會計(jì)學(xué)外文翻譯--大股東異質(zhì)性影響公司的會計(jì)質(zhì)量和信息不對稱-會計(jì)審計(jì)-資料下載頁
2025-05-12 16:37本頁面
【導(dǎo)讀】我調(diào)查了大股東與公司會計(jì)質(zhì)量和信息不對稱之間的關(guān)系。查了企業(yè)的會計(jì)信息質(zhì)量和信息不對稱是否與一個(gè)公司的大股東的類型，大小，以及監(jiān)測侵略性與有關(guān)。最近的經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退,增加大股東行動主義,以及新的安全交。易委員會規(guī)則允許大股東更大的代理訪問，這些都激勵(lì)了我對此的研究。在這些情況下，現(xiàn)存的會計(jì)文獻(xiàn)都不考慮大股東的作用，這隱含的一。機(jī)構(gòu)在資本市場已經(jīng)開始認(rèn)識到，大股東履行著重要的監(jiān)督作用。影響力，但美國證券交易委員會最近仍頒布規(guī)則，允許大股東獲得更多代理材料。該法案授權(quán)美國證券交易委員會建立規(guī)則，讓大股東獲。在SEC新規(guī)則下，股東的代理材料中包括一名或多名公司在年度會。議上被提名當(dāng)選董事的大股東。雖然威脅要更換整個(gè)石板董事的代理權(quán)爭奪，是。股東的監(jiān)控力度，而私人控制利益表明，由于大股東他們的影響力和所有權(quán)位置，權(quán)人士圍繞宣布購買和長期積極購買異常收益率在第一年的。
【正文】 I predict an increase in firms39。 information asymmetry. I also predict that this association is influenced by the types of large shareholders in a firm. Specifically, aggressive large shareholders have been shown to be more effective at influencing firms39。 decisions. I posit that monitoring aggressiveness is positively associated with firms’ information asymmetry in the postblock formation period The results of my study support my hypotheses that large shareholder heterogeneity is positively associated with firms39。 accounting quality and information asymmetry. Further, as hypothesized, the monitoring aggressiveness of certain large shareholders is positively associated with firms39。 accounting quality and information asymmetry. With respects to heterogeneity, large shareholder indicator variables capturing the different types of large shareholders present in a firm are significantly different from zero. Specifically, an indicator variable capturing the existence of aggressive large shareholders is positively associated with accounting quality and information asymmetry, while an indicator variable capturing moderate large shareholders is not significant. The relative size of an individual large shareholder39。s investment pared to other large shareholders does not appear to be a significant determinant of firms39。 accounting quality and information asymmetry. This result is not surprising given little variation in the measure I use to calculate size differences and possible measurement issues. The ratio of large aggressive shareholders to total large shareholders is, however, significant. Collectively, these results suggest that aggressive large shareholders are likely driving my results, which is consistent with my hypotheses on monitoring aggressiveness. An analysis of new block formations provides additional evidence that changes in firms39。 accounting quality and information asymmetry are associated with large shareholders in the post investment period. This finding supports my main hypotheses and provides evidence of the effects of new large shareholder investment on firms39。 accounting quality and information asymmetry. This supplementary evidence also helps to address causation in my study. Specifically, my findings reveal an increase in accounting quality and information asymmetry in the post block formation period My study contributes to the literature in several distinct respects. Little is known about the association between large shareholders and firms39。 accounting quality and information asymmetry. Therefore, evidence consistent with increases or decreases in firms39。 accounting quality and/or level information asymmetry being associated with certain types of large shareholders has implications for investors when evaluating current and future investments. For example, investors of a firm with a new block formation created by an aggressive large shareholder may place greater reliance on the quality of earnings in light of the results which show a positive association between accounting quality and aggressive large shareholder block formation. Likewise, investors in firms with little or no large shareholders may find lower accounting quality and place less weight on the quality of the firm39。s earnings.
畢業(yè)設(shè)計(jì)相關(guān)推薦
鄂ICP備17016276號-1