【文章內(nèi)容簡介】 ose no education CII(y) = $20,000y Optimal choice of y for Group I ?Benefits = $100,000 ?Cost ?CII(yO)= 20,000y ?$100,000$20,000y* ?y* 5 ?Choose y* 31 Chapter 1 Signaling ? Cost/Benefit Comparison ? Decision rule works if y* is between and 5 ? If y* = 4 ?Group I would choose no school ?Group II would choose y* ?Rule discriminates correctly 32 Chapter 1 Signaling ? Education does increase productivity and provides a useful signal about individual work habits. 33 Chapter 1 Working into the Night ? Question ? How can you signal to your employer you are more productive? 34 Chapter 1 Market Signaling ? Guarantees and Warranties ? Signaling to identify high quality and dependability ? Effective decision tool because the cost of warranties to lowquality producers is too high 35 Chapter 1 Example If financial aid were expanded and more students attended college as a result, would you expect that more students would get Master’s of Business Administration degrees? Why? 36 Chapter 1 Moral Hazard ? Moral hazard occurs when the insured party whose actions are unobserved can affect the probability or magnitude of a payment associated with an event. 37 Chapter 1 Moral Hazard ? Determining the Premium for Fire Insurance ? Warehouse worth $100,000 ? Probability of a fire: ?.005 with a $50 fire prevention program ?.01 without the program 38 Chapter 1 Moral Hazard ? Determining the Premium for Fire Insurance ? With the program the premium is: ? .005 x $100,000 = $500 ? Once insured owners purchase the insurance, the owners no longer have an incentive to run the program, therefore the probability of loss is .01 ? $500 premium will lead to a loss because the expected loss is $1,000 (.01 x $100,000) 39 Chapter 1 The Effects of Moral Hazard Miles per Week 0 $ 50 100 140 Cost per Mile $ $ $ D = MB MC’ With moral hazard insurance panies cannot measure mileage. MC to $ and miles driven increases to 140 miles/weekinefficient allocation. MC MC is the marginal cost of driving. With no moral hazard and assuming insurance panies can measure miles driven MC = MB at $ and 100 miles/weekefficient allocation. 40 Chapter 1 Reducing Moral Hazard Warranties of Animal Health ? Scenario ? Livestock buyers want disease free animals. ? Asymmetric information exists ? Many states require warranties ? Buyers and sellers no longer have an incentive to reduce disease (moral hazard). ? Question ? How can this moral hazard be reduced? 41 Chapter 1 Crisis in the Savings and Loan Industry ? Question ? How many people know the financial strength of their bank? ? Why not? ? Deposit insurance, moral hazard, and failures in the SL industry 42 Chapter 1 ? Cost of the SL Bailout ? 1,000+ failed institutions ? $200 billion (1990) ? Texas alone$42 billion (1990) ? Agency expenditures$100 million (1990) ? Question ? How can this moral hazard be reduced? Crisis in the Savings and Loan Industry 43 Chapter 1 Example Even though Joe has an excellent prehensive health insurance policy, he has no wish to risk a heart attack. He continues to watch his diet and exercise regularly to reduce the risk of heart disease even though he is insures. Is there any element of moral hazard that his health insurance pany would still need to be concerned about? 44 Chapter 1 The PrincipalAgent Problem ? Agency Relationship ?One person’s welfare depends on what another person does ? Agent ? Person who acts ? Principal ? Person whom the action effects 45 Chapter 1 The PrincipalAgent Problem ? Company owners are principals. ? Workers and managers are agents. ? Owners do not have plete knowledge. ? Employees may pursue their own goals and reduce profits. 46 Chapter 1 案例分析 :承包基數(shù)的確定 問題：委托人應(yīng)當(dāng)如何采取對(duì)策 ， 防止代理人利用自己的職權(quán)侵犯委托人的利益 ？ 改革開放以來國有資產(chǎn)的大量流失 ， 說明了研究這一問題的重要性和緊迫性 。 委托代理問題的核心是基數(shù)問題的確定 。 而且這一過程雙方所擁有的信息是不對(duì)稱的 ， 代理人明顯擁有比委托人更多的信息 。 基數(shù)的確定過程中的一個(gè)難題是：委托人總想提高基數(shù) ，而代理人總想降低基數(shù) ， 因此雙方僵持不下 ! 47 Chapter 1 案例分析 :承包基數(shù)的確定 騎馬比慢？還是跳起來摘蘋果？ 決策思想： 在信息不對(duì)稱的情況下，給代理人以決定基數(shù)的很大的發(fā)言權(quán)，（這樣就避免了代理人日后完不成基數(shù)把責(zé)任推給委托人這樣一種常見的“基數(shù)軟約束”的情況）。與此同時(shí)，對(duì)代理人 濫報(bào)基數(shù)的行為進(jìn)行制約，利用利益導(dǎo)向的行為引導(dǎo)代理人報(bào)出一個(gè)他通過努力能夠完成的最高基數(shù)。這樣，就使基數(shù)確定達(dá)到了最佳的狀態(tài)。 48 Chapter 1 具體講： 委托人與代理人共同確定基數(shù)，最終合同基數(shù) C（ Contract)是委托人要求數(shù) D (Demand)與代理人自報(bào)數(shù) S (Selfoffered)的加權(quán)平均。在實(shí)際應(yīng)用中，可取權(quán)數(shù) 為雙方 50％，即算術(shù)平均。合同基數(shù) C全部歸委托人，也即“基數(shù)全交”。 當(dāng)期末實(shí)際數(shù) A（ Actual)超過合同基數(shù) C時(shí)，超過部分 Q1（％）將作為獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)歸代理人，若 案例分析 :承包基數(shù)的確定 49 Chapter 1 案例分析 :承包基數(shù)的確定 AC，則不足部分的一個(gè)同樣的比例將由代理人補(bǔ)足。不妨取 Q1＝ 80％。 當(dāng)期末實(shí)際數(shù) A超過代理人自報(bào)數(shù) S時(shí)，將對(duì)代理人收取“少報(bào)罰金”（因?yàn)?S較小導(dǎo)致了加權(quán)平均后的合同基