會計(jì)學(xué)外文翻譯--大股東異質(zhì)性影響公司的會計(jì)質(zhì)量和信息不對稱-會計(jì)審計(jì)(完整版)
【正文】 vidence exists on how large shareholders are related to firms39。 accounting quality and information asymmetry. I begin my examination by constructing three alternative specifications of large shareholder heterogeneity (LSH) based on the type, size, and monitoring aggressiveness of the large shareholders present in a firm. Next, I test whether these measures of LSH are significant determinants of firms39。 accounting quality. Therefore, new block creations represent a substantial increase in the concentration of shares held by a shareholder who has more incentive to monitor managers. I also predict that this relationship is influenced by the type of large shareholder, such that new block formations with more aggressive monitors have greater increases in accounting quality, since prior research has shown that large aggressive shareholders are more influential monitors and are more effective at initiating change within firms. As far as new block formations and information asymmetry, I predict a positive association between new block formations and firms39。 accounting quality and information asymmetry are associated with large shareholders in the post investment period. This finding supports my main hypotheses and provides evidence of the effects of new large shareholder investment on firms39。 accounting quality and information asymmetry. Therefore, evidence consistent with increases or decreases in firms39。 information asymmetry. I also predict that this association is influenced by the types of large shareholders in a firm. Specifically, aggressive large shareholders have been shown to be more effective at influencing firms39。 accounting quality and information asymmetry. Applying the three measures of ownership heterogeneity, I first examine whether LSH helps to explain the variation in firms’ accounting quality. I measure accounting quality using two accrualbased metrics. The two accrualbased models are the discretionary accrual model developed by Jones (1991) as implemented by Tucker and Zarowin (2020), and the accrual quality model from Dechow and Dichev (2020) as modified by McNichols (2020). Next, I examine whether LSH is related to marketbased measures of firms’ information asymmetry. I use two marketbased measures to examine the relationship between LSH and firms’ information asymmetry. The first measure, following Barron, Kim, Lim, and Stevens (1998)hereafter BKLS”use analysts’ information precision as proxies for the precisions of total, public, and private information available to the capital markets. The second measure is the bidask spread which is used in the extant literature as a measure of information asymmetry (. Glosten and Milgrom, 1985。 operating decisions and corporate governance, legislators and regulators have begun to recognize the important monitoring role that large shareholders fulfill in the capital markets. Despite prior unsuccessful attempts by the SEC to increase the influence of large shareholders by allowing these influential owners greater access to board representation, the SEC was recently granted the authority to promulgate rules that allow large shareholders greater access to proxy materials. On July 21, 2020, the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act was s
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