高級(jí)微觀經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)常見(jiàn)問(wèn)題分析-文庫(kù)吧資料
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【正文】 n R1(y2). Thus,firm 2’s problem in the first stage of the game is 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 2m a x ( y , R ( y ) ) = m a x y [ 1 0 0 y R ( y ) ]? ?Using the first order condition: 210010 0 ( ) 02y? ? ? ?So we get: 2 1 0 0 5 0 5 0y ? ? ? ?1 1 21 0 0 5 0( ) 2 52y R y ?? ? ? ? ?Problem (e) is solved by 賴宇青 3023004028 Group work done by 李楠 3023004015 傅琴 3023004020 范倩蕾 3023004021 李滔 3023004027 賴宇青 3023004028 包佳杰 3023004030 。s optimal choice : When MR=MC, fjirm1 has its optimal choice Revenue=P(Y)*y1 with respect to y1 1002y1y2=0 y1=50y2/2 李楠 302300401 (c)calculate the cournot equilibrium amount of output for each firm Firm 1’s profit function is given by: P1(y1)=(100— （ y1+y2） )y1— c2(y2) Firm 2’ profit function is given by: P2(y2)=(100— （ y1+y2） )y1— c2(y2)
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