【正文】 te tribunal, should be the finder of the facts. To permit courts of appeals to share more actively in the factfinding function would tend to undermine the legitimacy of the district courts in the eyes of litigants, multiply appeals by encouraging appellate retrial of some factual issues, and needlessly reallocate judicial authority. 主要論點(diǎn)有利于推進(jìn) 搜索上訴審查 結(jié)果 ...純粹 證據(jù)的基礎(chǔ)是，規(guī)則的理由， 但是，在解釋改變這一年，咨詢(xún)委員會(huì)說(shuō)： 這些考慮 公眾輿論的 和司法經(jīng)濟(jì) 會(huì)被審判法庭，而不是 上訴法庭 要允許上訴法院 …… 。 Until 1985, the depth of review sometimes varied depending on whether cases turned on demeanor or documentary evidence. The latter had sometimes been accorded less 1985年，審查的深度有時(shí)視乎案件的行為或書(shū)面證據(jù)而不等。由于某些不同的原因，事實(shí)的裁決范圍要被擴(kuò)大，就像在 Dennison 案件中法官的審判，有“明顯錯(cuò)誤”的審查適用。 without the distinction, such rights would be hollow, and appellate judges are as bound as trial judges. While appellate courts may be the ultimate arbiters of issues of law, issues of fact properly entrusted to juries are entitled to exceptional deference under the “substantial evidence” standard. 事實(shí)上，這是陪審團(tuán)的固有權(quán)利；沒(méi)有這些區(qū) 別，陪審團(tuán)的這一權(quán)利就是被架空的，上訴法官和審判法官也一樣。因此，在 對(duì) “法律 ”和 “事實(shí) ”問(wèn)題 進(jìn)行分類(lèi)時(shí) ，法官和陪審團(tuán)的角色是至關(guān)重要的。 Unfortunately, the water is muddied when courts occasionally resolve fact issues as a“ matter of law.” Yet, even then, the operational definition stands: If a matter is sufficiently well established in the record that reasonable minds could not differ, it is within the ultimate control of judges, not a jury. Hence, in sorting out “l(fā)aw” and “fact” issues, roles of judge and jury are paramount. 不幸的是，在法院偶然的一次將事實(shí)問(wèn)題當(dāng)做判例法來(lái)解決后水還是被攪渾了。 The closest one can e to avoiding circularity is to look at whether a fact is critical only to the oute of the specific dispute or goes to establishing the rights and duties of the classes of which the parties are merely members. See generally, ., B. Schwartz, Administrative Law, 21316 (2d Ed. 1984). 最接近的一次可以 用 來(lái)避免循環(huán) 是看 事實(shí)是否 只對(duì)具體糾紛的結(jié)果，或只是去 建立 階級(jí)中少數(shù)成員的權(quán)利和義務(wù) ?？傊聦?shí)問(wèn)題的裁決 歷來(lái)是陪審團(tuán)認(rèn)為比較合適的裁判種類(lèi)之一 。 法律術(shù)語(yǔ) “法律”和“事實(shí)” 被用于若干方面 ， 在目前的情況下，我們有必要去 給這個(gè)兩個(gè)術(shù)語(yǔ)下定義 。人們希望，隨著 Dennison 案件的發(fā)回重申，能夠取得一些進(jìn)展，解決這些重要問(wèn)題。 Graham indicated neither reasons nor authority for denominating questions of patent validity, in general, or nonobviousness, specifically, as ones of “l(fā)aw” (as contrasted with “fact”). As shown below, without an analysis of those matters, it is very difficult to determine either whether validity issues other than nonobviousness should be treated as ones of “l(fā)aw” or, in any case, what sort of treatment should be afforded. It is hoped that, following the remand of Dennison, some progress will be made toward resolving those important problems. 不過(guò)，這句話的意思是什么不清楚， Graham 表示命名這些專(zhuān)利權(quán)的有效性問(wèn)題既沒(méi)有原因也沒(méi)有權(quán)威，在一般情況下，非顯而易性具體而言是作為“法律”（作為對(duì)比的“事實(shí)”）的。引述一則依法院決定將 Dennison 案發(fā)回重審的案例，法院對(duì) Graham v. John Deere ：“雖然專(zhuān)利的有效性問(wèn)題最終都是法律問(wèn)題， ... 第 103 項(xiàng)條件 ...隨后又詢(xún)問(wèn)了幾個(gè)基本的事實(shí)。 The Law/Fact Dichotomy 法律 /事實(shí)二分理論 The most directly relevant precedent governing appellate review of patent litigation is cryptic. Quoted in the per curiam decision that remands Dennison, It consists of one sentence from the Court’s decision in Graham v. John Deere Co.: “While the ultimate question of patent validity is one of law, ... the 167。本文 討論的是 ，如果法院都傾向于 對(duì) 專(zhuān)利的 非顯而易見(jiàn)性 堅(jiān)持更 嚴(yán)格 的審查， 則 另外兩個(gè)問(wèn)題需要考慮：第一， 審查 是否應(yīng)當(dāng)擴(kuò)大到所有涉及專(zhuān)利的有效性 審查 ，而且，第二，審查 是否應(yīng)根據(jù)“憲制上的事實(shí)”原則 來(lái) 進(jìn)行。 It is by no means certain that nonobviousness determinations should be treated as questions of law. Nevertheless, there is ample evidence that courts seek to review these findings more intensely than would be appropriate for questions of fact unde