高級(jí)微觀經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)常見(jiàn)問(wèn)題分析-資料下載頁(yè)
2024-08-29 09:05本頁(yè)面
【導(dǎo)讀】solutioninvolves?)(')('21xCxC?21yy?InaCartelindustry,)()(])[(max22112121,yCyCyyyyPyy????)(])[()(*1'1*2*1*2*1'*2*1yCyyyyPyyP?????)(])[()(*2'2*2*1*2*1'*2*1yCyyyyPyyP?????So)()(*2'2*1'1yCyC?Thatis,)()('2'1xCxC?)()()(1'21'12'2yCyCyC??)()(1'22'2yCyC?withtheargumentx,12yy?graphofMC.21yy?By傅琴。WhereY=y1+y2istotaloutput.Industryoutput?)('Ycp?Where0)('??mcYc. output?theindustry.Solution:. 100PYY??120CyCy??121212(,)()[]yypyyyy????1212(100)()yyyy????12max(,)yyyy?1210022yy???That’sall3023004030包佳杰。behavesasaleader,outputofeachfirm.iiji(y,y)=y[P(Y)-c]?iiji(y,y)=yP(Y)??1121max(y,y)=maxyP(Y)??1221002R(y)-y=0?
【正文】 s 1 1 2 1m a x ( y , y ) = m a x y P ( Y ) ? ?1 1 2= m a x y [ 1 0 0 y y ]Using the first order condition: 1 2 21 0 0 2 R ( y ) y = 0? which yields 2121 0 0 yR ( y ) =2Here R1(y1) is truly firm 1’s reaction to firm 2’s observed quantity. ?Since firm 2 can solve firm 1’s problem as well as firm 1 can solve it, firm 2 should anticipate that the quantity choice y2 will be met with the reaction R1(y2). Thus,firm 2’s problem in the first stage of the game is 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 2m a x ( y , R ( y ) ) = m a x y [ 1 0 0 y R ( y ) ]? ?Using the first order condition: 210010 0 ( ) 02y? ? ? ?So we get: 2 1 0 0 5 0 5 0y ? ? ? ?1 1 21 0 0 5 0( ) 2 52y R y ?? ? ? ? ?Problem (e) is solved by 賴宇青 3023004028 Group work done by 李楠 3023004015 傅琴 3023004020 范倩蕾 3023004021 李滔 3023004027 賴宇青 3023004028 包佳杰 3023004030
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