【導(dǎo)讀】抽樣了96家財務(wù)困難的公司和96家財務(wù)狀況健康的公司，我。此外，管理代理成本是極不利于公司財務(wù)狀況的。對這種財務(wù)困境的發(fā)生并沒有太大影響。此外，我們還測試了從國有企業(yè)重組到。國有和非國有所有制控股企業(yè)的影響。結(jié)果表明，公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)不同對這兩種形。自20世紀(jì)80年代起，公司治理已成為財務(wù)困境研究的實證課題。結(jié)果表明，董事會比較大的企業(yè)更不容易失敗。較低的董事會獨立性與高企業(yè)破產(chǎn)率有關(guān)系。外部董事的董事職位，對它有積極的影響。流通股進(jìn)一步分類。非流通股通常占較大比例的股份。有的大股東都是非流通股東。截至2021年底，非流通股平均占％。大股東架空和降低董事會的獨立性。第二個特點是，國有股權(quán)招致一些主要國家機(jī)構(gòu)間的矛盾。國有股，最終的股東是人民對中國人民共和國。此外，國有企業(yè)的風(fēng)險最終由公共部門和國家承擔(dān)。此外，為了避免造成投資者心理的巨大沖擊和市場參與者各方面的。利益，監(jiān)管當(dāng)局在建立退市法律方面一直持審慎態(tài)度。

　　

【正文】 and zero for the healthy panies. The data are collected oneyear prior to the occurrence of financial distress. In other words, the regression models are established with onelagged independent variables. In order to validate the classification results, we employ the ―jackknife‖ Proxies and Hypothesis Development Ownership Structure Ownership Concentration There are two different views in the literature on the roles of ownership concentration: restriction on free ride and expropriation. Grossman and Hart (1980) argue that widely dispersed ownership motivates shareholders to take a free ride on the improvements generated by the raiders. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) note that large shareholders will have incentives to monitor the managers when they have enough ownership control, and the existence of large shareholders is helpful in alleviating the freeride problem. On the other hand, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) also point out that if the ownership concentration exceeds a certain threshold, large shareholders are inclined to pursue private benefits disregarding the interest of minority shareholders. The viewpoint of expropriation is also supported by La Porta et al. (2021) and Claessens et al. (2021). There has been empirical evidence concerning the effect of ownership concentration on corporate failure. Elloumi and Gueyie (2021) and Parker and Howard (2021) find that firms with larger blockholder ownership are more likely to get over financial difficulties. However, Lee and Yeh (2021) find that the risk of financial distress is positively associated with expropriation by the controlling shareholders. As for Chinese stock panies, Xu and Wang (1997) report that the relationship between ownership concentration and a firm’s performance is significantly positive. However, it is still unclear how ownership concentration affects Chinese listed panies’ financial distress. Here we use two concentration ratios to measure ownership concentration: the largest shareholders’ ownership (percent) measured as the percentage of shares held by largest shareholders and the top five shareholders’ ownership (percent) measured as the sum of percentage of shares held by the top five shareholders. Furthermore, based on the above arguments, we infer that in most cases the panies are dominated by the largest shareholders because of their excessively large shareholding (nearly 44 percent on average). As some studies suggest, the counterweight power from other large shareholders can generate a mechanism to monitor the controlling shareholder and mitigate diversion (La Porta et al. 2021。 Pagano and Roel 1998。 Bennedsen and Wolfenzon 2021). To capture the restriction on the largest shareholder, we use the percentage of shares held by the top five shareholders divided by the percentage of shares held by the largest shareholders as the measure of the degree of ownership balance. State Ownership Some researchers have proven that withdrawal of state shares brings about efficiency. For example, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) and Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny (1996) show that politicians use subsidies and bribes to influence state firms in order to realize political objectives that may conflict with the firms’ operating efficiency. Privatization increases their cost for this influence and then leads to an efficient restructuring of these firms. La Porta and LopezdeSilanes (1999) show that privatization can bring about improvement of profitability, although it may cause social losses. Conversely, Anderson, Lee, and Murrell (2021) find that among Mongolia’s newly privatized enterprises, those with residual state ownership prove more efficient than the others, because the government is subject to the pressure of improving efficiency. Regarding Chinese listed panies, we conjecture that the principalagency problem related to state shareholding leads to performance decline. Xu and Wang (1997) and Wei and Varela (2021) present empirical results to show that the proportion of state shares is negatively related to Chinese firms’ performance. However, state shareholding panies are often burdened with public responsibilities, such as promoting employment and retaining economic stability. As the adverse impacts of financial distress may impair the state shareholding panies’ public function, the government is unlikely to disregard these panies undergoing distress. Some administrative control and political intervention must be executed to hinder the problematic panies from getting into distress. In addition, the managers of state shareholding panies, who were practically selected in a bureaucratic way, will struggle against distress so as to protect their political prospects. ―Survival with poor performance‖ is not a peculiar phenomenon among Chinese stateowned enterprises. In this context, we hypothesize that state ownership is negatively related to the probability of financial distress. State ownership (percent) is measured as the percentage of shares owned by the state. Managerial Ownership The convergenceofinterest hypothesis (Jensen and Meckling 1976), the neutrality hypothesis (Demsetz 1983), and the entrenchment hypothesis (Shleifer and Vishny 1989) present divergent perspectives concerning the effect of managerial ownership on corporate governance. Some empirical investigation also presents discordant conclusions about relations between managerial ownership and the risk of failure (for example, Parker and Howard 2021。 Simpson and Gleason 1999。 Teall 1993). Chinese Corporate Law stipulates that directors, supervisors, and managers are forbidden to transfer their shares during their incumbent periods. Thus, for managerial owners, it is not easy to exit prior to the event of financial distress. It is still not certain how managerial ownership influence