freepeople性欧美熟妇, 色戒完整版无删减158分钟hd, 无码精品国产vα在线观看DVD, 丰满少妇伦精品无码专区在线观看,艾栗栗与纹身男宾馆3p50分钟,国产AV片在线观看,黑人与美女高潮,18岁女RAPPERDISSSUBS,国产手机在机看影片

正文內(nèi)容

外文翻譯--治理機(jī)制與企業(yè)價(jià)值:股權(quán)集中度和紅利的影響-全文預(yù)覽

  

【正文】 m performance has also been reported from Australia. Lawrence and Stapledon(1999) found that independent directors do not appear to have added value to firms in the period 19851995. A similar result is reported by Cotter and Silvester(2020), who examine the largest 200 panies in 1997. In contrast, Bonn, Yoshikawa, and Phan(2020) reported that a higher proportion of independent directors on the board leads to stronger firm performance. Why are the findings on the relationship between board position and firm performance inconclusive? One possible explanation is that most of the corporate governance is both a result of the decisions made by previous directors and, itself a factor that potentially affects the choice of subsequent directors. Studies of boards often neglect this issue and therefore produce confusing results (Hermalin amp。 Jensen, 1983。 Klein, 1998。 Vishny, 1986) as well as have enough voting power to force management to act in the interest of shareholders(La Porta et al., 1999). Therefore, the classic ownermanager conflict described by Berle and Means(1932) should be lower in closelyheld firms than in widelyheld firms. The literature, however, suggests that bining ownership and control allows concentrated shareholders to exchange profits for private rents (., Bebchuk, 1999。 Young, 2020。 Vishny, 1997) define private benefits as “any value captured by those controlling the pany after the control contest and not shared among shareholders at large.” For example, the opportunity to engage in selfdealing and in taking corporate opportunities is regarded as private benefits of control. Furthermore, Shleifer and Vishny(1997) and La Porta et al.(2020) suggest that minority shareholder expropriation relates to insiders using the firm’s profits to their benefit rather than returning them to other shareholders. For example, insiders can simply steal or sell assets in the firms they control to another firm they own at below market prices. They can also divert corporate opportunities from the firm, appoint unqualified family members in managerial positions, or overpay executives. As such, ownership concentration can either mitigate or exacerbate agency problems and consequently may affect the position and effectiveness of the internal governance mechanisms. For example, to facilitate their opportunistic behavior large controlling shareholders may prefer boards and audit mittees that have fewer independent directors. Agency theorists also suggest independent directors can serve to protect minority shareholders against expropriation by large shareholders. Raheja(2020) hypothesizes that the optimal number of independent directors on the board increases as the private benefits to insiders increase. Indeed, Westphal(1998) suggests that since governance mechanisms in closelyheld firms are limited, minority shareholders potentially rely on their boards and their mittees to limit the controlling shareholder’s opportunism. Meanwhile, Anderson and Reeb(2020) argue that interests of minority shareholders are best protected when independent directors have greater power relative to extract rent for their private benefits are unlikely to assemble boards or audit mittees that can limit their control of firms, implying that a negative relation exists between ownership concentration and board and audit mittee independence. Empirical studies show that ownership concentration has a significant impact on board and audit mittee independence. For example, Anderson and Reeb(2020) report that family blockholders in large US firms prefer to limit independent director presence on the board. Kim, KitsabunnaratChatjuthamard, and Nofsinger(2020
點(diǎn)擊復(fù)制文檔內(nèi)容
畢業(yè)設(shè)計(jì)相關(guān)推薦
文庫(kù)吧 www.dybbs8.com
備案圖鄂ICP備17016276號(hào)-1