【文章內(nèi)容簡介】 ial of some factual issues, and needlessly reallocate judicial authority. 主要論點有利于推進 搜索上訴審查 結(jié)果 ...純粹 證據(jù)的基礎(chǔ)是，規(guī)則的理由， 但是，在解釋改變這一年，咨詢委員會說： 這些考慮 公眾輿論的 和司法經(jīng)濟 會被審判法庭，而不是 上訴法庭 要允許上訴法院 …… 。 更加積極地 分享實況調(diào)查功能往往會破壞在當事人的心目中的區(qū)法院的合法性，一些事實問題的上訴重審 案件將會速度增加，司法權(quán)威將會 不必要的重新分配。 “Constitutional Facts” “憲法事實” Despite that, and regardless of whether facts were initially before a jury, an argument can be made that courts should give aboveaverage scrutiny to cases where constitutional interests are at , the Supreme Court held exactly that in Bose Corp v. Consumers Union . While the decision concerned freedom of speech and product disparagement, not patents, a modest extension would have substantial impact on the latter. 盡管如此，也不管是否事實發(fā)生在審判 前， 在危急時刻憲法關(guān)注的一項爭議可以使 法院 給予 高于平 均水平的審查。事實上 ，最高法院認為正是在 Bose公司訴美國消費者聯(lián)盟案件， 雖然決定 有關(guān)于 言論 自由 和 詆毀產(chǎn)品，而不是專利，適度延伸審查范圍 會對后者產(chǎn)生重大影響。 In Bose, it was held that appellate courts are obligated to exercise independent judgment in determining when one should be liable to another for misstatements of fact (in this situation, as contrasted with “opinion”) concerning the other’s products. One mentator has argued that the Court’s reasoning makes it difficult to restrict that rule to first amendment cases. He also urges that deep review of constitutional facts is pelling when they have been found by administrative agencies. 在 Bose案件中，有人認為，上訴法院有責任決定當 一方應該對另外乙方的非事實描述信任的時候獨立裁判 （ 在此種情況下 ，與“意見” 相反的東西 ） 。一位評論家認為，法院的自由裁量難以限制的第一修正案。他還對當一項憲法事實被行政機關(guān)發(fā)現(xiàn)時它的審查深度時候可信度表示懷疑。 Consider whether findings that deal with patent validity do not fit in either instance. At least when no new art is introduced in the litigation, a challenge to validity involves not only issues of constitutional interest (Art. I 167。 8 cl. 8) but also a collateral challenge to findings of the Patent and Trademark Office. It is doubtful that the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the implications of this. Yet, it may well have had Bose (perhaps unconsciously) in mind when it remanded Dennison. If the CAFC, or ultimately the Supreme Court, believes that extraordinary review of facts in patent cases is warranted, consideration should be given to whether the “constitutional fact” doctrine might be usefully extended. Patent attorneys are fond of referring to the constitutional underpinnings of the patent system. Yet rarely will a case turn on them, and it is doubtful that any Supreme Court validity decision ever did. 考慮 專利的有效性 不適合其他任何實例的結(jié)果是否成立 。至少在沒有新的 發(fā)現(xiàn)在訴訟中出現(xiàn) ，對涉及的有效性提出挑戰(zhàn)，不僅憲法利益的問題（第一條 第 8款第 8項 ）， 也是一個 對于專利和商標是局的調(diào)查結(jié)果的變相 挑戰(zhàn) 。這是令人懷疑的是，最高法院有機會考慮有關(guān)的影響。然而， 在考慮 Dennison 案件是 很可能有 Bose公司 （也許不自覺地） 在潛意識里 。如果 美國聯(lián)邦巡回法院 ，或者 最高法院認為，在專利案件事實的 特殊 審查是非常必要的， 應考 慮 “憲制上的事實 ”學說 是否 可能是有益的延長。專利代理人喜歡專利制度的憲法基礎(chǔ) 這一理論 。然而，很少 有案 件會轉(zhuǎn)移到這方面來 ， 任何最高法院所作出的有效性裁決 都是 值得懷疑的 。 Even an 1850 case often regarded as the genesis of the nonobviousness requirement was not based on the Constitution. On the contrary, notwithstanding a dissent claiming otherwise, Justice Nelson did not admit to adding a new requirement — much less one mandated by the Constitution. Indeed, he insisted that mere novelty, even coupled with market success, had long been inadequate to support patent validity. 即使是 1850 年的情況通常 認為非顯而易見性的 要求 不是以憲法為依據(jù) 的 。相反，盡管聲稱異議，法官納爾遜不承認加入了新的要求 —— 更不用說一 個由憲法規(guī)定的。事實上，他堅持認為，單純的新穎性，即使加上市場的成功，早已不足以支持專利的有效性。 The first Supreme Court allusion to constitutional interests being involved in standards of patentability does not seem to have occurred until the 1950 — almost exactly a century later. Moreover, i