英國小企業(yè)ceo薪酬與公司業(yè)績關(guān)系研討-預(yù)覽頁
【正文】 學(xué) 院畢業(yè)設(shè)計(jì)(論文)外文資料翻譯系 （院）：經(jīng)濟(jì)管理學(xué)院專 業(yè)：財(cái)務(wù)管理姓 名：高施佳學(xué) 號：3062106438外文出處：+the+market+for+top+executi(用外文寫)ves+work%3f附 件：；。 附件1：外文資料翻譯譯文 市場是否對高管有作用？——英國小企業(yè)CEO薪酬和公司業(yè)績關(guān)系研究Martin J. ConyonDaphne Nicolitsas摘要：本文介紹了我們對中小型制造業(yè)公司的勞動(dòng)力市場管理運(yùn)作情況的調(diào)查結(jié)果。1 引言在英國，高級管理人員的工資上漲已經(jīng)引起社會(huì)公眾的輿論，同時(shí)也引起了其他國家的關(guān)注。管理者為提高他們的生產(chǎn)力可以通過控制更多的資源或通過控制一個(gè)常數(shù)實(shí)現(xiàn)。其次，是創(chuàng)新CEO薪酬的焦點(diǎn)。目前的研究階段是希望通過增加對勞動(dòng)力市場管理紀(jì)律的了解，評估小公司的經(jīng)理在公司業(yè)績不佳的情況下，薪酬上漲的可能性。本文以大量的工作理論為基礎(chǔ)，夠建了實(shí)證分析的框架。（見羅森，1990）。j表示假設(shè)某一行業(yè)的生產(chǎn)僅限于受企業(yè)規(guī)模大小控制；Ui表示企業(yè)受不確定性因素的影響。其中，“自然狀態(tài)”表示大環(huán)境相近，即有類似的企業(yè)規(guī)模與生產(chǎn)力。 f162。所以，這個(gè)設(shè)計(jì)就應(yīng)該要達(dá)到薪酬結(jié)構(gòu)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的權(quán)衡和激勵(lì)的最佳狀態(tài)兩方面的要求。其余的變量在方程（1）段中已經(jīng)說明。 營業(yè)額與業(yè)績之間的關(guān)系股東可以通過利用薪酬與績效之間的關(guān)系，進(jìn)行激勵(lì)管理。 這個(gè)假設(shè)的結(jié)果是通過CEO輪換制來實(shí)現(xiàn)的：如果在任期間業(yè)績表現(xiàn)良好，那么應(yīng)該得到相應(yīng)回報(bào)，反之亦然，不管其他原因，公司業(yè)績差將直接導(dǎo)致首席執(zhí)行官的更換。關(guān)于預(yù)期業(yè)績計(jì)量的符號為負(fù)?？釟W，格雷格和梅欽（1995年）審查了關(guān)于董事支付與公司治理的一些最新數(shù)據(jù)。而對于198991年期間相同的取樣結(jié)果顯示企業(yè)的這個(gè)彈性為零。布魯斯和巴克（1996）使用1990年60家大公司的FTSE100指數(shù)進(jìn)行研究，他們發(fā)現(xiàn)，當(dāng)以包括期權(quán)的價(jià)值作為薪酬時(shí)，管理人員的薪酬與業(yè)績關(guān)系表現(xiàn)還是比較敏感的。 Section 2 sets out the framework used in the analysis, Section 3 briefly describes the data used and presents some facts on the issues of interest, Section 4 looks at the relationship between management pay and pany size and performance. Section 5 presents information on the relationship between turnover and pany performance. Section 6 concludes.2. A framework for analysisTheoretical interest in the market for top executives started in the 1960s but only took off recently in the last decade or so following developments in information economics. The best exposition of the issues involved and the development of the appropriate models can be found in Rosen (1990). This section draws heavily on this work to outline the theoretical framework which forms the basis for the empirical analysis.. The relationship between executive pay and firm sizeStarting from the premise that firms are organized in a hierarchical structure with the CEO at the top, Rosen (1990) has shown that executive pay and organisation size are positively correlated since the marginal product of the CEO is reproduced at each lower level. Assuming that the distribution of talent is such that more able individuals are higher up the hierarchy the implications of this structure are that CEO pay is increasing with the span of control at each layer of the hierarchy (s) and the number of layers (n) involved. So, the expectation is that executive pensation and pany size are positively correlated reflecting the greater managerial talent of those at the apex of the pany (see Rosen, 1990).In empirical work this hypothesis has been investigated using loglinear regressions of the form.Ln Wit =a + b 1n xit + gt + dj + ui + hit (1)where:i represents the firm, and t the year。dj are industry dummies to control for factors specific to the industry in which the firm belongs。 0 (2)Y = f(e, e)。 t + dj 180。 Weisbach, 1988).A basic model is thus of the form:Pr(DCEOit) = F(xb) =exp(xb)/(1 + exp xb) (5)where:DCEOit indicates the presence or otherwise of a new
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