【正文】 s development, the nature of its assets, the structure of the investment and the exit strategy. Duration will also be affected when exit is preplanned or by reason of an unsolicited offer. Finally, duration may also be influenced the availability of capital for investment by the VC and the multitask nature of a venture capitalist39。 however, the theory and empirical evidence predominantly indicated causality from duration to exit strategy. The intuition for this result is as follows. Different exit vehicles enable informational asymmetry between the entrepreneurial firm and their new owners to be mitigated to different longer VC investment duration mitigates informational asymmetries between the entrepreneurial firm and the new owners, the need to select an exit vehicle that facilitates mitigation of informational asymmetry is less pronounced. Therefore, causality is from total investment duration to choice of exit vehicle. s first sale of shares. The extent of exit raises the issue of certification. Partial exits enable the venture capitalist to certify the quality of the entrepreneurial firm and better mitigate informational asymmetry between the entrepreneurial firm and its new owners. Younger firms with a short track record and firms without significant assistance from a venture capitalist over a long duration benefit from the certification advantage associated with a partial exit strategy. We therefore expect that the causal relation between investment duration and extent of exit to be from investment duration to the extent of exit。 Reason for ExitExit may be preplanned, or inspired by an unsolicited offer. One may expect preplanned exits to be over a shorter duration. Unsolicited offers present the VC with an opportunity to exit prior to the time at which exit was anticipated. Thus, we would also expect that the acceptance of an unsolicited offer to be associated with investments of a shorter duration. Market conditions may also be the underlying reason for exit. Note, however, that investment duration will not necessarily be affected by market conditions in any particular direction as expectations may vary independently of the market conditions at any given point in time. A dummy variable for VC exits for reasons of market conditions is also included in the econometric analysis as a control variable. We include such this dummy variable to account for the fact that our data does not prise a full business cycle. vii)HighTechnology InvestmentsMoral hazard costs may be inherent in high technology industries as the assets in hightechnology firms are highly specific. Adverse selection costs also tend to be relatively more significant for hightechnology firms as their assets are predominantly intangible, especially in their earlier stages. Taken together, to the extent that there are high moral hazard costs and high hidden information costs inherent in hightechnology firms, our null hypothesis is that hightechnology investments will be over a longer total duration. Longer investment duration enables the VC to minimize the pronounced agency costs between hightechnology entrepreneurial firms and their new owners, and therefore maximize the value of the firm upon exit. On the other hand, as hightechnology entrepreneurs are highly motivated selfselecting individuals, hidden action costs associated with financing among hightechnology entrepreneurs may be trivial. Duration will therefore be independent of technology insofar as agency costs among hightechnology firms are trivial. Rather, the duration of technology investments is typically influenced by a plethora of other factors. For example, biotechnology tends to be very longterm as a result of a long development period。i)s development, the nature of the firm39。 rather, investment duration reflects grandstanding and a multitask agency problem among venture capitalists as agents of their investee firms. II: Efficient Venture Capital Investment DurationThe riskaverse players in the analysis of efficient investment duration include the entrepreneur, the venture capitalist(s), and the new owners of the firm. There are two types of uncertainty: market uncertainty and project quality uncertainty. All players face market uncertainty. Only the new owners are uncertain about the quality of the entrepreneurial firm at the time of exit (but the VC also faces quality uncertainty at the time of initial investment). The key endogenous variable is the total duration of venture capital investment: the time from the first venture capital investment to the first sale of VC shares. The venture capitalist39。除了這些經(jīng)濟因素外，法律和體制障礙，以高效率的退出可能會影響投資的期限。在預先計劃的退出或因邀約投標的時候，投資期限也會受到影響。總之,在選擇投資期限取決于不對稱信息條件。因為較長的風險投資期限減輕了創(chuàng)業(yè)公司和新企業(yè)主之間的信息不對稱，所以選擇一個退出工具使得信息的不對稱更容易得到減輕的需要顯得不太明顯。根據(jù)總的投資期限選擇退出工具在分析中可能也被評估；然而，多數(shù)理論和完全跟據(jù)經(jīng)驗的證據(jù)從投資期間到退出策略指出了因果關(guān)系。 除了全部退出和部分退出，退出策略還包括退出工具的選擇。年輕的公司能提供簡短的紀錄，沒有長時間接受風險投資者的援助，從而得到認證和局部退出策略的優(yōu)勢。退出的程度將增加認證的問題。我們包括這個虛擬變量，以顧及這一事實，我們的數(shù)據(jù)并不包含整個商業(yè)周期。在任何特定的方向、任何時間點，期望可能獨立市場條件的變化?！笆袌鰲l件”，也可能是退出的根本原因。目前邀約的風險投資有機會比預先計劃作出更早的退出。（六）產(chǎn)生退出的原因退出的發(fā)生往往是有預先計劃的，或是出于邀約投標。因此，在這段時期中非技術(shù)范圍的成本作為代理成本在高新科技產(chǎn)業(yè)中是微不足道的，而且科技投資的期間通常受到很多的其他因素的影響。較長時間的投資，會在高科技產(chǎn)業(yè)與新創(chuàng)業(yè)公司之間使存在的突出代理成本減至最低的，因此，在到達價值的最大化后公司實行退出。逆向選擇成本對于高新科技產(chǎn)業(yè)來說，也往往是比較重要的，他們的資產(chǎn)主要是無形資產(chǎn)，尤其是在其早期階段。因此，我們的假設就是風險投資者會選擇投資有著更高素質(zhì)的企業(yè)或公司，在他們新的投資中貢獻適當?shù)臅r間和精力去解決信息不對稱的問題之后，才能實現(xiàn)的他們的最大價值。素質(zhì)對投資的期限所造成影響主要體現(xiàn)在兩種主要方式。退出策略(新股，收購，二次銷售，贖回，和全部或部分退出