【導讀】共頁，第1頁。┊。┊。┊。┊。┊。┊。┊。┊。┊。┊。┊。┊。┊。裝。┊。┊。┊。┊。┊。訂。┊。┊。┊。┊。┊。線。┊。┊。┊。┊。┊。┊。┊。┊。┊。┊。┊。┊。┊。附錄。原文:. Abstract. 1.Introduction. 共頁，第2頁。┊。┊。┊。┊。┊。┊。┊。┊。┊。┊。┊。┊。┊。裝。┊。┊。┊。┊。┊。訂。┊。┊。┊。┊。┊。線。┊。┊。┊。┊。┊。┊。┊。┊。┊。┊。┊。┊。┊

　　

【正文】 zation). In column (7), regulatory pressure is considered through the dummy variable TARP, which assumes a value of unity if the bank has received public funds from the . Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP). The variables are the same as those defined in Table 2. The heteroskedasticityconsistent standard errors are presented in brackets. 5. Conclusions Researchers in corporate finance have often found interest in studying financial firms due to their amplified agency and governance problems, and their critical importance for the good functioning of the modern financial system. The 2020– 09 financial crisis has further enhanced the interest as a result of the unique macroeconomic setting and the regulatory shifts that occurred during this period. We construct a new dataset on 462 . bank holding panies to study the dividend policy in the context of the 2020– 09 financial crisis. We test the signaling and agency hypotheses alongside the Fama and French (2020) characteristics of dividend 共 頁 ， 第 12 頁 ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ 裝 ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ 訂 ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ 線 ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ payers controlling for the regulatory shifts during the period under analysis. Our main findings indicate that dividend payouts depend on the macroeconomic context (before and during the financial crisis). The Fama and French (2020) characteristics – larger, more profitable and low growth banks tend to pay more dividends – hold for both periods. Interestingly, despite the presence of external regulators in the financial industry, the findings still support the agency argument that dividends pensate for the need for monitoring. Our findings also support the signaling argument that dividends work as a signal of future growth opportunities, although only during the financial crisis. A possible interpretation is that bank holding panies have little need to signal unless the whole industry is under strain and it is important to be identified as a better than average bank. The controlling regulatory pressure hypothesis that undercapitalized banks plowback earnings to recapitalize themselves only holds during the financial crisis, a period during in which regulators exerted more pressure on banks with low capital buffers. Governance problems are often considered to be more severe and plex in financial firms. The 2020– 09 financial crisis further exposed the governance issues in financial firms creating the pathway for increased regulatory pressure, and their consequent implications for performance. Our findings shed light on the dividend payout of bank holding panies in a unique macroeconomic setting that spans a period before and during the 2020– 09 financial crisis and in which the banking industry foresaw major shifts in the regulatory landscape. The recent regulatory focus on dividend policy contrasts with the limited attention paid to the issue in past empirical studies. The regulatory reforms currently being put into place impose a capital conservation mechanism by constraining dividend payouts for banks whose capital buffers fall within a range close to the minimum requirements. The ineffectiveness of regulatory pressure in limiting dividend payouts by undercapitalized banks before the financial crisis – a period during which banks were supposed to build capital buffers – supports the Federal Reserve and the Basel Committee39。s initiatives to limit dividend payouts by undercapitalized banks. Because our findings provide robust empirical support for the signaling and agency cost hypotheses, the reforms may have an unintended impact on the use of dividends as both signaling and agency cost reduction mechanisms. Inability to use these governance mechanisms may reduce the potential to attract external financing, both debt and equity. The level up to which regulators may want to allow signaling and agency mechanisms to function is an issue that deserves serious attention from academics and regulators alike. Acknowledgments We are grateful to the Managing Editor, Jeffry Netter, and the anonymous reviewer, for their ments and suggestions. We acknowledge the financial support from “ Funda231。227。o para a Ci234。ncia e Teologia” (PTDC/EGEECO/114977/2020). The views 共 頁 ， 第 13 頁 ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ 裝 ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ 訂 ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ 線 ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the institutions with which the authors are affiliated. Any errors are the responsibility of the authors. References [1]Anderson, C., Campbell, T., 2020. Corporate governance of Japanese banks. J. Corp. Financ. 10 (3), 327–354. [2]Andres, C., 2020. Large shareholders and firm performance an empirical examination of foundingfamily ownership. J. Corp. Financ. 14 (4), 431–445. [3]BCBS, 2020. Basel III: a global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (June, Available at: [4]Bessler, W., Nohel, T., 1996. The stockmarket reaction to dividend cuts and omissions by mercial banks. J. Bank. Financ. 20 (9), 1485–1508. [5]Bhattacharya, S., 1979. Imperfect information, dividend policy, and ‘the bird in the hand’ fallacy. Bell J. Econ. 10 (1), 259–270. [6]Brook, Y., Hendershott, R., Lee, D., 2020. Corporate governance and recent consolidation in the banking industry. J. Corp. Financ. 6 (2), 141–164. [7]Brown, J., Liang, N.,Weisbenner, S., 2020. Executive financial incentives and payout policy: firm responses to the 2020 dividend tax cut. J. Financ. 62 (4), 193