【正文】 由于我的學術水平有限，所寫論文難免有不足之處，懇請各位老師和學友批評和指正！ 山東科技大學本科畢業(yè)論文 24 附錄： DANISH MORTGAGE REGULATIONS— STRUCTURE, EVOLUTION, AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT I. INTRODUCTION The Danish mortgage system was hailed by the International Moary Fund in late 2020 as “highly rated“ and one of the ”most sophisticated” mortgage systems in the world. All mortgages granted by credit institutions to property purchasers (“Homebuyers”) in Denmark must be supported by an “equivalent bond with a maturity and cashflow that matches those of the underlying loan almost perfectly.”This foundational principle, known as the “balance principle,” balanceprincippet, is codified in Danish law and has been the basis and hallmark of Denmark?s mortgage market model since the market?s inception in 1797. At first glance, the mortgage market system of a small Scandinavian country with a population of approximately million and a land area of slightly under 43,000 square kilometers (slightly less than twice the size of Massachusetts), may seem insignificant. However, in contrast to the country?s land size and population, the Danish mortgage market, relative to its gross domestic product (“GDP”), is the largest in the world. Further, in terms of sheer moary value, it is the secondlargest mortgage market in Europe. This “tiny” country has an immense value in its real estate. Mortgage bonds prise just over seventy percent of the Danish bond 山東科技大學本科畢業(yè)論文 25 market. Financial anizations call Danish mortgage bonds “very strong and very lowrisk financial instruments.”In the over two hundred years since the inception of the mortgage bond market, “there has never been an incidence of default on a Danish mortgage bond.”Largely due to this stable regime, emerging mortgage markets, such as Mexico?s, are now attempting to emulate the Danish system. Billionaire financier Gee Soros has also called for an adoption of the Danish system in the United States as well as in other countries. Given this global high esteem and regard, the Danish system appears to be the “best possible” mortgage system yet to be conceived. As such, given the current unstable global financial climate, if any housing finance system were to retain integrity through these tough times, it ought to be the Danish version. This Note traces the history, development, and recent crises of the Danish mortgage system. It also examines how the amount of insularity the system has protects it from the global market while continuing to court global investors to its product. The strength of the Danish mortgage system was recently called into question when Denmark?s eighthlargest bank went bankrupt in July 2020. At that time, Roskilde Bank no longer met solvency requirements in the face of increasing “write downs”of real estate loans. Most of these real estate loans do not equate with mortgages regulated under the mortgage system, but are instead related to “property development projects.”Thus, Roskilde?s demise was premised not on mortgage defaults or other problems with the mortgage bond system, but rather with Roskilde?s other loans which failed due to the bank?s “slipshod credit policy and a collapse in the local property market.” However, much of Roskilde?s holdings were also nested in the mortgage 山東科技大學本科畢業(yè)論文 26 credit market:In mon with most regional and local Danish banks, Roskilde Bank continues to finance its mortgage loans via mortgage providers Totalkredit/Nykredit and DLR Kredit. Since 2020,Roskilde Bank has not provided guarantees against losses inconnection with the arrangement of mortgages to Totalkredit. Therefore, the guarantees against losses on mortgage loans will decrease. Going forward, losses on Totalkredit mortgages arranged by Roskilde Bank will be offset against the current mission to the bank for its current service to Totalkredit?s borrowers. Thus, even though its liquidity woes were linked to bad real estate loans and not the mortgage bond market, Roskilde Bank?s financial failures affected its guarantees against Homebuyers? default on mortgages arranged by the bank on behalf of the mortgage credit institutions. Later in July 2020, Roskilde Bank put itself up for sale. With no takers, it was bailed out by the Danish Central Bank, Nationalbanken, in August 2020. The bailout amounted to over billion kroner, which was equivalent to approximately $897 million USD. Nationalbankens Governor Nils Bernstein expressed “that other Danish banks? ability to access international capital could have been promised if the central bank had not stepped in to guarantee Roskilde?s debt.” Roskilde?s demise brought to light a chink in the armor of the Danish mortgage system despite its reputation as a“tightly regulated”market that traditionally “shielded mortgage bonds from default risk.”Since 2020,Roskilde Bank had not guaranteed any of its arranged mortgages with Totalkredit. Thus, while “mortgagors shall be liable for the loan [mortgage] personally and with 山東科技大學本科畢業(yè)論文 27 the mortgaged property towards the series or the mortgagecredit institution in general,” in the event that Homebuyers default, mortgage credit institutions remain obliged to pay mortgage bond holders. If a mercial bank originally services the loan, it must also provide a guarantee to the mortgage credit institution should Homebuyers default。本文引用了數(shù)位學者的研究文獻，如果沒有各位學者的研究成果的幫助和啟發(fā)，我將很難完成本篇論文的寫作。尤其要強烈感謝我的論文指導老師牛哲莉老師，她對我進行了無私的指導和幫助，在牛老師的嚴格要求下，從論文提綱開始，嚴格要求，一遍遍的修改，并 提出一些更加合理的建議，在這里再次向我的導師送上深深的謝意。希望本文能對非上市公司股權質押制度的研究起到一定的拋磚引玉作用。即使如此，相信文中疏漏之處亦不在少數(shù)。 ① ① 曹琦：《論股權質押中質權人權益的保護》，華東政法大學碩士學位論文 2020 年，第 2526 頁。要落實好質權人的質權保全權就要確保好質權人的知情權，股權質押的質權人雖有在質物可能貶值之時，有要求追加擔?；蛱崆扒鍍?shù)臋嗬?，但質權人無法實際掌控質物，無法得知質物是否貶值。出質股權價值減少時，質權人有權要求出質人盡力恢復股權價值，或者提供與減少的價值相當?shù)膿！？梢越?鑒抵押擔保的相關規(guī)定，