經(jīng)理人掠奪視角的薪酬合約設(shè)計(jì)：承諾價值和外部法律環(huán)境的影響(參考版)
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【正文】 10 / 10。Burkart, Mike, Gromb, Denis, and Panunzi, Fausto, “Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and The Value of the Firm.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics (August 1997): 963728.Core, John and Wayne Guay, 2001, “Stock Option Plans for NonExecutive Employees”, Journal of Financial Economics. 61:2, pp. 25387.Cyert, Richard, SokHyon Kang and Praveen Kumar, 2002, “Corporate Governance, Takeovers, and Topmanagement Compensation: Theory and Evidence.” Management :4, pp. 45369.Demsetz, Harold, “The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm.” Journal of Law and Economics 26 (June 1983): 37590.Dyck, Aleexander and Luigi Zingales, 2002, “Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison,” NBER Working Paper 8711.Hall, Brian J. and Kevin J. Murphy, 2003, “The Trouble with Stock Options”, Journal of Economic Perspectives 17:3, .Hartzell, Jay C. and Laura T. Starks, 2002, “Institutional Investors and Executive Compensation.” Working paper, New York University Stern School of Business.Holmstrom Bengt, 1979, “Moral Hazard and Observability.” Bell Journal of Economics 10, Spring pp. 7491.Holmstrom, B. and P. Milgrom, 1987, “Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives”, Econometrica 55: 30328.Jensen, Michael C., and Meckling, William H., “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure.” Journal of Financial Economics 3 (1976): 305360.La Porta, Rafael, Lopezdesilanes, Florencio, Shleifer, Andrei, and Vishny, Robert, “Investor Protection and Corporate Governance.” Journal of Financial Economics 58 (2000): 327.Mirrlees, James A., 1976, “The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority within an Organization.” Bell Journal of Economics, 7, Spring, 105131.Morck，Randall, Daniel Wolfenzon and Bernard Yeung，2005, “Corporate Governance, Economic Entrenchment and Growth”, NBER Working paper.Murphy, Kevin J. 1999, “Executive Compensation,” in Handbook of Labor Economics Volume IIIb, Amsterdam: North Holland.North D. and B. Weingast, 1989, “Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenthcentury England”, Journal of Economic History 49,4: 803832.Stulz, Rene M., 1988, “Managerial Control of Voting Rights.” Journal of Financial Economics 20: 2554.Volpin, Paolo F., 2000, “Ownership Structure, Banks, and Private Benefits of Control”, Bondon Business School Working paper.白重恩、劉俏、陸洲、宋敏和張俊喜，2005，“中國上市公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)的實(shí)證研究”，《經(jīng)濟(jì)研究》第2期，8191。首先，要采取其他輔助手段（如指數(shù)化股票期權(quán)、提高公司內(nèi)部人股票交易活動的信息的透明度；推行長期的股票薪酬合約等）避免股權(quán)激勵的負(fù)面效應(yīng)，以發(fā)揮經(jīng)理人持股的承諾價值；其次，在進(jìn)行經(jīng)理人持股的薪酬合約設(shè)計(jì)時要以避免導(dǎo)致經(jīng)理人的盤踞為限；最后，通過建立與健全包括公司控制權(quán)市場在內(nèi)的外部環(huán)境來提高內(nèi)部治理機(jī)制效率，從而克服經(jīng)理人權(quán)力和租掠奪對經(jīng)理人薪酬合約設(shè)計(jì)的影響。特別地，當(dāng)法律對投資者利益保護(hù)越弱時，外部投資者應(yīng)該允許的經(jīng)理人最優(yōu)持股比例越高。除了最優(yōu)合約理論所指出的經(jīng)理人持股（股票或股票期權(quán)）的激勵作用外，從發(fā)揮經(jīng)理人持股的承諾價值出發(fā)，我們不應(yīng)忽略經(jīng)理人持股對于降低經(jīng)理人對投資者利益的掠奪所發(fā)揮的重要作用。顯然，對于公司治理實(shí)踐中通常出現(xiàn)的經(jīng)理人持股行為，其存在的合理性不僅僅在于向經(jīng)理人提供降低道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)行為的激勵，還在于其所具有的降低經(jīng)理人對外部投資者利益掠奪的承諾價值。進(jìn)一步考察外部法律環(huán)境（法律對投資者利益的保護(hù)程度）對經(jīng)理人薪酬設(shè)計(jì)的影響，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，如果法律對投資者利益保護(hù)越弱，外部投資者應(yīng)該允許的經(jīng)理人最優(yōu)持股比例越高。本文一方面與最優(yōu)合約理論強(qiáng)調(diào)經(jīng)理人偷懶對投資者利益
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