【導(dǎo)讀】越來越多的證據(jù)表明，會(huì)計(jì)質(zhì)量越好，越可以減少信息的不對(duì)稱和對(duì)融資成。與此相一致的可能性是，減少了具有更高敏感性的會(huì)計(jì)質(zhì)量的公司的投資對(duì)內(nèi)。部產(chǎn)生的現(xiàn)金流量。威爾第和希拉里發(fā)現(xiàn)，對(duì)企業(yè)投資和與投資相關(guān)的會(huì)計(jì)質(zhì)量容易不足，是容易引發(fā)過度投資的原因。私人信息或可直接監(jiān)測(cè)管理人員。通過訪問個(gè)人信息與控制管理行為，外部資本的供應(yīng)商。符合這個(gè)想法的還有比德爾和希拉。他們發(fā)現(xiàn)，會(huì)計(jì)品質(zhì)的影響在于美國(guó)投。資效益，而不是在日本。他們認(rèn)為，一個(gè)可能的解釋是不同的是債務(wù)和股權(quán)的美國(guó)版本的。力獲得融資的沒有影響。為了緩解這一問題，我們限制我們的樣本公司有所有最近獲得的。然而，這種可能性偏見拒絕。相關(guān)理論意味著減少公共債務(wù)持有人獲取私。人信息，因而減少借款有效的監(jiān)測(cè)。司的會(huì)計(jì)質(zhì)量的投資波利效果，資本投資者入境計(jì)劃，將取決于是否貸款合同限制投資。而且還與他們是否在ING投資不足項(xiàng)目的積極現(xiàn)在的價(jià)值工程。他的調(diào)查結(jié)果，即減輕了

　　

【正文】 ccess to private information and by loans that contain numerous covenants. There is much theoretical banking literature that focuses on banks’ ability to reduce information asymmetries. Empirical support for these theoretical models is provided by the ?ndings in James 1987 that banks provide cheap ‘‘informed’’ funds as opposed to the costly ‘‘uninformed’’ funds provided by public debt. Similarly, Krishnaswami, Spindt, and Subramaniam (1999) ?nd that ?rms with a greater degree of information asymmetry rely more on bank debt. Previous research has also documented that covenant use differs for public versus bank debt. For example, Billet, King, and Mauer (2020) document covenant use for a sample of 7,567 public bonds issued between 1995 and 2020 with covenant data available on the Fixed Ine Securities Database. They ?nd that less than 5 percent of these issues include capital expenditure restrictions, while Nini, Smith, and Su? (2020) document that the incidence of these covenants in syndicated bank loans is much higher. They ?nd capital expenditure restrictions in 32 percent of their sample of 3,720 deals with covenant data. We exploit the difference in banks’ access to private information relative to public debt holders to explore how private information affects the role that accounting q uality plays in reducing investment–cash ?ow sensitivities. In addition, the prevalence of capital expenditure covenants in bank debt contracts allows us to further distinguish between the importance of banks’ private information and their ability to monitor the borrower in mitigating information problems. 3 Hypotheses development In the absence of information problems, investment decisions should not depend on internal cash ?ows. However, in the presence of information asymmetry between managers and outside capital suppliers, ?rms may face ?nancing constraints causing them to rely on internally generated funds to ?nance their investments (Fazzari, Hubbard, and Peterson 1988, 2020). Firms’ dependence on internal cash ?ows will increase with the extent of information asymmetry between managers and capital providers. Capital providers with greater access to private information (like banks) are likely to have superior information about ?rms pared to lenders that obtain their information from public sources (like public debt holders). Biddle and Hilary (2020) argue that banks’ superior private information should serve as a substitute for accounting quality in determining the sensitivity of investment to internal cash ?ows. While this prediction is con sistent with theoretical models such as Holthausen and Verrecchia 1988, recent empirical research suggests that, rather than acting as substitutes, private information and public information may act as plements. For example, Francis, Schipper, and Vincent (2020) ?nd a positive association between the market reaction to analysts’ reports and quarterly earnings announcement. Similarly, Chen, Cheng, and Lo (2020) argue that private and public information sources can plement one another if the public information contains plex data that is made more informative after additional explanation and interpretation. Given the con?icting predictions from the theoretical versus empirical work, we expect that access to private information and accounting quality could serve either as substitutes or as plements in determining the investment–cash?ow sensitivity. Our ?rst hypothesis is: Hypothesis 1. The effect of accounting quality on the investment–cash ?ow sensitivity is mitigated for ?rms issuing bank debt relative to those issuing public debt if public and private information are substitutes and is enhanced if these two sources of information are plements. In addition, banks often include explicit covenants in their debt agreements to limit managers’ opportunistic investments. These covenants provide banks with an alternative mechanism to mitigate the problems associated with information asymmetry. Based on the assumption that capital expenditure covenants provide a substitute mechanism for addressing information problems, we expect that the importance of accounting quality in reducing the investment–cash ?ow sensitivity to be mitigated in the presence of these covenants. (The opposite prediction would hold if these covenants and accounting quality are plements rather than substitutes.) Our second hypothesis is: Hypothesis 2. The effect of higher quality accounting on the investment–cash ?ow sensitivity is mitigated by the existence of a capital expenditure covenant. 4 Sample characteristics and Sample selection We test our hypotheses using a sample of ?rms listed on the SDC database that have issued public debt or entered into a syndicated loan. We include ?rm years in which these public or bank debts are outstanding. To deal with the selection bias of investment covenants in bank loans, we require that the SDC database have information on the size of the loan, the type of loan (revolver or term), and whether the bank loan contains an investment covenant. We then merge this data with the COMPUSTAT database to obtain ?nancial accounting information for the ?rm that entered into the loan or debenture. This data restriction resulted in a ?nal sample of 1,163 ?rms (4,475 ?rm years) that had all of the data necessary to test our hypotheses. Of the 4,475 ?rm years in our ?nal sample, we noted that 1,083 observations issued public debt, 3,392 observations issued bank debt (syndicated loans), and 1,026 observations issued both. Within the ?nal bank debt sample, 1,124 observations are associated with the use of covenants that restrict investments representing 33 percent of the bank debt sample. These percentages are similar to those repo