new SEC Compensation Disclosure Rules and Section 162(m) were to reduce excessive CEO pensation levels and strengthen the pay for performance relation. We formulate five propositions to test the effect of these pensation regulations using 1991–1997 CEO pensation data. We find that while the regulations have not achieved the objective of reducing CEO pensation growth, they appear to have had a statistically and economically significant impact on the pensation structure of firms most likely to be affected by the regulations. We also document an impact on the level and structure of pensation for an easily identifiable subset of firms that reduce CEO salaries from more than one million dollars to one million dollars or below. Twentythree of the 25 firms doing so refer to 162(m), however, total pensation still increases for a majority of these firms. We also find an increasing relation between stock returns and both bonus payments and total pensation after 1993 for all firms. Consistent with the law39。s effect, this finding is especially pronounced for milliondollar firms. Robustness tests show that the increased pay for performance relation is not driven by surging stock option grants, the definition of milliondollar firms, or CEO ownership. To further understand the effect of 162(m) and the disclosure regulation on our large sample of firms, we also examine the sensitivity of three measures of CEO39。s wealth to firm value. Again, we use our three alternative measures of a firm39。s milliondollar status and find that, relative to other firms, there has been an increase in the sensitivity of CEO wealth to shareholder wealth from 1993 to 1996 for milliondollar firms after controlling for other factors that affect CEO incentives. In sum, our results suggest that pensation mittees have taken the regulatory environment into account, and that these regulations have had a real economic impact on pensation and on the overall pay for performance relation. The reaction of firms with a pay for performance emphasis in their pensation policy to the currently changing economic conditions will generate interesting observations on the durability of this phenomenon.