【正文】
cost (maximum cost to pay for an information system to reveal the agent’s effort level). ? But the most fundamental problem is that this type of contracts violates the “risk adverse” nature of the agent. Now the agent bees the principal! 學(xué)知網(wǎng)( )專注于提供優(yōu)質(zhì)的 管理培訓(xùn) 課程與服務(wù) 20 Incentive Compatible Contract – Problem Setup Maximize (55,000 – R55)Φ55(e1) + (40,000R40)Φ40 (e1) Subject to: R55189。)32,750]25= E3=4 [(55,000189。)32,750]36= E2=5 [(55,000189。 42 = 112 Is it likely to have the “adverse selection” problem? How about the “moral hazard” problem? And, the horizon problem? Residual loss? 學(xué)知網(wǎng)( )專注于提供優(yōu)質(zhì)的 管理培訓(xùn) 課程與服務(wù) 17 What can we say, up to this point? ? Under condition of unobservability (inplete information), fixed payments to agents (. workers, employees) most likely do not work. ? What are then the alternatives? ? We can give the principal a fixed payment instead. ? Or, we can e up with an “incentive patible” conditional contract. 學(xué)知網(wǎng)( )專注于提供優(yōu)質(zhì)的 管理培訓(xùn) 課程與服務(wù) 18 Fixed Payment to the Principal Consider this new contract under which the principal gets $32,750 no matter what happens and the agent keeps the rest. Will this work? Effort level Expected payoff to the agent E1=6 [(55,000189。 62 = 100 E2=5 18,496189。 學(xué)知網(wǎng)( )專注于提供優(yōu)質(zhì)的 管理培訓(xùn) 課程與服務(wù) 11 Agency Costs ? Bonding costs – costs incurred, before entering the contract, to convince the principal that such agency relationship will not result in the abovementioned agency problems. Examples are: reputation building, 3rd party guarantor, etc. 學(xué)知網(wǎng)( )專注于提供優(yōu)質(zhì)的 管理培訓(xùn) 課程與服務(wù) 12 Agency Costs ? Monitoring costs – costs incurred, after entering the contract, to ensure that such agency problems will not arise. Examples include auditing and inspection costs. 學(xué)知網(wǎng)( )專注于提供優(yōu)質(zhì)的 管理培訓(xùn) 課程與服務(wù) 13 Agency Costs ? Residual loss – loss unavoidably arise, despite the bonding and monitor