高級(jí)微觀經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)常見問題分析(參考版)
2024-09-02 09:05本頁面
【正文】 (3)the payoff to firm i is given by the profit function where P(Y)=100– Y is the marketclearing price when the aggregate quantity on the market is Y=y1+y2 , and c is the constant marginal cost of production. As we know, c=0. So we can write i i j i( y , y ) = y [ P ( Y ) c ]?i i j i( y , y ) = y P ( Y ) ? ? To solve the backwardsinduction oute of this game, we first pute firm 1’s reaction to an arbitrary quantity by firm 2. R1(y2) solves 1 1 2 1m a x ( y , y ) = m a x y P ( Y ) ? ?1 1 2= m a x y [ 1 0 0 y y ]Using the first order condition: 1 2 21 0 0 2 R ( y ) y = 0? which yields 2121 0 0 yR ( y ) =2Here R1(y1) is truly firm 1’s reaction to firm 2’s observed quantity. ?Since firm 2 can solve firm 1’s problem as well as firm 1 can solve it, firm 2 should anticipate that the quantity choice y2 will be met with the reactio
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