英國小企業(yè)ceo薪酬與公司業(yè)績關(guān)系研討-文庫吧在線文庫
【正文】 決定而導(dǎo)致。所以設(shè)W，一些業(yè)績表現(xiàn)；Y，特別是努力（e）和自然狀態(tài)（e）作用于CEO的薪酬（尤其見：哈特，1995函數(shù)）。因此，所期望的是有更多的管理信息是反映高管薪酬與企業(yè)規(guī)模大小是呈正相關(guān)的。然而，已發(fā)表的證據(jù)證明：在英國小企業(yè)中缺乏薪酬——業(yè)績關(guān)聯(lián)的執(zhí)行機制，此外，研究發(fā)現(xiàn)現(xiàn)實中存在大量比小公司更有效的相關(guān)數(shù)據(jù)。因為由于管理培訓(xùn)和商學(xué)院的課程擴散，供應(yīng)給社會的合格管理人員人數(shù)就可能得以增加，勞動供給曲線就有可能轉(zhuǎn)移到了右側(cè)，因此，在一定范圍內(nèi)至少有一個管理人員愿意增加工資的數(shù)量來做這項工作；而對于上移需求曲線時，管理人員的邊際產(chǎn)品必須增加，也就是說，管理者必須要更加富有成效。年月日簽名： 注：請將該封面與附件裝訂成冊。在這類型的企業(yè)管理中首席執(zhí)行官的6位數(shù)薪酬遠遠低于大型上市公司，但即使如此也比我們預(yù)期的要高很多。英國和美國同時對前一個命題進行了測試，總的來說 ，使用的數(shù)據(jù)都來自大型上市公司。2 分析框架上世紀六十年代開始關(guān)注對高管薪酬的理論研究，但是隨著信息經(jīng)濟的發(fā)展，它只持續(xù)了一段時間。x表示衡量的大小，一般是由其總就業(yè)人數(shù)，實際資產(chǎn)總額或?qū)嶋H銷售組成。 f 162。 t + dj 180。然而，可以通過其他手段來規(guī)范管理行為。在第4部分和第5部分將使用數(shù)據(jù)進一步驗證以證明上面的假設(shè)。詹森和墨菲（1990）有影響的論文中也報告說，薪酬與績效之間的敏感度低，股東財富每增加1000美元CEO的財富增加 。x represents size measured, in general, by total employment, total real assets or real sales。1 0, f162。, and CEO characteristics, qkt, some of which are time invariant (. date of birth, nationality) and some of which are time varying (. alternative appointments, education).The expected sign on the performance measure is negative. That is good performance is rewarded by reelecting the current CEO and bad performance is ‘punished’ by bringing in a new CEO.Sections 4 and 5 use the data described next to test the above hypotheses.. Some recent evidence on pay and turnoverBelow we present a succinct review of some of the recent evidence, predominantly for the ., on executive pensation and management turnover to set the context within which to place our results. Conyon, Gregg and Machin (1995) review some of the recent evidence on directors’ pay in relation to corporate governance. Most of the studies reviewed relate to samples of large quoted panies. The main conclusion is that the estimated link between pensation of the highest paid director and market measures of pany performance is small. For instance, Gregg, Machin and Szymanski (1993) using a sample of 288 . quoted panies find an elasticity of pay to shareholder returns of for the period 1983– 88. Whereas for the same sample of firms over the period 1989–91 this elasticity is zero. The results appear consistent with the . evidence. The influential paper by Jensen and Murphy (1990) also reports a low sensitivity of pay to pany performance。vi, t – 1 represents some measure of performance (. profits per employee, accounting rates of return, shareholder rate of return, sales, firm profits relative to industry profits)。 andhit represents unobservable effects pertaining to both individual firms and time periods.. The relationship between pay and performanceIn modelling the pay of top executives we start with the presumption that managers’ effort is unobservable. Thus pay has to be linked with a performance measure which in turn is a function of effort. Thus W, the CEO’s pay is a function of some performance measure Y which, in turn, is a function of, inter alia, effort (e) and the state of nature (e) (see, inter alia, Hart, 1995). Where th‘state of nature’ represents both firmlevel and industrywide shocks.W =
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