【正文】 人們希望法院會(huì)振作起來(lái)。 Regardless of the oute, everyone should appreciate an honest attempt to grapple with an issue in limbo far too long. In Dennison, the CAFC has an opportunity to shape the very foundations of patent litigation. It is to be hoped that the court will rise to the occasion. 無(wú)論結(jié)果如何，每個(gè)人都應(yīng)該明白一個(gè)誠(chéng)實(shí)的嘗試拼一明朗的問(wèn)題太長(zhǎng)。 因此， “ 憲法事實(shí) ” 原則值得密切注意。 Should review more intensive than permitted under Rule 52(a) be somehow justified for fact disputes underlying one or more validity requirements, calling them issues of “l(fā)aw” changes nothing and merely confuses matters. Hence, the “constitutional fact” doctrine deserves close attention. It would highlight the need for intense appellate review without concealing the essential nature of the issue。 最壞的情況也將無(wú)法處理這個(gè)問(wèn)題 。仔細(xì)觀察 后 ， 可能發(fā)現(xiàn) 這種審查是 毫無(wú)根據(jù)的 ，或者 落在了 一個(gè)公認(rèn)的例外范圍。這將 猜想留給了 審判法庭和 法庭欄桿了 。然而， 忽略 審查標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，它不能 依賴(lài) 證人 相對(duì)可靠性來(lái) 猜測(cè)糾紛 的解決 。 It can also correct clear errors of fact. Its power is even greater where no jury is involved. Yet, regardless of the standard of review, it cannot secondguess the resolution of disputes that turn on the relative credibility of witnesses. If a case turns on credibility, it is difficult to justify reversal. That would leave trial courts and the bar guessing. 它也可以糾正事實(shí) 的 清楚 錯(cuò)誤 。 The Bottom Line 例外情況 The CAFC has full control of issues of patent law, subject only to legislative and Supreme Court oversight. When reviewing infringement litigation, whether there is a jury or not, it has the capacity, for example, to correct for the application of erroneous legal standards, to expand the application of principles, or to carve out exceptions to rules. 根據(jù)最高人民法院的立法和監(jiān)督 ， 美國(guó)聯(lián)邦巡回法院 有專(zhuān)利法 的 完全控制權(quán) 。 The CAFC might also attempt to distinguish nonobviousness on the basis of its technical difficulty and the tendency of fact finders to see inventions as obvious through hindsight. Still, neither that nor the tendency to Mondaymorning quarterback should any more justify extraordinary appellate review than it would justify withholding nonobviousness (or, for that matter, medical malpractice) from the jury altogether. 美國(guó)聯(lián)邦巡回法院 也可能試圖 在 技術(shù)難度 和 事實(shí)發(fā)現(xiàn)者 在看到事后明顯的虛構(gòu)物時(shí)的 傾向基礎(chǔ)上 ，分辨 非顯而易見(jiàn)性 。然而， 然而 ,盡管 非顯而易見(jiàn)性 已經(jīng) 被 發(fā)現(xiàn)在Hotchkiss 是具有憲法 ，一個(gè)隱含要求將很難超過(guò) 與憲法同樣明晰的 實(shí)用要求。如果聯(lián)邦巡回法院 選擇 對(duì)非顯而易見(jiàn)性進(jìn)行 特殊待遇 ， 應(yīng)該證明它的做法。 Is Nonobviousness a Special Case? 非顯而易見(jiàn)性是一個(gè)特殊的情形嗎？ Whatever the CAFC decides about the appropriate standard of review for nonobviousness, it ought also to address why that standard should differ from that applied to other validity requirements. While nonobviousness was the primary concern in Graham and panion cases, that decision calls validity a question of law. If the CAFC chooses to single out nonobviousness for special treatment, it should justify it’s approach. 無(wú)論 聯(lián)邦巡回法院 決定為 非顯而易見(jiàn)性決定 適當(dāng)?shù)膶彶闃?biāo)準(zhǔn)，它應(yīng)該也能解釋為何該標(biāo)準(zhǔn)應(yīng)有所區(qū)別 于 應(yīng)用到其他的有效性要求。 但是， 無(wú)論在憲法或其他任何學(xué)說(shuō)應(yīng)當(dāng)用于這一目的，就轉(zhuǎn)變成了 另外一個(gè)問(wèn)題。P, it would have been helpful in understanding what was meant by calling validity a question of law. Nevertheless, the explicit constitutional origins of the patent system, perhaps coupled with the fact that validity may involve collateral review of administrative action, could serve as a basis for de novo review of questions of fact. Whether the constitutional fact doctrine or anything else should be used to that end, however, is another question. Before attending to it, a closer examination of nonobviousness may be useful. 如果 Graham引述司法部 Douglas在 A＆ P公司 的觀點(diǎn) ，這將 對(duì)理解 什么是調(diào)用 法律效力問(wèn)題 是有幫助的 。然而， Mahn 只指出，雖然可能 專(zhuān)利 專(zhuān)員 過(guò)度 尊重事實(shí)問(wèn)題， 但是 法院不必 在這個(gè)法律問(wèn)題