外文翻譯--港口集群治理-其他專業(yè)-展示頁(yè)
2025-01-31 10:16本頁(yè)面
【正文】 o grant the port authority more autonomy, and to change the monitoring and control function from the city council to an independent board of directors is discussed. However, even when the suggested new structure is approved, the municipality will remain the major shareholder. 5. Conclusions In this paper we argue that an analysis of the governance in port clusters adds to our understanding port petition, port development and port performance. We have presented an analytic framework for ana lysing (port) cluster governance. The quality of the governance of a cluster depends on the level of transaction costs in a cluster and the ‘scope of coordination beyond price’. Four variables influence both: the presence of leader firms, the presence of intermediaries, the level of trust and solutions to collective action problems. Cluster governance can be evaluated by ana lysing those four variables. In this approach, port authorities are no longer Centre stage。 ? contributing to solving collective action problems (Olson, 1971) Thus, leader firms can enable or even enforce cooperation and for that reason add to the performance of clusters. action in clusters The ‘problem’ of collective action (Olson, 1971) is relevant in clusters. Even when collective benefits of cooperation to achieve collective goals exceed (collective) costs, such cooperation does not (always) develop spontaneously. Different CAP’s (Collective Action Problems), such as education and training and innovation are relevant in clusters. For each CAP a governance regime arises. In this context, a regime can be defined as a ‘relatively stable collaborative agreement that provides actors with the capacity to overe collective action problems’. authorities as ‘cluster managers’ Even though a variety of actors play a role in the governance of a seaport cluster, the port authority is the most central actor. The term ‘cluster manager’ can be used to describe the role of the port authority. We discuss the role of a cluster manager in general, the institutional position of port authorities and sources of revenue and investment decisions of port authorities. The role of a ‘cluster manager’ A ‘perfect’ cluster manager would be an galvanization with the following four characteristics. 1. A cluster manager has incentives to invest in the cluster, because its revenues are related to the performance of the cluster. The ‘perfect’ cluster manager would receive a share of the value added generated in the cluster as revenue, for instance through a ‘cluster tax’. 2. A cluster manager invests in activities with cluster benefits (instead of firm specific benefits). Furthermore, the cluster manager aims to invest when ‘cluster benefits’ exceed costs. 3. A cluster manager aims to distribute investment costs for investments to those firms that benefit. This involves cofinance arrangements with a specific group of beneficiary firms. 4. A cluster manager operates selfsustaining: over time investments equal revenues. The port authority matches all four criteria: they have incentives and resources to invest in the cluster. The port dues and lease revenues are resources to invest in the port cluster. Furthermore, they generally are selfsustaining and invest in the performance of the cluster as a whole. Port authorities invest in activities with general benefits, such as p
試題試卷相關(guān)推薦
鄂ICP備17016276號(hào)-1