英國(guó)小企業(yè)ceo薪酬與公司業(yè)績(jī)關(guān)系研討-文庫(kù)吧在線文庫(kù)
【正文】 決定而導(dǎo)致。所以設(shè)W，一些業(yè)績(jī)表現(xiàn)；Y，特別是努力（e）和自然狀態(tài)（e）作用于CEO的薪酬（尤其見(jiàn)：哈特，1995函數(shù)）。因此，所期望的是有更多的管理信息是反映高管薪酬與企業(yè)規(guī)模大小是呈正相關(guān)的。然而，已發(fā)表的證據(jù)證明：在英國(guó)小企業(yè)中缺乏薪酬——業(yè)績(jī)關(guān)聯(lián)的執(zhí)行機(jī)制，此外，研究發(fā)現(xiàn)現(xiàn)實(shí)中存在大量比小公司更有效的相關(guān)數(shù)據(jù)。因?yàn)橛捎诠芾砼嘤?xùn)和商學(xué)院的課程擴(kuò)散，供應(yīng)給社會(huì)的合格管理人員人數(shù)就可能得以增加，勞動(dòng)供給曲線就有可能轉(zhuǎn)移到了右側(cè)，因此，在一定范圍內(nèi)至少有一個(gè)管理人員愿意增加工資的數(shù)量來(lái)做這項(xiàng)工作；而對(duì)于上移需求曲線時(shí)，管理人員的邊際產(chǎn)品必須增加，也就是說(shuō)，管理者必須要更加富有成效。年月日簽名： 注：請(qǐng)將該封面與附件裝訂成冊(cè)。在這類型的企業(yè)管理中首席執(zhí)行官的6位數(shù)薪酬遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)低于大型上市公司，但即使如此也比我們預(yù)期的要高很多。英國(guó)和美國(guó)同時(shí)對(duì)前一個(gè)命題進(jìn)行了測(cè)試，總的來(lái)說(shuō) ，使用的數(shù)據(jù)都來(lái)自大型上市公司。2 分析框架上世紀(jì)六十年代開始關(guān)注對(duì)高管薪酬的理論研究，但是隨著信息經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展，它只持續(xù)了一段時(shí)間。x表示衡量的大小，一般是由其總就業(yè)人數(shù)，實(shí)際資產(chǎn)總額或?qū)嶋H銷售組成。 f 162。 t + dj 180。然而，可以通過(guò)其他手段來(lái)規(guī)范管理行為。在第4部分和第5部分將使用數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)一步驗(yàn)證以證明上面的假設(shè)。詹森和墨菲（1990）有影響的論文中也報(bào)告說(shuō)，薪酬與績(jī)效之間的敏感度低，股東財(cái)富每增加1000美元CEO的財(cái)富增加 。x represents size measured, in general, by total employment, total real assets or real sales。1 0, f162。, and CEO characteristics, qkt, some of which are time invariant (. date of birth, nationality) and some of which are time varying (. alternative appointments, education).The expected sign on the performance measure is negative. That is good performance is rewarded by reelecting the current CEO and bad performance is ‘punished’ by bringing in a new CEO.Sections 4 and 5 use the data described next to test the above hypotheses.. Some recent evidence on pay and turnoverBelow we present a succinct review of some of the recent evidence, predominantly for the ., on executive pensation and management turnover to set the context within which to place our results. Conyon, Gregg and Machin (1995) review some of the recent evidence on directors’ pay in relation to corporate governance. Most of the studies reviewed relate to samples of large quoted panies. The main conclusion is that the estimated link between pensation of the highest paid director and market measures of pany performance is small. For instance, Gregg, Machin and Szymanski (1993) using a sample of 288 . quoted panies find an elasticity of pay to shareholder returns of for the period 1983– 88. Whereas for the same sample of firms over the period 1989–91 this elasticity is zero. The results appear consistent with the . evidence. The influential paper by Jensen and Murphy (1990) also reports a low sensitivity of pay to pany performance。vi, t – 1 represents some measure of performance (. profits per employee, accounting rates of return, shareholder rate of return, sales, firm profits relative to industry profits)。 andhit represents unobservable effects pertaining to both individual firms and time periods.. The relationship between pay and performanceIn modelling the pay of top executives we start with the presumption that managers’ effort is unobservable. Thus pay has to be linked with a performance measure which in turn is a function of effort. Thus W, the CEO’s pay is a function of some performance measure Y which, in turn, is a function of, inter alia, effort (e) and the state of nature (e) (see, inter alia, Hart, 1995). Where th‘state of nature’ represents both firmlevel and industrywide shocks.W =
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