【正文】
我們把我們的調(diào)查結(jié)果當作是對未來研究的準備,通過檢查一個更大和更具代表性的樣本來延伸我們的研究。值得一提的是,審計委員會的會議次數(shù)和審計委員會專家的比例,可能在研究的時間段會因?qū)ω攧請蟾鎲栴}認識的不同已發(fā)生重大變化。首先,我們把一小段時間內(nèi)的一個小樣本放在后薩班斯時代中對其內(nèi)部控制進行研究時,我們投入了大量的精力和物力。我們認為 ,這是配套的金融專業(yè)知識在薩班斯法案中受重視的結(jié)果,也是對專業(yè)知識的要求要比簡單的提名一名成員更重要,以滿足證券交易所的要求??紤]到組成和不積極是由薩班斯法案規(guī)定,后者的變化有著更大的重要性。 結(jié)論和局限因素 本文的目的是研究在后薩班斯時代審計報告和審計委員會對內(nèi)部控制薄弱環(huán)節(jié)的作用。因此,可以說,因為審計委員會的專家,為防止缺陷而存在的可能已建立了完備的制度和實施有效控制,從而導致報告那些缺陷的可能性較小。這將導致內(nèi)部控制出現(xiàn)缺陷的可能性減小。德福特等( 2020 年)用文件證明了審計委員會中的金融專家對股價的積極反應。這些調(diào)查結(jié)果延伸到各委員會中去,將意味著審計委員會的規(guī)模越大,委員會可能會越有效。 第一個特點, 我們考慮的是審計委員會的規(guī)模。在薩班斯法案提出的大部分內(nèi)容下,審 計委員會的作用已 大大增強,委員會已對成員提出了特殊要求。 假說發(fā)展 審計委員會在發(fā)展和維持良好內(nèi)部控制中的作用已被幾項研究所證實(英國零售商公會 1999,德族魯特, 1997 卡賽羅等, 2020)。 我們的研究對內(nèi)部控制方面的文獻,薩班斯法案的制定和審計委 員會的作用方面都作出了重大貢獻。本研究的目的是對兩個重要的管理代理人,以及審計委員會和審計員所出具的內(nèi)部控制缺陷報告要符合薩班斯法案 404 條款規(guī)定的實證研究。公司報告的弱點中也有審計師經(jīng)常變化和審計師重述以前財務報表的特點。本文提供了兩個關(guān)鍵的因素,即審計委員會和審計人員內(nèi)部控制不足之處的報告。內(nèi)部控制報告有弱點的企業(yè)中,財務報表 優(yōu)先重述的比例也較高 。 (2020) documents a negative relationship between audit mittee expertise and internal control weaknesses in the preSOX era. Thus it can be argued that with the presence of audit mittee experts, systems and controls are probably in place to prevent weaknesses, and thus lead to lesser likelihood of reporting such that SOX requires the disclosure of the presence of an expert and the stock exchanges require the presence of an expert in the audit mittee. Because such requirements result in firms designating a single person most of the time as the audit mittee expert, there is very little variation among firms on the dimension of , if expertise truly matters one must take into account both the number of experts and the size of the audit mittee to capture variation among firms in terms of audit mittee financial expertise. Hence, we hypothesize that greater number of experts would lead to more effective audit mittees and thus we focus on the proportion (of experts on the audit mittee to the total number of directors on the audit mittee) rather than the mere presence of a single expert in audit mittees. CONCLUSION AND LIMITATIONS The objective of this paper is to study the role of audit mittees and auditors in the reporting of internal control weaknesses in the postSOX era. Studying this time period is important for several reasons. Unlike before, SOX requires disclosures of weaknesses。 Peecher, 2020).2 The objective of this study is to provide preliminary empirical evidence on the role of two important governance agents, audit mittees and auditors, in reporting internal control deficiencies required under section 404 of the SOX. In studying the disclosures on internal controls under section 404, we assume that firms that report internal control weaknesses are the only firms with such weaknesses and firms that do not report any such weaknesses (firms that we use as control group) are not subject to weaknesses at the time of the study. While we have verified that control firms did not report any weaknesses at the time of the study, it is possible that some of these firms had internal control weaknesses but report them in subsequent periods. To the extent we have misidentified a control firm as one without a weakness, the procedure biases against finding any significant results. We contribute to the literature on internal controls, impact of SOX, and the role of audit mittees. Our finding that the audit mittee activity rather than its position is associated with the timely reporting of internal control deficiencies suggests that future studies have to examine attributes of governance othe