【正文】 f(Y)。 that is, managers must have bee more productive. Managers can increase their productivity either by controlling more resources or by controlling a constant amount of resources more effectively. We here address the following question: Does the market for top executive work? In order to provide an answer to this we test the twin predictions of the agency model that (i) executive pensation and economic performance are positively correlated and (ii) that poor pany performance results in a higher probability of CEO turnover. The former proposition has been tested for both the . and the . using, in general, data for large quoted panies. A recent review of this literature is presented in Conyon, Gregg and Machin (1995).This paper augments the . empirical literature on the determination of top pay by focusing on executive wage setting in small panies。研究得出的主要結(jié)論是：高收入的董事和其采取的公司治理措施，薪酬與個(gè)人業(yè)績(jī)聯(lián)系很少。 威斯巴赫 1988）。也就是說(shuō)，薪酬反作用于企業(yè)績(jī)效。2 ? 0 (3)思考過(guò)程是這樣的：由于是自然狀態(tài)下的企業(yè)，所以受管理者個(gè)人業(yè)績(jī)以外因素作用的差異程度就顯得相對(duì)較小，這樣也就更利于體現(xiàn)個(gè)人能力對(duì)企業(yè)的影響力程度。 薪酬和能力之間的關(guān)系在研究模型中，我們一開(kāi)始假設(shè)高管的個(gè)人能力對(duì)于高管薪酬的影響是不可預(yù)測(cè)的，可見(jiàn)，個(gè)人業(yè)績(jī)的表現(xiàn)過(guò)程對(duì)薪酬結(jié)構(gòu)是有很重要的影響的。我們對(duì)人才內(nèi)部結(jié)構(gòu)做出假設(shè)：CEO薪酬是與控制在每個(gè)層次（s）和對(duì)層（不適用若干層跨度增加）參與，這樣就更能提高個(gè)人層次對(duì)這種結(jié)構(gòu)的影響。他們發(fā)現(xiàn)：公司高管薪酬與業(yè)績(jī)關(guān)系比代理理論預(yù)測(cè)的更大。（經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家報(bào)紙，1995年6月3日）在合理的市場(chǎng)環(huán)境下，薪酬的上升趨勢(shì)，可以通過(guò)調(diào)整勞動(dòng)供給曲線來(lái)穩(wěn)定，也就是可通過(guò)左移或向上移動(dòng)勞動(dòng)供給曲線來(lái)實(shí)現(xiàn)。指導(dǎo)教師評(píng)語(yǔ)： 外文資料與課題相關(guān)性較強(qiáng)，翻譯符合原文意思，語(yǔ)言表達(dá)順暢，格式規(guī)范，符合外文翻譯要求。研究分析過(guò)程中，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)了一些數(shù)據(jù)，表明在小企業(yè)中任職期間的CEO薪酬與其自身業(yè)績(jī)相關(guān)，CEO薪酬與公司業(yè)績(jī)敏感性較強(qiáng)。本文強(qiáng)調(diào)了在過(guò)去研究中受到較少關(guān)注的問(wèn)題，英國(guó)小企業(yè)中就執(zhí)行確定工資為重點(diǎn)的薪酬戰(zhàn)略經(jīng)驗(yàn)（一個(gè)例外：斯托里，沃森，威尼司克，1995年）。從羅森（1990）的研究分析中可以找到所涉及問(wèn)題的最佳解釋和發(fā)展的模型。t表示假設(shè)的受時(shí)間控制的總變化量。 0 (2) Y = f(e, e)。 t + uit (4)其中：I 表示特定企業(yè)中固定不變的影響（常量）；vi, t – 1表示一些業(yè)績(jī)指標(biāo)（如每名雇員帶來(lái)的利潤(rùn)，會(huì)計(jì)收益率，股東回報(bào)率，銷(xiāo)售，企業(yè)的利潤(rùn)相對(duì)于行業(yè)的利潤(rùn)水平）；xi, t – 1 表示實(shí)施范圍，uit表示是有關(guān)企業(yè)和個(gè)人時(shí)期都無(wú)法觀察到的影響。進(jìn)一步來(lái)說(shuō)，是所有者可以通過(guò)評(píng)價(jià)CEO在過(guò)去所作出的業(yè)績(jī)來(lái)進(jìn)行管理。 最近的薪酬和營(yíng)業(yè)額的調(diào)查數(shù)據(jù)下面我們將提供一個(gè)最新研究數(shù)據(jù)，主要是關(guān)于英國(guó)薪酬和營(yíng)業(yè)額調(diào)查的研究，這有助于證明我們的研究結(jié)果。在上述研究中存在著的一個(gè)不足之處就是：在表明業(yè)績(jī)向下的關(guān)系時(shí)，可能是因?yàn)槎聯(lián)蜟EO時(shí)股票期權(quán)是不算在薪酬尺度之內(nèi)引起的，這就說(shuō)明存在著薪酬的偏置區(qū)間。gt are time dummies to control for aggregate variations。2 ? 0 (3)The idea is that the state of nature affects all firms and thus differences in relative performance reveal information about the manager’s effort. The issue is more plicated, however, since although it is not possible for a single firm to influence the macroeconomic environment, the level of exposure to different adverse shocks is a management decision. The design of the payment scheme should thus achieve the optimal tradeoff between risk and motivation.In the empirical analysis the interest is in identifying the relationship between pay and performance by estimating equations of the ln Wit = ai + b1 1n vi, t – 1 + b2 1n xi, t – 1+ gt 180。 CEO wealth increases by $ for every $1000 increase in shareholder wealth.One of the disadvantages of the above studies is that stock options held by directors are not included in the measure of pensation. This could be biasing the relationship between pay and performance downwards as Main, Bruce and Buck (1996) show. Using data on 60 large pani