【正文】 0億，總經(jīng)費(fèi)由央行注入可能高達(dá)人民幣165億。正如一些貧困地區(qū)可以享受一些更多的優(yōu)惠，據(jù)估計(jì)，所需的總資金將人民幣1688億，其中人民幣1679億將專項(xiàng)票據(jù)和人民幣8億3千萬是從中央專項(xiàng)再貸款銀行。到2005年年中，包括在實(shí)驗(yàn)區(qū)已獲得央行票據(jù)人民幣985億的兩批29個(gè)省份。改革的局限性雖然改革已經(jīng)實(shí)施了一段短時(shí)間，一些初步的指標(biāo)顯示，農(nóng)村信用社的財(cái)務(wù)已經(jīng)取得了進(jìn)展在。然而，農(nóng)村信用社從長遠(yuǎn)來表現(xiàn)來看，很大程度上取決于新系統(tǒng)是如何工作的。不幸的是，在改革的新一波仍未解決一些根本性的問題。在改革過程中，省級政府的行為似乎證明這種擔(dān)心。一些研究人員已經(jīng)發(fā)現(xiàn)，已經(jīng)有實(shí)驗(yàn)地區(qū)的農(nóng)村信用社的治理結(jié)構(gòu)沒有顯著變化。相反，省級政府試圖鞏固權(quán)力決定自己動手。指定為首批實(shí)驗(yàn)區(qū)的八個(gè)省份都選擇成立一個(gè)聯(lián)社。正如沈（2004年）指出，在每個(gè)省，縣級聯(lián)社是省聯(lián)社的股東，但實(shí)際上后者管理前者的權(quán)力。例如，縣級聯(lián)社的董事均由省聯(lián)社任命。在這種權(quán)力結(jié)構(gòu)，省聯(lián)社可以很容易地為省級政府汽車獲得廉價(jià)信貸。沈（2004）甚至警告說，省級聯(lián)社規(guī)模的道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的問題可能很容易產(chǎn)生，因?yàn)樗麄兛赡苁恰疤蠖荒艿归]”。結(jié)語在前面的章節(jié)中，我們已經(jīng)討論了在不同階段的農(nóng)村信用社中國改革。正如我們在本文的開頭，在中國建立一個(gè)健康的農(nóng)村金融體系不是一件容易的事。盡管多次嘗試，農(nóng)村信用社，以及其他農(nóng)村金融機(jī)構(gòu)，仍然感到困惑的各種問題。似乎有沒有簡單明了的解決方案，這些困難。這大概就是為什么中央政府允許各省嘗試更多。有些人認(rèn)為，如果不同區(qū)域采用不同的模型，它們之間的競爭將使最佳模式出現(xiàn)。第一輪改革實(shí)驗(yàn)中的八個(gè)指定的省份之一批評是單一模式的選擇在這些省份，也就是說，一個(gè)省聯(lián)社管理農(nóng)信社系統(tǒng)（沈2004）的形成。在這一過程中，省級政府有效地抑制模型可能適合不同的縣（市）的所有其他可能的選擇。這可能是太早取得近期改革的最終評價(jià)。然而，以確保各項(xiàng)改革模式可以與進(jìn)行實(shí)驗(yàn)，尤其是當(dāng)改革擴(kuò)展到另外的二十一省是中央政府重要。最后，中央決策者也應(yīng)謹(jǐn)慎看待被劫持到在改革進(jìn)程中注入越來越多的資金進(jìn)入農(nóng)村信用社的可能性附錄B 譯文原文China’s Reform of Rural Credit CooperativesProgress and LimitationsSince rural reforms were launched in 1978, the Chinese government has been searching for a new financial system that can facilitate the development of the rural economy. Several factors have rendered financial development in rural areas necessary. The marketoriented reforms have freed rural households from the control of the people’s mune. Being independent producers, they need credits from financial institutions for agricultural activities. The expansion of nonagricultural activities, typically organized by township and village enterprises, also fueled the demand for loans in rural areas. Furthermore, without the pooling of production risks of the collective, some peasant households also need to borrow against the future when adverse shocks occur.However, establishing a rural financial system that is suitable for China is a plicated task. There are hundreds of millions of rural households and millions of small and mediumsized enterprises scattered in large rural areas with poor transportation and munication infrastructure. Moreover, these rural households and enterprises only demand a small amount of loans. High unit costs will be incurred by any institution that supplies credits to them. Without government intervention, the rural financial market would only encourage the survival of usuryVarious experiments to reform the RCCs were carried out in the past two decades. However, the Chinese government apparently has not found a solution to all the problems in the system. This article evaluates the reforms of RCCs at various stages, with special emphasis on the reforms since the mid1990s. It should be noted that the reforms of RCCs and their performance were affected by the development of other financial institutions. Thus, we have placed our analysis of RCC reforms in the context of rural financial development in China. In the next section, we first give a brief account of the historical evolution of the role of RCCs in China’s rural economy before 1978 and then analyze the preliminary attempts of the Chinese government to reform the RCCs in the 1980s. In 1994, China introduced national financial reforms that emphasized the differentiation of roles among financial institutions. Then, we study how the reforms took place in rural China and why the major objectives were not achieved. The next section explains in detail the new reform initiatives in 2003–4, which aim to fundamentally change the governance and administrative structure of RCCs. After that, we examine some limitations of the reforms based on the problems revealed in the implementation process before concluding the article.Reform Experiments in 2003–2004After years of discussion, new reform initiatives were seen in June 2003. The Chinese government designated eight provincial units (Jilin, Shandong, Zhejiang, Guizhou, Jiangxi, Shaanxi, Chongqing, and Jiangsu) as the first batch of experimental regions for the reform of RCCs. A policy document called “Plan for Deepening the Reform of Rural Credit Cooperatives” (hereafter the Plan) was issued to explain in detail the measures to be implemented. In November 2004, the reforms were extended to another twentyone provinces. Among the provinciallevel administrative units, only Xizang and Hainan were excluded from the reform. There was no RCC in the former, while the problems in the RCCs in the latter were so serious that the central government decided to deal with it the wide adoption of the reforms, the Chinese government continued to call them experiments, indicating the possibility that the reforms could be modified in light of the realized impact of the initial changes.In the new reform program, it was reiterated that the general goal of the reforms was to transform the RCCs into local or munity financial institutions that would serve the needs of farmers, agriculture, and the rural economy. Comprehensive measures were designed to tackle the major problems of the RCCs. The program mainly consists of three elements. At the microlevel, the aim is to build up a governance structure with a new operation mechanism. The ownership of the RCCs would be clarified by establishing legal entities at appropriate administrative levels. The new approach opens up a variety of ownership forms which do not necessarily preserve the cooperative nature of the RCCs. There is no need for different regions to adopt a unified model of reform. Another important element is the strengthening of the role of the provincial government in administering the RCCs. The provincial governments will also be responsible for choosing the appropriate reform model for the RCCs in their jurisdiction. The third element was to inject funding into the RCCs to help them shed the financial burdens that had been built up in the past. If the RCCs are trapped in financial difficulties, it is impossible for them to carry out the ownership reforms. The new strategy of cleaning up the NPLs is very often dubbed “spending money to buy a new mechanism” (huaqian mai