【正文】 上 推遲 —— 因為這 根本就不是什么驚天動地的 問題。以及有效性問題是一個法律問題。在那里，有人認為，多數是可以 扭轉，盡管 有 兩法庭規(guī)則。 The most noteworthy aspect of that case, for present purposes, is a concurring opinion by Justice Douglas. There, it was argued that the majority would have been justified in reversing, notwithstanding the twocourt rule. He reasoned that validity is a question of law because “The standard of patentability is a constitutional standard。 雖然它必須有兩個下級法院進行結果檢查規(guī)定 ， 但法院從來沒有判定專利無效 。 The first Supreme Court allusion to constitutional interests being involved in standards of patentability does not seem to have occurred until the 1950 — almost exactly a century later. Moreover, it arose in the context of the Court’s addressing the scope of appellate review in patent cases. While it had a rule against reexamining findings consistently made by two lower courts, the Court nevertheless found the patent invalid. The majority maintained, however, that it was reversing because the wrong legal standard had been applied. 第一最高法院針對憲法的利益被 參與到 專利標準 的事實 似乎并未有發(fā)生，直到 1950年 幾乎整整一個世紀之后。相反，盡管聲稱異議，法官納爾遜不承認加入了新的要求 —— 更不用說一 個由憲法規(guī)定的。然而，很少 有案 件會轉移到這方面來 ， 任何最高法院所作出的有效性裁決 都是 值得懷疑的 。如果 美國聯邦巡回法院 ，或者 最高法院認為，在專利案件事實的 特殊 審查是非常必要的， 應考 慮 “憲制上的事實 ”學說 是否 可能是有益的延長。這是令人懷疑的是，最高法院有機會考慮有關的影響。 8 cl. 8) but also a collateral challenge to findings of the Patent and Trademark Office. It is doubtful that the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the implications of this. Yet, it may well have had Bose (perhaps unconsciously) in mind when it remanded Dennison. If the CAFC, or ultimately the Supreme Court, believes that extraordinary review of facts in patent cases is warranted, consideration should be given to whether the “constitutional fact” doctrine might be usefully extended. Patent attorneys are fond of referring to the constitutional underpinnings of the patent system. Yet rarely will a case turn on them, and it is doubtful that any Supreme Court validity decision ever did. 考慮 專利的有效性 不適合其他任何實例的結果是否成立 。他還對當一項憲法事實被行政機關發(fā)現時它的審查深度時候可信度表示懷疑。 In Bose, it was held that appellate courts are obligated to exercise independent judgment in determining when one should be liable to another for misstatements of fact (in this situation, as contrasted with “opinion”) concerning the other’s products. One mentator has argued that the Court’s reasoning makes it difficult to restrict that rule to first amendment cases. He also urges that deep review of constitutional facts is pelling when they have been found by administrative agencies. 在 Bose案件中，有人認為，上訴法院有責任決定當 一方應該對另外乙方的非事實描述信任的時候獨立裁判 （ 在此種情況下 ，與“意見” 相反的東西 ） 。 “Constitutional Facts” “憲法事實” Despite that, and regardless of whether facts were initially before a jury, an argument can be made that courts should give aboveaverage scrutiny to cases where constitutional interests are at , the Supreme Court held exactly that in Bose Corp v. Consumers Union . While the decision concerned freedom of speech and product disparagement, not patents, a modest extension would have substantial impact on the latter. 盡管如此，也不管是否事實發(fā)生在審判 前， 在危急時刻憲法關注的一項爭議可以使 法院 給予 高于平 均水平的審查。 The principal argument advanced in favor of a more searching appellate review of findings... based solely on documentary evidence is that the rationale of Rule but, in explaining the change made that year, the Advisory Committee said: These considerations are outweighed by the public interest in the stability and judicial economy that would be promoted by recognizing that the trial court, not the appella