【正文】 ? c) Buyers are willing to pay 5,000, and only lowquality cars will be offered for sale。 ? e) Buyers are willing to pay10,000, and only highquality cars will be offered for sale。 委托代理問題的核心是基數(shù)問題的確定 。 基數(shù)的確定過程中的一個難題是：委托人總想提高基數(shù) ，而代理人總想降低基數(shù) ， 因此雙方僵持不下 ! 47 Chapter 1 案例分析 :承包基數(shù)的確定 騎馬比慢？還是跳起來摘蘋果？ 決策思想： 在信息不對稱的情況下，給代理人以決定基數(shù)的很大的發(fā)言權(quán)，（這樣就避免了代理人日后完不成基數(shù)把責(zé)任推給委托人這樣一種常見的“基數(shù)軟約束”的情況）。這樣，就使基數(shù)確定達到了最佳的狀態(tài)。在實際應(yīng)用中，可取權(quán)數(shù) 為雙方 50％，即算術(shù)平均。 當(dāng)期末實際數(shù) A（ Actual)超過合同基數(shù) C時，超過部分 Q1（％）將作為獎勵歸代理人，若 案例分析 :承包基數(shù)的確定 49 Chapter 1 案例分析 :承包基數(shù)的確定 AC，則不足部分的一個同樣的比例將由代理人補足。 當(dāng)期末實際數(shù) A超過代理人自報數(shù) S時，將對代理人收取“少報罰金”（因為 S較小導(dǎo)致了加權(quán)平均后的合同基數(shù) C=(D+S)/2也較小，從而使委托人收益減少）。 50 Chapter 1 案例分析 :承包基數(shù)的確定 ?可以證明：如果委托人采用上述三條對策，那么，他在確定基數(shù)時只要提出一個保底數(shù)就夠了，而代理人則會自動報出一個通過他努力能夠完成的最大基數(shù)。這樣代理人的凈收益為 8萬元。 53 Chapter 1 The PrincipalAgent Problem ? The PrincipalAgent Problem in Private Enterprises ? Only 16 of 100 largest corporations have individual family or financial institution ownership exceeding 10%. ? Most large firms are controlled by management. ? Monitoring management is costly (asymmetric information). 54 Chapter 1 The PrincipalAgent Problem ? The PrincipalAgent Problem in Private Enterprises ? Managers may pursue their own objectives. ?Growth ?Utility from job 55 Chapter 1 The PrincipalAgent Problem ? The PrincipalAgent Problem in Private Enterprises ?Limitations to managers’ ability to deviate from objective of owners ?Stockholders can oust managers ?Takeover attempts ?Market for managers who maximize profits 56 Chapter 1 The PrincipalAgent Problem ? The PrincipalAgent Problem in Public Enterprises ? Observations ?Managers’ goals may deviate from the agencies goal (size) ?Oversight is difficult (asymmetric information) ?Market forces are lacking 57 Chapter 1 The PrincipalAgent Problem ? The PrincipalAgent Problem in Public Enterprises ? Limitations to Management Power ? Managers choose a public service position ? Managerial job market ? Legislative and agency oversight (GAO OMB) ? Competition among agencies 58 Chapter 1 The Managers of Nonprofit Hospitals as Agents ? Are non profit anizations more or less efficient that forprofit firms? ? 725 hospitals from 14 hospital chains ? Return on investment (ROI) and average cost (AC) measured 59 Chapter 1 ForProfit % % Nonprofit % % Return On Investment 1977 1981 The Managers of Nonprofit Hospitals as Agents 60 Chapter 1 ? After adjusting for differences in services: ? AC/patient day in nonprofits is 8% greater than profits ? Conclusion ?Profit incentive impacts performance ? Cost and benefits of subsidizing nonprofits must be considered. The Managers of Nonprofit Hospitals as Agents 61 Chapter 1 Example The demand for automobiles is highly cyclical, going up when the economy is doing well, and going down when the economy is in a recession. The owners of the automobile panies realize this, and have to consider different payment schemes knowing that the profits each year for firm will depend on the strength of the economy and the performance of their managers. Which of the following payment schemes would you remend to the owners and why? 1). Pay the managers a flat salary that is not tied to firm’s performance. 2). Pay the managers a share of the profits. 3). Pay the managers a flat salary plus a bonus that is tied to the firm’s performance. 62 Chapter 1 ? Incentives in the PrincipalAgent Framework ? Designing a reward system to align the principal and agent’s goalsan example ? Watch manufacturer ? Uses labor and machinery ? Owners goal is to maximize profit ? Machine repairperson can influence reliability of machines and profits The PrincipalAgent Problem 63 Chapter 1 The PrincipalAgent Problem ? Incentives in the PrincipalAgent Framework ? Designing a reward system to align the principal and agent’s goalsan example ?Revenue also depends, in part, on the quality of parts and the reliability of labor. ?High monitoring cost makes it difficult to assess the repairperson’s work 64 Chapter 1 The Revenue from Making Watches Low effort (a = 0) $10,000 $20,000 High effort (a = 1) $20,000 $40,000 Poor Luck Good Luck 65 Chapter 1 The PrincipalAgent Problem ? Incentives in the PrincipalAgent Framework ? Designing a reward system to align the principal and agent’s goalsan example ? Repairperson can work with either high or low effort ? Revenues depend on effort relative to the other events (poor or good luck) ? Owners cannot determine a high or low effort when revenue = $20,000 66 Chapter 1 The PrincipalAgent Problem ? Inc