英國(guó)小企業(yè)ceo薪酬與公司業(yè)績(jī)關(guān)系研討-文庫(kù)吧
2025-05-02 13:54 本頁(yè)面
【正文】 注股東利益的最大化條件下，薪酬和績(jī)效之間薄弱的聯(lián)系可能導(dǎo)致公司的激勵(lì)管理機(jī)制失效。然而，可以通過(guò)其他手段來(lái)規(guī)范管理行為。進(jìn)一步來(lái)說(shuō)，是所有者可以通過(guò)評(píng)價(jià)CEO在過(guò)去所作出的業(yè)績(jī)來(lái)進(jìn)行管理。 這個(gè)假設(shè)的結(jié)果是通過(guò)CEO輪換制來(lái)實(shí)現(xiàn)的：如果在任期間業(yè)績(jī)表現(xiàn)良好，那么應(yīng)該得到相應(yīng)回報(bào)，反之亦然，不管其他原因，公司業(yè)績(jī)差將直接導(dǎo)致首席執(zhí)行官的更換。換言之，CEO將面臨被解雇的威脅（見(jiàn)詹森，墨菲 1990。 威斯巴赫 1988）。一個(gè)基本的模式是如下的形式： Pr(DCEOit) = F(xb) =exp(xb)/(1 + exp xb) (5)其中：CEOit表示一位首席執(zhí)行官以新的或其他方式存在；在x向量中包括了在過(guò)去的P時(shí)期公司的平均表現(xiàn)； 加權(quán)是表示首席執(zhí)行官的特點(diǎn)，qkt,一些不隨時(shí)間變化的（如出生日期， 國(guó)籍）和有些是隨時(shí)間變化（如選擇任用，教育）的量。關(guān)于預(yù)期業(yè)績(jī)計(jì)量的符號(hào)為負(fù)。然后，現(xiàn)任首席執(zhí)行官的業(yè)績(jī)好，就獲得嘉獎(jiǎng)；業(yè)績(jī)差，就必須受到懲罰，也就意味著將重新選舉新的首席執(zhí)行官。在第4部分和第5部分將使用數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)一步驗(yàn)證以證明上面的假設(shè)。 最近的薪酬和營(yíng)業(yè)額的調(diào)查數(shù)據(jù)下面我們將提供一個(gè)最新研究數(shù)據(jù)，主要是關(guān)于英國(guó)薪酬和營(yíng)業(yè)額調(diào)查的研究，這有助于證明我們的研究結(jié)果?？釟W，格雷格和梅欽（1995年）審查了關(guān)于董事支付與公司治理的一些最新數(shù)據(jù)。這項(xiàng)研究中的大樣本大多關(guān)系到上市公司。研究得出的主要結(jié)論是：高收入的董事和其采取的公司治理措施，薪酬與個(gè)人業(yè)績(jī)聯(lián)系很少。例如，格雷格，梅欽和斯曼斯基（1993年）。而對(duì)于198991年期間相同的取樣結(jié)果顯示企業(yè)的這個(gè)彈性為零。結(jié)果表明符合美國(guó)研究的結(jié)論。詹森和墨菲（1990）有影響的論文中也報(bào)告說(shuō)，薪酬與績(jī)效之間的敏感度低，股東財(cái)富每增加1000美元CEO的財(cái)富增加 。在上述研究中存在著的一個(gè)不足之處就是：在表明業(yè)績(jī)向下的關(guān)系時(shí)，可能是因?yàn)槎聯(lián)蜟EO時(shí)股票期權(quán)是不算在薪酬尺度之內(nèi)引起的，這就說(shuō)明存在著薪酬的偏置區(qū)間。布魯斯和巴克（1996）使用1990年60家大公司的FTSE100指數(shù)進(jìn)行研究，他們發(fā)現(xiàn)，當(dāng)以包括期權(quán)的價(jià)值作為薪酬時(shí)，管理人員的薪酬與業(yè)績(jī)關(guān)系表現(xiàn)還是比較敏感的。附件2:外文原文(復(fù)印件)Does the Market for Top Executives Work ?CEO Pay and Turnover in Small . CompaniesMartin J. ConyonDaphne NicolitsasABSTRACT. This paper presents the results of our investigation into the operation of the managerial labour market in small and medium sized manufacturing panies. Using a sample of some 40 or so panies we study the sensitivity of managerial pay and tenure to pany performance. Managerial pay in this type of firms is much lower than the six digit figures quoted for large public panies and CEO turnover is much higher than we expected. We find some evidence to suggest that pay in small panies is sensitive to sales growth and that CEO tenure in public panies responds to the growth in sales.1. IntroductionThe soaring pay of top executives has caused a public outcry in Britain, and rumblings of discontent in other countries. The real problem is not the level of salaries, but their failure to reflect performance. The Economist Newspaper, 3 June 1995 (Our emphasis added)Within the context of a market environment an upward trend in pay could be justified either by an upward shift of the labour demand curve with a constant labour supply curve, or by a shift to the left of the labour supply curve. The supply of suitably qualified managers has probably increased given the proliferation of management training and Business School courses. So the labour supply curve is likely to have shifted tothe right. Thus at least within a certain wage range there is an increase in the number of managers willing to do the job. For the demand curve to have shifted upwards the marginal product of managers must have increased。 that is, managers must have bee more productive. Managers can increase their productivity either by controlling more resources or by controlling a constant amount of resources more effectively. We here address the following question: Does the market for top executive work? In order to provide an answer to this w
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