【正文】
those that do not. Thus we focus on characteristics of mittees that are not necessarily the result of a regulatory provision. The first characteristic we consider is the size of the audit mittee. Larger mittees are more likely to have greater participation in the governance process and are more likely to address controls and reporting more prehensively. Prior auditing literature (see for example, Abbott et al., 2020) has found that the audit mittee’s effectiveness is positively related to the size of the mittee. In contrast, studies such as Yermack (1996) find that larger boards are less efficient than smaller boards. Extending those findings to the individual mittee level would imply that the greater the audit mittee size, the less effective the mittee is likely to be. Given these conflicting implications of prior research we do not specify a directional prediction for audit mittee size. Audit mittee size alone does not result in greater diligence as that would depend upon the technical expertise of the members in the mittee. To address this we consider a second characteristic, the proportion of ‘a(chǎn)ccounting or nonaccounting financial experts’ in the audit mittee. DeFond et al. (2020) document positive stock price reactions to appointment of financial experts to audit mittees. Bedard et al. (2020) find lower earnings management for firms with experts on their audit mittees. Krishnan and Visvanathan (2020) find that firms with financial experts on their audit mittees are more conservative in their financial reporting. Such results suggest that greater financial expertise in the audit mittee is likely to result in increased monitoring and diligence and thus, higher quality of governance. This would lead to lesser likelihood of internal control deficiencies occurring. On the other hand, arguably the absence of experts makes it difficult to identify and thus report control weaknesses which implies the presence of experts is positively associated with internal control believe that the former explanation is more likely for the following reasons: as noted before, the prior literature documents that greater presence of expertise is associated with accounting attributes such as conservatism and earnings quality that potentially imply the presence of good control systems。 DeZoort, 1997。中文 3685 字 本科畢業(yè)論文(設(shè)計(jì)) 外 文 翻 譯 外文出處 International Journal of Auditing 外文作者 Gopal V. Krishnan Gnanakumar Visvanathan 原文: Reporting Internal Control Deficiencies in the PostSarbanesOxley Era: The Role of Auditors and Corporate Governance This study addresses the role of audit mittees and auditors in the reporting of internal control deficiencies after the passage of the SarbanesOxley Act (SOX). We find that a higher number of meetings of the audit mittee, lesser proportion of ‘financial experts’ in the audit mittee, and more auditor changes characterize firms that report weaknesses in their internal controls pared to firms with no weaknesses. Prior restatements of financial statements are also higher for firms that report weaknesses in internal controls. These results obtain after controlling for a variety of firm characteristics such as plexity of operations, profitability, and growth. Our results underscore the importance of governance characteristics beyond general firm characteristics in examining the reporting of internal control weaknesses. SUMMARY The SarbanesOxley Act enacted significant regulations concern