英國(guó)小企業(yè)ceo薪酬與公司業(yè)績(jī)關(guān)系研討(文件)
【正文】 d to the understanding of managerial labour markets by assessing whether managers in small firms are disciplined for poor pany performance by increased probability of turnover.The rest of this paper is organised as follows。gt are time dummies to control for aggregate variations。 f 162。2 ? 0 (3)The idea is that the state of nature affects all firms and thus differences in relative performance reveal information about the manager’s effort. The issue is more plicated, however, since although it is not possible for a single firm to influence the macroeconomic environment, the level of exposure to different adverse shocks is a management decision. The design of the payment scheme should thus achieve the optimal tradeoff between risk and motivation.In the empirical analysis the interest is in identifying the relationship between pay and performance by estimating equations of the ln Wit = ai + b1 1n vi, t – 1 + b2 1n xi, t – 1+ gt 180。xi, t – 1 measures size, uit represents unobservable effects pertaining to both individual firms and time periods. The rest of the variables are as in equation (1) above.The performance and size variables are lagged by a year since we are interested in the sensitivity of remuneration to past achievements whereas the current value of size and performance is likely to be endogenous. That is, corporate performance could also be affected by pay. Additionally, since it is likely that the pay of the CEO is decided before the end of the current financial year this provides an additional rationale for using lagged right hand side variables.. The relationship between turnover and performanceThe relationship between pay and performance is only one way by which the shareholders can motivate management. Since, as noted in the introduction, the evidence for the . suggests that the link between pensation and performance has been at best weak, this has led to concerns that the incentive structure faced by managers at leading . panies in pursuing shareholders interests may not be effective. It is, however, possible to regulate management behaviour by other means. More specifically the owners could monitor management by making tenure a function of past performance.The proposition under scrutiny then is whether good performance is rewarded by reelecting the CEO and, vice versa, whether bad pany performance leads to replacement of the CEO. In other words the issue is whether the threat of dismissal could act as a discipline device (see Jensen and Murphy, 1990。 CEO wealth increases by $ for every $1000 increase in shareholder wealth.One of the disadvantages of the above studies is that stock options held by directors are not included in the measure of pensation. This could be biasing the relationship between pay and performance downwards as Main, Bruce and Buck (1996) show. Using data on 60 large panies from the 1990 FTSE 100 index they find that management remuneration is more sensitive to performance when the former is defined as
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