【正文】 ort expansion, safety and dredging. Given their institutional position, most port authorities are not profit driven The port authority owns and exploits the port area and benefits when the port cluster is an attractive location because they can lease more land and charge higher prices. Furthermore, port authorities collect ‘port dues’. Thus, the more ships call a port the higher the port dues. For these two reasons, port authorities have a clear incentive to invest in the performance of the port , port authorities can be regarded as cluster managers. Revenues of port authorities The port authority has various sources of revenue. The existence and relative importance of various charges differs between ports (Asar, 2021). In general, port authorities generate revenue from three sources: ? charges to shipowners/ ship operators。Governance In Seaport Clusters Peter W. de Erlangen 1. Introduction Apart from wellknown physical factors such as the location, maritime accessibility and hinterland infrastructure, the governance of seaports is an important determinant of their performance. An analysis of the governance of seaports has mostly been limited to the role of the port authority. Notwithstanding the central role of port authorities in ports, we argue that an analysis of governance in seaports requires attention for the role of (private) firms. Institutional economic literature offers a useful framework for ana lysing advantages and disadvantages of alternative governance mechanisms and provides a basis for ana lysing the roles of port authorities. In this paper we deal with the issue of cluster governance in seaports and illustrate our approach with an analysis of the port of Rotterdam.. First, we briefly discuss the theoretical foundations of the cluster governance concept. Second, we discuss the role of port authorities in the governance of seaports. Third, we present empirical results of a survey among 43 cluster experts in Rotterdam on the governance of Rotterdam’s port cluster. We feminality the paper with conclusions. Quality Of Cluster Governance We define cluster governance as ‘the mix of and relations between various mechanisms of coordination used in a cluster’. The quality of the governance differs between clusters. The quality depends on the level of coordination costs and the ‘scope’ of ‘coordination beyond price’. Low coordination costs and much coordination beyond price improve the quality of governance. When the benefits of coordination are distributed unequally, when (the threat of) opportunistic behaviour prevents coordination or when benefits of coordination are uncertain, coordination beyond price does not arise spontaneously or instantaneously, even when benefits of coordination exceed costs. Therefore there is in general a shortage of coordination beyond price. More coordination beyond price improves the quality of the governance of clusters. In clusters where the level of trust is high, (average) transaction costs are relatively low, because of low costs to specify contracts and low monitoring costs. Furthermore, costs of coordination beyond price are lower and as a consequence, more coordination beyond price will arise. The level of trust in a cluster is influenced by the importance of reputation effects in a cluster. If reputation effects are