【導(dǎo)讀】及取得的研究成果。據(jù)我所知，除文中已經(jīng)注明引用的內(nèi)容外，本論文（設(shè)。計(jì)）不包含其他個(gè)人已經(jīng)發(fā)表或撰寫(xiě)過(guò)的研究成果。研究做出重要貢獻(xiàn)的個(gè)人和集體，均已在文中作了明確說(shuō)明并表示謝意。有權(quán)將論文（設(shè)計(jì)）用于非贏利目的的少量復(fù)制并允許論。文（設(shè)計(jì)）進(jìn)入學(xué)校圖書(shū)館被查閱。保密的論文（設(shè)計(jì)）在解密后適用本規(guī)定。論文正文字?jǐn)?shù)不少于萬(wàn)字。證研究[J].中國(guó)工業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)，20xx，:80一87.[10]張傳洲.中小企業(yè)股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、成長(zhǎng)性、績(jī)效與資本結(jié)構(gòu)的研究[J].統(tǒng)計(jì)教育，20xx，7.[11]包新亭.中小企業(yè)板上市公司股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與公司績(jī)效研究[D].廈門(mén)：廈門(mén)大學(xué)，20xx.[12]姜碩，莊新田，陸培明.中國(guó)上市公司股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與經(jīng)營(yíng)績(jī)效實(shí)證研究[J].東北大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào)，20xx，[13]阮梓坪，汪睿.中小企業(yè)股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與公司治理績(jī)效研究一基于委托代理理論解釋的實(shí)證研究[J].中國(guó)管理信息化，20xx，:52一55.[15]陳德萍，陳永圣.股權(quán)集中度、股權(quán)制衡度與公司績(jī)效關(guān)系研究[J].會(huì)計(jì)研究，20xx，：38-43.

　　

【正文】 ts allocation. I focus on all nonfinancial panies traded on the Warsaw Stock Exchange since its inception in 1991 up to 20xx. The ownership structure of these panies bees more dispersed with the number of years of listing. The results give support to the hypothesis that firms belonging to the sector of high technology have lower ownership concentration than firms in more ?mature? industries. The positive impact of ownership concentration on firm value detected in OLS regressions bees even stronger when we control for the endogeneity of ownership. Keywords : Ownership structure, corporate governance, uncertainty, knowledge economy What are the characteristics of?good?ownership structure?Does ownership structure matter for firm performance?Why certain firms have large block holders and others do not?Should the power of large shareholders be limited to avoid expropriation or enc ouraged to curb managerial discretion?These questions have been largely explored in corporate finance literature and we understand better now the intricacies of the relationship between ownership structure and firmperformance. But empirical evidence on the impact of shareholders with significant equity holdings on corporate performance remains authors using different samples of firms and different empirical strategies obtain different,difficult to pare and sometimes contradictory is increasingly recognized that the problem in disentangling this relationship is largely due to the pervasive endogeneity of ownership which has to be taken into account in order to obtain unbiased the existing empirical evidence also suggests that the relationship between ownership and performance may depend on the type of the firm and on the period of observation in the life of the firm. The purpose of this paper is to explore more in details the determinants of ownership concentration and the relationship between ownership structure and firm value in the context of an economy undergoing important changes in its legal and regulatory frame work,in macroeconomic policy and most of all,in its property rights a panel of firms listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange(WSE)offers an unusual opportunity for this kind of investigation. The Polish economy was exposed to radical institutional changes in the strategy in Poland was strongly influenced by the willingness to create appropriate ownership structure in privatized firms, ensure that powerful block holders control the large portion of stateowned enterprises was privatized and the conditions for entry of new firms were signific antly of the privatized and newly created 湖南涉外經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院本科生畢業(yè)論文 (設(shè)計(jì) ) 17 firms have entered the stock exchange established in firms are likely to show a lot of ownership structure is likely to be determined by the firm origin and for privatized firms by the method of firms,when they bee listed on the stock exchange are likely to have,at least during the initial years of listing,more concentrated ownership structure than privatized ,new firms established by their founders in a market friendly environment may require less ownership,financial and industrial restructuring than previously stateowned enterprises. The sensitivity of firm performance to firm ownership structure is likely to vary across may also undergo important changes over firms are listed on the stock exchange,reallocation of ownership stakes bees greatly first part of this paper is devoted to the exploration of the determinants of ownership to understand why certain firms have large owners and others have dispersed ownership structure,I build on the extant literature and notably on Demsetz and Lehn (1985)and Himmelberg et al.(1999).The contribution of my paper to the literature consists in taking into account the importance of knowledge related activities. The idea is that analyzing the relationship between managers and shareholders requires different perspectives in firms belonging to the sector of“new economy”than in firms belonging to more traditional industries4 (Audretsch and Lehmann,20xx).In more?mature?industries,it can be assumed that it is well understood what should be done and how and it is important to make sure that managers implement efficiently the objectives agreed such conditions,the dominant concern is indeed about managerial shirking,laziness and laxity(Marshall,1923).Such concern motivates the importance and high value of firms with strong human capital ponent,it is less clear what is the right strategy or the right managers to do a particular thing may be costly since shareholders may not know what the best thing to do such highly uncertain environment,(?uncertain?in the sense of Knight),the crucial issue is less to make sure that the agentmanager realizes a given objective with a maximum effort than to incite the manager to search for the best project. Managers are more likely to show initiative if they have some latitude to make effort and undertake innovative Aghion and Tirole(1997)concentrated ownership provides incentives to monitor,but it also reduces the manager?s initiative or incentive to acquire the importance of managerial initiative is at the heart of the theory of Burkart et al.(1997).They argue that increased monitoring by shareholders may be costly because it may depress initiative displayed by managers:managers are less likely to be active if they know that shareholders are likely to too much monitoring may negatively 湖南涉外經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院本科生畢業(yè)論文 (設(shè)計(jì) ) 18 affect managerial initiative and profitable investment opportunities will be lost. Burkart et al.(1997) view firm ownership structure as an instrument to solve the tradeoff between control and more dispersed ownership structure shareholders mit themselves to weaker intervention which makes managers confident enough that they will not b