【正文】 t arose in the context of the Court’s addressing the scope of appellate review in patent cases. While it had a rule against reexamining findings consistently made by two lower courts, the Court nevertheless found the patent invalid. The majority maintained, however, that it was reversing because the wrong legal standard had been applied. 第一最高法院針對憲法的利益被 參與到 專利標(biāo)準(zhǔn) 的事實(shí) 似乎并未有發(fā)生，直到 1950年 幾乎整整一個世紀(jì)之后。此外， 在 它的背景下出現(xiàn) 了 法院 在 處理在專利案件上訴 時規(guī)定了 審查 范圍。 雖然它必須有兩個下級法院進(jìn)行結(jié)果檢查規(guī)定 ， 但法院從來沒有判定專利無效 。 然而 大多數(shù)人認(rèn)為， 這是因為錯誤的法律標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的應(yīng)用 。 The most noteworthy aspect of that case, for present purposes, is a concurring opinion by Justice Douglas. There, it was argued that the majority would have been justified in reversing, notwithstanding the twocourt rule. He reasoned that validity is a question of law because “The standard of patentability is a constitutional standard。 and the question of validity is a question of law.” For authority he cited Mahn , an 1884 case in which the Court reviewed a decision of the Patent Commissioner. Yet, Mahn merely points out that, while the Commissioner might be entitled to some deference on questions of fact, courts need not defer on questions of law— hardly an earthshaking proposition. 在 那種 情況下 對于當(dāng)前的目的 最值得注意的方面， 就是讓 大法官 Douglas 贊成這個意見 。在那里，有人認(rèn)為，多數(shù)是可以 扭轉(zhuǎn)，盡管 有 兩法庭規(guī)則。他的理由是有效性是法律的問題，因為他說： “專利標(biāo)準(zhǔn)是憲法標(biāo) 準(zhǔn) 。以及有效性問題是一個法律問題。 ”對于權(quán)威，他引用 Mahn 在 1884年 審判的一個 案件中，法院審查了 專利專員 的決定 。然而， Mahn 只指出，雖然可能 專利 專員 過度 尊重事實(shí)問題， 但是 法院不必 在這個法律問題上 推遲 —— 因為這 根本就不是什么驚天動地的 問題。 Had Graham cited Justice Douglas’ opinion in Aamp。P, it would have been helpful in understanding what was meant by calling validity a question of law. Nevertheless, the explicit constitutional origins of the patent system, perhaps coupled with the fact that validity may involve collateral review of administrative action, could serve as a basis for de novo review of questions of fact. Whether the constitutional fact doctrine or anything else should be used to that end, however, is another question. Before attending to it, a closer examination of nonobviousness may be useful. 如果 Graham引述司法部 Douglas在 A＆ P公司 的觀點(diǎn) ，這將 對理解 什么是調(diào)用 法律效力問題 是有幫助的 。然而， 憲法明確了專利制度的起源，也許 事實(shí)有效性可能涉及抵押品的行政行為的審查，可以作為一個從頭對事實(shí)問題審查的基礎(chǔ)上加上。 但是， 無論在憲法或其他任何學(xué)說應(yīng)當(dāng)用于這一目的，就轉(zhuǎn)變成了 另外一個問題。 在致力于這個事實(shí)之前 ， 對非顯而易見性更 仔細(xì) 的 考察可能是有用的。 Is Nonobviousness a Special Case? 非顯而易見性是一個特殊的情形嗎？ Whatever the CAFC decides about the appropriate standard of review for nonobviousness, it ought also to address why that standard should differ from that applied to other validity requirements. While nonobviousness was the primary concern in Graham and panion cases, that decision calls validity a question of law. If the CAFC chooses to single out nonobviousness for special treatment, it should justify it’s approach. 無論 聯(lián)邦巡回法院 決定為 非顯而易見性決定 適當(dāng)?shù)膶彶闃?biāo)準(zhǔn)，它應(yīng)該也能解釋為何該標(biāo)準(zhǔn)應(yīng)有所區(qū)別 于 應(yīng)用到其他的有效性要求。雖然 非顯而易見性 是在 Graham案件和同樣的案件中 的主要 關(guān)注點(diǎn) ，該決定被稱為一個法律問題的有效性。如果聯(lián)邦巡回法院 選擇 對非顯而易見性進(jìn)行 特殊待遇 ， 應(yīng)該證明它的做法。 It might do so based on the origins of the nonobviousness requirement. Yet, even if nonobviousness had been found in Hotchkiss to be constitutionally mandated, an implicit requirement would hardly be more important than the utility requirement, which is about as explicit as the Constitution gets. Thus, even if the “constitutional fact” doctrine were used to justify more appellate review, nonobviousness would not stand out. 也許這樣做 是基于 非顯而易見性 要求的 起源。然而， 然而 ,盡管 非顯而易見性 已經(jīng) 被 發(fā)現(xiàn)在Hotchkiss 是具有憲法 ，一個隱含要求將很難超過 與憲法同樣明晰的 實(shí)用要求。因此，即使是 “憲 法 事實(shí) ”學(xué)說 被用于 辯護(hù) 更多的上訴 評審 ， 非顯而易見性也 不會脫穎而出。 The CAFC might al