外文翻譯--后薩班斯時代的內(nèi)部控制缺陷報告：審計(jì)人員與公司治理的作用(編輯修改稿)
2025-06-26 07:39 本頁面
【文章內(nèi)容簡介】 ess is positively related to the size of the mittee. In contrast, studies such as Yermack (1996) find that larger boards are less efficient than smaller boards. Extending those findings to the individual mittee level would imply that the greater the audit mittee size, the less effective the mittee is likely to be. Given these conflicting implications of prior research we do not specify a directional prediction for audit mittee size. Audit mittee size alone does not result in greater diligence as that would depend upon the technical expertise of the members in the mittee. To address this we consider a second characteristic, the proportion of ‘a(chǎn)ccounting or nonaccounting financial experts’ in the audit mittee. DeFond et al. (2020) document positive stock price reactions to appointment of financial experts to audit mittees. Bedard et al. (2020) find lower earnings management for firms with experts on their audit mittees. Krishnan and Visvanathan (2020) find that firms with financial experts on their audit mittees are more conservative in their financial reporting. Such results suggest that greater financial expertise in the audit mittee is likely to result in increased monitoring and diligence and thus, higher quality of governance. This would lead to lesser likelihood of internal control deficiencies occurring. On the other hand, arguably the absence of experts makes it difficult to identify and thus report control weaknesses which implies the presence of experts is positively associated with internal control believe that the former explanation is more likely for the following reasons: as noted before, the prior literature documents that greater presence of expertise is associated with accounting attributes such as conservatism and earnings quality that potentially imply the presence of good control systems。 (2020) documents a negative relationship between audit mittee expertise and internal control weaknesses in the preSOX era. Thus it can be argued that with the presence of audit mittee experts, systems and controls are probably in place to prevent weaknesses, and thus lead to lesser likelihood of reporting such that SOX requires the disclosure of the presence of an expert and the stock exchanges require the presence of an expert in the audit mittee. Because such requirements result in firms designating a single person most of the time as the audit mittee expert, there is very little variation among firms on the dimension of , if expertise truly matters one must take into account both the number of experts and the size of the audit mittee to capture variation among firms in terms of audit mittee financial expertise. Hence, we hypothesize that greater number of experts would lead to more effective audit mittees and thus we focus on the proportion (of experts on the audit mittee to the total number of directors on the audit mittee) rather than the mere presence of a single expert in audit mittees. CONCLUSION AND LIMITATIONS The objective of this paper is to study the role of audit mittees and auditors in the reporting of internal control weaknesses in the postSOX era. Studying this time period is important for several reasons. Unlike before, SOX requires disclosures of weaknesses。 significant changes have been required by the SOX in the position of the audit mittee。 and the role of auditors has been enhanced by requiring them to report on management’s assessment of internal controls. Our results indicate that more active audit
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