外文翻譯--治理機(jī)制與企業(yè)價(jià)值：股權(quán)集中度和紅利的影響-文庫吧
2025-04-17 06:28 本頁面
【正文】 it mittee in Australia. For example, Koh, Laphante, and Tong(2020) examine the twin roles of accountability and value enhancement of corporate governance in the context of financial reporting. The authors find that independent active audit mittees and independent boards are important governance mechanisms and value enhancing. Cotter and Silvester(2020), however, find no support for a positive relationship between audit mittee independence and firm value. Meanwhile, Psaros and Seamer(2020) report that the audit mittee independence of Australia’s largest 250 panies appears to have deteriorated between 1998 and 2020. The positive impact of an audit mittee on firm value may e from the role of the audit mittee in constraining earnings management. A number of studies provide support for this notion. For example, Davidson, Goodwin Stewart, and Kent(2020) show that a majority of nonexecutive directors on the audit mittee is associated with a lower likelihood of earnings management. Hsu and Koh(2020) find that a longterm oriented institution can act as a corporate governance mechanism to mitigate aggressive earnings management, while Chan, Faff, Mather, and Ramsay(2020) documented a positive relationship between the likelihood and frequency of firms issuing management earnings forecasts and audit mittee independence. Stewart and Munro(2020) show that the existence of an audit mittee is associated with a reduction in perceived audit risk. Finally, Krishnamoorthy, Wright, and Cohen(2020) and Chen, Carson, and Simt(2020) suggest that audit mittee plays an important role in enhancing financial reporting quality. Independent Directors, Audit Committee and Ownership Concentration The relation between ownership concentration and boards of directors can be explained by agency theory. Jensen and Meckling(1976) suggest that agency problems will be lower when the interests of agents(., managers) and principals(., shareholders) are more aligned through higher managerial share ownership. Agency problems between owners and managers relate to managerial consumption of perquisites, shirking, misallocation of pany funds, and entrenchment(Shleifer amp。 Vishny, 1997). The presence of blockholders may also enhance corporate governance. Since blockholders hold a significant percentage of firm equity, they have an incentive to collect information and monitor management (Shleifer amp。 Vishny, 1986) as well as have enough voting power to force management to act in the interest of shareholders(La Porta et al., 1999). Therefore, the classic ownermanager conflict described by Berle and Means(1932) should be lower in closelyheld firms than in widelyheld firms. The literature, however, suggests that bining ownership and control allows concentrated shareholders to exchange profits for private rents (., Bebchuk, 1999。 Bebchuk amp。 Kahan, 1990:1090。 Faccio, Lang, amp。 Young, 2020。 Fama amp。 Jensen, 1983。 Shleifer amp。 Vishny, 1997) define private benefits as “any value captured by those controlling the pany after the control contest and not shared among shareholders at large.” For example, the opportunity to engage in selfdealing and in taking corporate opportunities is regarded as private benefits of control. Furthermore, Shleifer and Vishny(1997) and La Porta et al.(2020) suggest that minority shareholder expropriation relates to insiders using the firm’s profits to their benefit rather than returning them to other shareholders. For example, insiders can simply steal or sell assets in the firms they control to another firm they own at below market prices. They can also divert corporate opportunities from the firm, appoint unqualified family members
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