英國(guó)小企業(yè)ceo薪酬與公司業(yè)績(jī)關(guān)系研討(存儲(chǔ)版)
【正文】 首席執(zhí)行官。結(jié)果表明符合美國(guó)研究的結(jié)論。W is CEO real pay。 f162。The x vector includes a measure of average firm performance during the last p periods。xi, t – 1 measures size, uit represents unobservable effects pertaining to both individual firms and time periods. The rest of the variables are as in equation (1) above.The performance and size variables are lagged by a year since we are interested in the sensitivity of remuneration to past achievements whereas the current value of size and performance is likely to be endogenous. That is, corporate performance could also be affected by pay. Additionally, since it is likely that the pay of the CEO is decided before the end of the current financial year this provides an additional rationale for using lagged right hand side variables.. The relationship between turnover and performanceThe relationship between pay and performance is only one way by which the shareholders can motivate management. Since, as noted in the introduction, the evidence for the . suggests that the link between pensation and performance has been at best weak, this has led to concerns that the incentive structure faced by managers at leading . panies in pursuing shareholders interests may not be effective. It is, however, possible to regulate management behaviour by other means. More specifically the owners could monitor management by making tenure a function of past performance.The proposition under scrutiny then is whether good performance is rewarded by reelecting the CEO and, vice versa, whether bad pany performance leads to replacement of the CEO. In other words the issue is whether the threat of dismissal could act as a discipline device (see Jensen and Murphy, 1990。 f 162。 an area that has received paratively little attention (an exception is Storey, Watson and Wynarczyk, 1995). The second innovation herein is the focus on CEO turnover. The influential paper by Jensen and Murphy (1990), based on data for large . firms, illustrates that the discipline provided by the threat of job dismissal acts to align the objectives of managers and owners. They find that management turnover is greater in panies with poor economic performance as predicted by the agency theory. There is, however, a paucity of published evidence on the executive turnover mechanism in . panies. Furthermore, the studies that do exist relate to large rather than small firms (see Cosh and Hughes, 1995).The current paper hopes to add to the understanding of managerial labour markets by assessing whether managers in small firms are disciplined for poor pany performance by increased probability of turnover.The rest of this paper is organised as follows。例如，格雷格，梅欽和斯曼斯基（1993年）。一個(gè)基本的模式是如下的形式： Pr(DCEOit) = F(xb) =exp(xb)/(1 + exp xb) (5)其中：CEOit表示一位首席執(zhí)行官以新的或其他方式存在；在x向量中包括了在過(guò)去的P時(shí)期公司的平均表現(xiàn)； 加權(quán)是表示首席執(zhí)行官的特點(diǎn)，qkt,一些不隨時(shí)間變化的（如出生日期， 國(guó)籍）和有些是隨時(shí)間變化（如選擇任用，教育）的量。此外，也可能是CEO的薪酬決策是在本財(cái)政年度結(jié)束之前決定，這就表明了利用右移變量可以使得內(nèi)部更合理化。但是這個(gè)問(wèn)題比較復(fù)雜，因?yàn)榧词鼓骋粋€(gè)行業(yè)可能受到宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)環(huán)境影響程度類似，但接觸不利沖擊的程度的大小卻是一個(gè)由不同管理
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