英國小企業(yè)ceo薪酬與公司業(yè)績關(guān)系研討-免費(fèi)閱讀
【正文】 Weisbach, 1988).A basic model is thus of the form:Pr(DCEOit) = F(xb) =exp(xb)/(1 + exp xb) (5)where:DCEOit indicates the presence or otherwise of a new CEO。 0 (2)Y = f(e, e)。 Section 2 sets out the framework used in the analysis, Section 3 briefly describes the data used and presents some facts on the issues of interest, Section 4 looks at the relationship between management pay and pany size and performance. Section 5 presents information on the relationship between turnover and pany performance. Section 6 concludes.2. A framework for analysisTheoretical interest in the market for top executives started in the 1960s but only took off recently in the last decade or so following developments in information economics. The best exposition of the issues involved and the development of the appropriate models can be found in Rosen (1990). This section draws heavily on this work to outline the theoretical framework which forms the basis for the empirical analysis.. The relationship between executive pay and firm sizeStarting from the premise that firms are organized in a hierarchical structure with the CEO at the top, Rosen (1990) has shown that executive pay and organisation size are positively correlated since the marginal product of the CEO is reproduced at each lower level. Assuming that the distribution of talent is such that more able individuals are higher up the hierarchy the implications of this structure are that CEO pay is increasing with the span of control at each layer of the hierarchy (s) and the number of layers (n) involved. So, the expectation is that executive pensation and pany size are positively correlated reflecting the greater managerial talent of those at the apex of the pany (see Rosen, 1990).In empirical work this hypothesis has been investigated using loglinear regressions of the form.Ln Wit =a + b 1n xit + gt + dj + ui + hit (1)where:i represents the firm, and t the year。而對(duì)于198991年期間相同的取樣結(jié)果顯示企業(yè)的這個(gè)彈性為零。關(guān)于預(yù)期業(yè)績計(jì)量的符號(hào)為負(fù)。 營業(yè)額與業(yè)績之間的關(guān)系股東可以通過利用薪酬與績效之間的關(guān)系，進(jìn)行激勵(lì)管理。所以，這個(gè)設(shè)計(jì)就應(yīng)該要達(dá)到薪酬結(jié)構(gòu)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的權(quán)衡和激勵(lì)的最佳狀態(tài)兩方面的要求。其中，“自然狀態(tài)”表示大環(huán)境相近，即有類似的企業(yè)規(guī)模與生產(chǎn)力。（見羅森，1990）。目前的研究階段是希望通過增加對(duì)勞動(dòng)力市場管理紀(jì)律的了解，評(píng)估小公司的經(jīng)理在公司業(yè)績不佳的情況下，薪酬上漲的可能性。管理者為提高他們的生產(chǎn)力可以通過控制更多的資源或通過控制一個(gè)常數(shù)實(shí)現(xiàn)。 附件1：外文資料翻譯譯文 市場是否對(duì)高管有作用？——英國小企業(yè)CEO薪酬和公司業(yè)績關(guān)系研究Martin J. ConyonDaphne Nicolitsas摘要：本文介紹了我們對(duì)中小型制造業(yè)公司的勞動(dòng)力市場管理運(yùn)作情況的調(diào)查結(jié)果。在研究過程中我們使用大約40家的公司來作為研究薪酬與公司業(yè)績敏感性的樣本。為了給“市場是否對(duì)高管期作用？”的問題提供一個(gè)答案，我們?cè)谶@里要探討以下方面：也就是我們機(jī)構(gòu)測試的雙重假設(shè)模式：（一）行政賠償和經(jīng)濟(jì)績效呈正相關(guān)；（二）業(yè)績?cè)讲畹墓?，其CEO更迭的可能性越大。本文的其余部分組織如下：第２節(jié)進(jìn)行分析；第３節(jié)簡要介紹使用的數(shù)據(jù)，并提出管理人員的薪酬和公司規(guī)模關(guān)系的一些事實(shí)問題；第４節(jié)介紹使用的框架和性能；第５節(jié)介紹公司業(yè)績與薪酬之間的關(guān)系。這種假設(shè)已經(jīng)在對(duì)數(shù)形式的線性回歸模型研究中得到了驗(yàn)證： ln Wit =a + b 1n xit + gt + dj + ui + hit (1)其中：i表示該公司，t表示時(shí)間；W表示CEO實(shí)際薪酬。 W = f(Y)。通過對(duì)上面（1）公式的實(shí)證研究分析 ，可估算確定薪酬和績效之間的關(guān)系如下： ln Wit = ai + b1 1n vi, t – 1 + b2 1n xi, t – 1+ gt 180。就像在引言中指出的一樣，在對(duì)英國的樣本研究中表明，英國一直關(guān)注股東利益的最大化條件下，薪酬和績效之間薄弱的聯(lián)系可能導(dǎo)致公司的激勵(lì)管理機(jī)制失效。然后，現(xiàn)任首席執(zhí)行官的業(yè)績好，就獲得嘉獎(jiǎng)；業(yè)績差，就必須受到懲罰，也就意味著將重新選舉新的
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