【正文】 arning model inconsistent conclusions, the warning and even conflicting and conflict. The financial risks of enterprise39。s formation and alert in advance of appear often exist certain financial warning signs, it is the warning signs and warning signs of recognition of the need to scientific financial risk theory and wealthGame theory and countermeasures, and is a kind of strategic behavior analysis method. It is expected to consider the behavior of each other and the relationship between the way admitted. Game Theory by John von Newman and Oscar Morgan, 1944) (in their creative works, game Theory and Economic Behavior of Games and guys (have) first summarize Behavior for the Economic Theory, there are many economists to do a lot of work. Now already more and more game is applied to panies and government decision analysis, in all the decision makers for rational assumption that every decision makers to try to predict the petitor may actions and responses of optimal decision making. Generally speaking, a game elements include some of the game (bureau), human adopted the game by game strategies and the result of the decision. All sorts of gambling process is different, for example, each player in the game, other did not know how to do, and not to respond to each other39。s action under the condition of this game action, called oneoff game. In the actual operating environment, many game is not a onetime, but repeated, such as an enterprise established low price, the petitor may adopt the same strategy, because of this strategy is the damage of their own interests, therefore, the price to follow a bottom line, if the existing strategy game is infinite repetition, player may establish a mon protocols and make the game to stop.In economics, often see in the example is dominant strategy equilibrium. Due to the game process of each game strategies, each game relevance of optimal strategies depend on all other game of strategy. But in some particular game, a game the optimal strategy may not depend on other player strategies, namely, regardless of what the other game on the game, the strategies for selection of a particular strategy is always the optimal strategies, such as pure. Assume the market with two manufacturers are always full production, if the manufacturer to expand capacity, may get more market share, but will be facing the market price pressure. Each manufacturer are able to independently, if given decision making capacity of manufacturer for no strategy to expand capacity, then, in the decision, the manufacturer b not to expand capacity b will gain economic profits 180 million Yuan, to expand capacity b will gain economic profits of 200 million Yuan, visible, in this case, the manufacturer b will choose to expand capacity this decision, Similarly, when manufacturers of strategy determine to expand capacity, not a manufacturer will expand capacity in economic profit is million Yuan, will expand capacity in economic profit, manufacturers, 160 million Yuan will choose a expand capacity. In this example we don39。t understand the external environment, under the premise of decision is often from the point of view and benefit, not for others and social benefit, therefore, the enterprise in the decisionmaking process of external factors should be taken into consideration, the analysis of petitive power, based on the correct decision.在財務預警的定性研究方面，國內(nèi)外學者從引起企業(yè)危機發(fā)生發(fā)展的內(nèi)外各種因素進行了探討，對財務危機的各個階段進行了詳細的劃分和研究，對問題各個方面的分析都很深入。但從事定性研究的結(jié)論能夠直接和定量模型結(jié)合起來的還不多。如探討了影響企業(yè)財務困境的各種因素，但怎樣把這些因素用于財務預警模型中，進行這方面研究的人并不多見。國內(nèi)外研究簡評: 在國內(nèi)外現(xiàn)有的財務預警研究中,指標的選擇往往基于一般的財務理論、風險理論和管理理論，有時甚至取決于研究者的直觀判斷以及資料的可獲得性，眾多研究者還沒有找到令人信服的財務風險和預警理論來支撐所建立的預警模型,由此造成了各種財務預警模型的預警結(jié)論不一致，甚至相互矛盾和沖突。企業(yè)財務風險的形成和警情的出現(xiàn)往往在事前存在著一定的征兆，這就是財務預警的警兆,而警兆的識別需要以科學的財務風險理論衡量。博弈論又稱對策論，是一種分析戰(zhàn)略行為的方法。它要考慮預期的其他人的行為并彼此承認相互之間關聯(lián)性的方式。博弈論由約翰馮紐曼和奧斯卡摩根斯頓(1944.)在其創(chuàng)作性著作《博弈論與經(jīng)濟行為》(Theory of Games and Economic Behavior)中首先總結(jié)為經(jīng)濟理論的，此后有許多經(jīng)濟學家對此作了大量的工作。目前博弈論已越來越多地被應用于公司及政府決策分析，在所有決策者為理性假定下，每個決策者試圖預測競爭對手的可能行為和反應時的最優(yōu)決策制定。一般而言，一場博弈的要素包括一些博弈者(局中人)、博弈者所采取的策略、以及由博弈者的決策所導致的結(jié)果。各種博弈的過程是不同的，比如每個博弈者在不知道其他博弈者將如何做，以及沒有機會對對方的行動作出反應的情況下采取行動，這種博弈被稱為一次性博弈。在實際經(jīng)營環(huán)境中，很多博弈并非是一次性的，而是重復進行的，比如一家企業(yè)制定了低價格，其競爭者可能會采取同樣的策略，由于這種策略是損害自身利益的，因此，這種價格追隨策略存在一個底線，如果博弈是無限重復進行的，博弈者便可能建立某種共謀協(xié)議而使博弈停止。在經(jīng)濟學中經(jīng)常見到的例子是占優(yōu)策略均衡。由于博弈過程中各博弈者的策略具有相關性，因而每個博弈者的最優(yōu)策略選擇依賴于所有其他博弈者的策略選擇。但在一些特殊博弈中，一個博弈者的最優(yōu)策略可能并不依賴于其他博弈者的策略選擇，即不管其他博弈者選擇什么策略，對該博弈者而言選擇某一策略永遠是最優(yōu)的，這樣的策略稱為“占優(yōu)策略”。假設市場上有兩個廠商總是滿負荷生產(chǎn)，如果廠商擴大產(chǎn)能，也許會獲得更大的市場份額，但將會面臨市場降價壓力。每個廠商都能夠同時獨立地作出產(chǎn)能決策，如果給定廠商甲的戰(zhàn)略為“不擴大產(chǎn)能”，那么，在廠商乙的決策中，“不擴大產(chǎn)能”廠商乙將會獲得年經(jīng)濟利潤180萬元，“擴大產(chǎn)能”廠商乙將會獲得年經(jīng)濟利潤200萬元，可見，在這種情況下，廠商乙將選擇“擴大產(chǎn)能”這一決策；同理，當廠商乙的戰(zhàn)略確定為“擴大產(chǎn)能”，廠商甲“不擴大產(chǎn)能”將獲得年經(jīng)濟利潤150萬元，“擴大產(chǎn)能”將獲得年經(jīng)濟利潤160萬元，可見，廠商甲將選擇“擴大產(chǎn)能”。這個例子告誡我們：在不了解外部環(huán)境的前提下，決策往往是從利己的角度考慮而做出的，不會顧及他人和社會的利益，因此，企業(yè)在進行決策過程中要充分考慮外部因素影響，分析各種競爭力量，在此基礎上作出正確決