英國小企業(yè)ceo薪酬與公司業(yè)績關(guān)系研討-全文預(yù)覽
【正文】 to include the value of options. 原文不全12 / 12。The x vector includes a measure of average firm performance during the last p periods。 t + uit (4)where: ai represents firmspecific unobservable fixed effects。 f162。ui are unobservable firmspecific effects。W is CEO real pay。附件2:外文原文(復(fù)印件)Does the Market for Top Executives Work ?CEO Pay and Turnover in Small . CompaniesMartin J. ConyonDaphne NicolitsasABSTRACT. This paper presents the results of our investigation into the operation of the managerial labour market in small and medium sized manufacturing panies. Using a sample of some 40 or so panies we study the sensitivity of managerial pay and tenure to pany performance. Managerial pay in this type of firms is much lower than the six digit figures quoted for large public panies and CEO turnover is much higher than we expected. We find some evidence to suggest that pay in small panies is sensitive to sales growth and that CEO tenure in public panies responds to the growth in sales.1. IntroductionThe soaring pay of top executives has caused a public outcry in Britain, and rumblings of discontent in other countries. The real problem is not the level of salaries, but their failure to reflect performance. The Economist Newspaper, 3 June 1995 (Our emphasis added)Within the context of a market environment an upward trend in pay could be justified either by an upward shift of the labour demand curve with a constant labour supply curve, or by a shift to the left of the labour supply curve. The supply of suitably qualified managers has probably increased given the proliferation of management training and Business School courses. So the labour supply curve is likely to have shifted tothe right. Thus at least within a certain wage range there is an increase in the number of managers willing to do the job. For the demand curve to have shifted upwards the marginal product of managers must have increased。結(jié)果表明符合美國研究的結(jié)論。這項(xiàng)研究中的大樣本大多關(guān)系到上市公司。然后，現(xiàn)任首席執(zhí)行官的業(yè)績好，就獲得嘉獎(jiǎng)；業(yè)績差，就必須受到懲罰，也就意味著將重新選舉新的首席執(zhí)行官。換言之，CEO將面臨被解雇的威脅（見詹森，墨菲 1990。就像在引言中指出的一樣，在對(duì)英國的樣本研究中表明，英國一直關(guān)注股東利益的最大化條件下，薪酬和績效之間薄弱的聯(lián)系可能導(dǎo)致公司的激勵(lì)管理機(jī)制失效。自從我們這一年來的研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，業(yè)績與薪酬的關(guān)系越來越緊密，這很有可能他們之間存在著內(nèi)源性。通過對(duì)上面（1）公式的實(shí)證研究分析 ，可估算確定薪酬和績效之間的關(guān)系如下： ln Wit = ai + b1 1n vi, t – 1 + b2 1n xi, t – 1+ gt 180。1 0, f162。 W = f(Y)。it表示是由企業(yè)規(guī)模和時(shí)間帶來的無法預(yù)測的影響。這種假設(shè)已經(jīng)在對(duì)數(shù)形式的線性回歸模型研究中得到了驗(yàn)證： ln Wit =a + b 1n xit + gt + dj + ui + hit (1)其中：i表示該公司，t表示時(shí)間；W表示CEO實(shí)際薪酬。 企業(yè)規(guī)模與高管薪酬之間的關(guān)系從CEO是公司的最高管理員的角度講，羅森（1990）從高管經(jīng)營業(yè)績水平較低的實(shí)證研究中表明了高管的薪酬與組織規(guī)模大小的緊密關(guān)聯(lián)性。本文的其余部分組織如下：第２節(jié)進(jìn)行分析；第３節(jié)簡要介紹使用的數(shù)據(jù)，并提出管理人員的薪酬和公司規(guī)模關(guān)系的一些事實(shí)問題；第４節(jié)介紹使用的框架和性能；第５節(jié)介紹公司業(yè)績與薪酬之間的關(guān)系。受詹森和墨菲（1990）論文的影響，以美國大公司的數(shù)據(jù)為研究基礎(chǔ)，說明了提供統(tǒng)一的就業(yè)解雇規(guī)范化行為對(duì)管理人員和所有者造成了威脅。為了給“市場是否對(duì)高管期作用？”的問題提供一個(gè)答案，我們?cè)谶@里要探討以下方面：也就是我們機(jī)構(gòu)測試的雙重假設(shè)模式：（一）行政賠償和經(jīng)濟(jì)績效呈正相關(guān)；（二）業(yè)績?cè)讲畹墓?，其CEO更迭的可能性越大。而在對(duì)這個(gè)問題上，真正的關(guān)注點(diǎn)不在于薪金水平的高低，而是他們未能反映薪酬與業(yè)績之間的關(guān)系。在研究過程中我們使用大約40家的公司來作為研究薪酬與公司業(yè)績敏感性的樣本。 淮 陰 工
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