【正文】 es from the 1990 FTSE 100 index they find that management remuneration is more sensitive to performance when the former is defined as to include the value of options. 原文不全12 / 12。 t + uit (4)where: ai represents firmspecific unobservable fixed effects。ui are unobservable firmspecific effects。附件2:外文原文(復(fù)印件)Does the Market for Top Executives Work ?CEO Pay and Turnover in Small . CompaniesMartin J. ConyonDaphne NicolitsasABSTRACT. This paper presents the results of our investigation into the operation of the managerial labour market in small and medium sized manufacturing panies. Using a sample of some 40 or so panies we study the sensitivity of managerial pay and tenure to pany performance. Managerial pay in this type of firms is much lower than the six digit figures quoted for large public panies and CEO turnover is much higher than we expected. We find some evidence to suggest that pay in small panies is sensitive to sales growth and that CEO tenure in public panies responds to the growth in sales.1. IntroductionThe soaring pay of top executives has caused a public outcry in Britain, and rumblings of discontent in other countries. The real problem is not the level of salaries, but their failure to reflect performance. The Economist Newspaper, 3 June 1995 (Our emphasis added)Within the context of a market environment an upward trend in pay could be justified either by an upward shift of the labour demand curve with a constant labour supply curve, or by a shift to the left of the labour supply curve. The supply of suitably qualified managers has probably increased given the proliferation of management training and Business School courses. So the labour supply curve is likely to have shifted tothe right. Thus at least within a certain wage range there is an increase in the number of managers willing to do the job. For the demand curve to have shifted upwards the marginal product of managers must have increased。這項(xiàng)研究中的大樣本大多關(guān)系到上市公司。換言之，CEO將面臨被解雇的威脅（見詹森，墨菲 1990。自從我們這一年來的研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，業(yè)績與薪酬的關(guān)系越來越緊密，這很有可能他們之間存在著內(nèi)源性。1 0, f162。it表示是由企業(yè)規(guī)模和時(shí)間帶來的無法預(yù)測的影響。 企業(yè)規(guī)模與高管薪酬之間的關(guān)系從CEO是公司的最高管理員的角度講，羅森（1990）從高管經(jīng)營業(yè)績水平較低的實(shí)證研究中表明了高管的薪酬與組織規(guī)模大小的緊密關(guān)聯(lián)性。受詹森和墨菲（1990）論文的影響，以美國大公司的數(shù)據(jù)為研究基礎(chǔ)，說明了提供統(tǒng)一的就業(yè)解雇規(guī)范化行為對管理人員和所有者造成了威脅。而在對這個(gè)問題上，真正的關(guān)注點(diǎn)不在于薪金水平的高低，而是他們未能反映薪酬與業(yè)績之間的關(guān)系。 淮 陰 工 學(xué) 院畢業(yè)設(shè)計(jì)(論文)外文資料翻譯系 （院）：經(jīng)濟(jì)管理學(xué)院專 業(yè)：財(cái)務(wù)管理姓 名：高施佳學(xué) 號：3062106438外文出處：+the+market+for+top+executi(用外文寫)ves+work%3f附 件：；。1 引言在英國，高級管理人員的工資上漲已經(jīng)引起社會公眾的輿論，同時(shí)也引起了其他國家的關(guān)注。其次，是創(chuàng)新CEO薪酬的焦點(diǎn)。本文以大量的工作理論為基礎(chǔ)，夠建了實(shí)證分析的框架。j表示假設(shè)某一行業(yè)的生產(chǎn)僅限于受企業(yè)規(guī)模大小控制；Ui表示企業(yè)受不確定性因素的影響。 f162。其余的變量在方程（1）段中已經(jīng)說明。 這個(gè)假設(shè)的結(jié)果是通過CEO輪換制來實(shí)現(xiàn)的：如果在任期間業(yè)績表現(xiàn)良好，那么應(yīng)該得到相應(yīng)回報(bào)，反之亦然，不管其他原因，公司業(yè)績差將直接導(dǎo)致首席執(zhí)行官的更換?？釟W，格雷格和梅欽（1995年）審查了關(guān)于董事支付與公司治理的一些最新數(shù)據(jù)。布魯斯和巴克（1996）使用1990年60家大公司的FTSE100指數(shù)進(jìn)行研究，他們發(fā)現(xiàn)，當(dāng)以包括期權(quán)的價(jià)值作為薪酬時(shí)，管理人員的薪酬與業(yè)績關(guān)系表現(xiàn)還是比較敏感的。dj are industry dummies to control for factors specific to the industry in which the firm belongs。 t + dj