【正文】 該《指導(dǎo)意見(jiàn)》明確規(guī)定，完成股權(quán)分置改革的 上市公司可以實(shí)施管理層股權(quán)激勵(lì)。 2020 年 5 月啟動(dòng)了萬(wàn)眾矚目的上市公司股權(quán)分置改革試點(diǎn)工作。并且，聯(lián)想集團(tuán)、 四通公司、天津泰達(dá)、上海貝嶺、武漢國(guó)有資產(chǎn)管理公司等 80 余家上市公司或其控股公司還擬定了相應(yīng)的股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃。 國(guó)內(nèi)研究現(xiàn)狀 我國(guó)自改革開(kāi)放以來(lái)，也逐步對(duì)多種激勵(lì)制度進(jìn)行了探索，其中針對(duì)公司高級(jí)管理人員的股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度亦在上市公司中普遍存在。因此分析經(jīng)營(yíng)者的行為導(dǎo)向，設(shè)計(jì)有效的經(jīng)營(yíng)者激勵(lì)模式成為理論界研究的一個(gè)重點(diǎn)領(lǐng)域。激勵(lì)機(jī)制的核心是使委托人與代理人的目標(biāo)趨于一致，即：使代理人在追求個(gè)人利益時(shí)，委托人的利益也能夠相應(yīng)實(shí)現(xiàn)。激勵(lì)問(wèn)題是所有經(jīng)濟(jì)面臨的一個(gè)核心問(wèn)題，中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)改革要解決的似乎也是一個(gè)激勵(lì)問(wèn)題。有資料顯示， 2020 財(cái)政年度美國(guó)高管薪酬上漲了 12%，但同期美國(guó)普通股票回報(bào)為 %而同一年中國(guó)股票收益下跌了 21%，但中國(guó)高管薪酬平均漲幅卻依然達(dá)到 %，可見(jiàn)由于高管薪酬這幾年的大幅增長(zhǎng)高管薪酬與企業(yè)業(yè)績(jī)的相關(guān)性遭受普遍質(zhì)疑。 國(guó)外在激勵(lì)問(wèn)題上 30 多年的研究表明，建立有效的激勵(lì)制度能將高管人員的報(bào)酬與企業(yè)的長(zhǎng)期業(yè)績(jī)表現(xiàn)緊密相結(jié)合，對(duì)企業(yè)的快速發(fā)展和國(guó)民經(jīng)濟(jì)的持續(xù)增長(zhǎng)產(chǎn)生顯著的推動(dòng)作用。因而如何對(duì)高管人員進(jìn)行有效激勵(lì)一直是 理論界和實(shí)務(wù)界關(guān)心的重要問(wèn)題。但由于合約的不完全性固有缺陷，高管激勵(lì)報(bào)酬合約不僅存在激勵(lì)效應(yīng)，而且在其制定和執(zhí)行過(guò)程中還存在代理沖突增加效應(yīng)。s rapid development and sustained growth of the national economy. The research on the executive pensation has continued for many years since the reform and openingup from 1978, but it still has not solved the incentive problem due to the constraints of political and economical condition. A good incentives managers can affect the value orientation of managers to guide managers mitted to the creation of shareholder value and improve the motivation and morale of the managers, to create a culture of continuing efforts to create more wealth for efforts to maximize enterprise value and how to develop reasonable incentives to build munication between shareholders and managers and regulatory mechanisms. This article focuses on the most widely used incentive pay mode and equity incentive mode a series of mathematical analysis, the results of the analysis of the data, analyze the strengths and weaknesses of the excitation pattern, and then bined with the actual situation of China39。 本文重點(diǎn)對(duì)目前應(yīng)用最為廣泛的薪酬激勵(lì)模式以及股權(quán)激勵(lì)模式的 進(jìn)行了一系列的數(shù)學(xué)分析，通過(guò)數(shù)據(jù)的分析結(jié)果，分析出激勵(lì)模式的優(yōu)勢(shì)和不足，然后結(jié)合我國(guó)企業(yè)實(shí)際情況，對(duì)當(dāng)下各個(gè)公司采用的激勵(lì)模式提出建議和意見(jiàn)。我國(guó)自 1978 年以來(lái)，在企業(yè)高管人員的工資分配制度上進(jìn)行了大量的探索，但由于社會(huì)政治經(jīng)濟(jì)環(huán)境等諸多因素的影響，企業(yè)高管人員的激勵(lì)問(wèn)題始終沒(méi)有得到很好的解決。特別是股份公司大量興起之后，伴隨公司所有權(quán)與經(jīng)營(yíng)權(quán)的分離而產(chǎn)生的委托代理問(wèn)題，使高管人員激勵(lì)問(wèn)題受到了更廣泛的關(guān)注，激勵(lì)方式也得到了極大地發(fā)展。長(zhǎng)期以來(lái)，我國(guó)上市公司高管人員薪酬制度不合理，人力資本不能按照生產(chǎn)要素分配原則參與分配，導(dǎo)致了高管人員缺乏工作積極性和創(chuàng)造性，甚至為了實(shí)現(xiàn)個(gè)人效用而追求“職務(wù)消費(fèi)”和“灰色收入”，經(jīng)營(yíng)短期化行為較為普遍，造成部分上市公司的財(cái)務(wù)狀況及經(jīng)營(yíng)情況日趨惡化，極大的損害了廣大股東的權(quán)益和投資積極性，動(dòng)搖了證券市場(chǎng)的基石。 1 摘 要 高管激勵(lì)是現(xiàn)代企業(yè)兩個(gè)重要的公司治理機(jī)制之一。但由于合約的不完全性固有缺陷，高管激勵(lì)報(bào)酬合約不僅存在激勵(lì)效應(yīng)，而且在其制定和執(zhí)行過(guò)程中還存在代理沖突增加效應(yīng)。因而如何對(duì)高管人員進(jìn)行有效激 勵(lì)一直是理論界和實(shí)務(wù)界關(guān)心的重要問(wèn)題。國(guó)外在激勵(lì)問(wèn)題上30 多年的研究表明，建立有效的激勵(lì)制度能將高管人員的報(bào)酬與企業(yè)的長(zhǎng)期業(yè)績(jī)表現(xiàn)緊密相結(jié)合，對(duì)企業(yè)的快速發(fā)展和國(guó)民經(jīng)濟(jì)的持續(xù)增長(zhǎng)產(chǎn)生顯著的推動(dòng)作用。一個(gè)好的激勵(lì)機(jī) 制能夠影響管理者的價(jià)值取向，引導(dǎo)管理者致力于股東價(jià)值的創(chuàng)造，提高經(jīng)理人的積極性和士氣，創(chuàng)造出一種使經(jīng)理人員持續(xù)努力創(chuàng)造更多財(cái)富的文化氛圍，并為實(shí)現(xiàn)企業(yè)價(jià)值最大化而努力因此，如何制定合理的激勵(lì)政策，搭建股東與管理者之間的溝通與監(jiān)管機(jī)制，使企業(yè)創(chuàng)造更大的價(jià)值，是當(dāng)前亟待研究的重要問(wèn)題，對(duì)于上市公司高管人員績(jī)效評(píng)價(jià)的研究有助于完善我國(guó)上市公司的治理結(jié)構(gòu)并對(duì)于有效激勵(lì)高級(jí)管理人員有重大的現(xiàn)實(shí)意義，好的高管激勵(lì)機(jī)制的尋求是未來(lái)上市企業(yè)得到更好發(fā)展的必要前提。 關(guān)鍵詞： 高管激勵(lì)，影響因素，激勵(lì)方式，公司業(yè)績(jī) 2 Abstract The Senior Management Incentive is the modern enterprise are two important corporate governance , due to inplete inherent defects of the contract, the Senior Management Incentive pensation contract exists not only the incentive effect, and the effect in the formulation and implementation process proxy conflict increases. For a long time,Senior executive’s salary system of listed panies of our country is unreasonable .Cause the financial situation and operation of some listed panies to worsen day by day. The study on senior executive’s salary system of listed pany. Great damage to the interests of the majority of shareholders and the investment enthusiasm, has shaken the cornerstone of the securities market. How to effectively motivate senior executives has been a concern of researchers and shareholder. Due to the principalagent problem along with the rise of jointstock pany motivating executives has been paid more attention to and the types of incentives have been developed years of research abroad incentive problems show that the establishment of an effective incentive system to reward executives with longterm performance of the enterprise can be closely bining to produce a significant role in promoting the enterprise39。s enterprises, panies on the current incentive, make remendations and opinions. Keyword： Senior management Incentive, Influencing factors, Incentives, Performance of the pany 3 目 錄 摘 要 ............................................................................................................................ 1 Abstract .......................................................................................................................... 2 1 緒言 ............................................................................................................................ 1 研究的背景和意義 ......................................................................................... 1 國(guó)內(nèi)研究現(xiàn)狀 ................................................................................................ 2 國(guó)外研究現(xiàn)狀 ................................................................................................ 2 國(guó)內(nèi)高管激勵(lì)存在的缺陷 ............................................................................ 3 2 高管激勵(lì)模型的探究設(shè)計(jì) ........................................................................................ 4 我國(guó)激勵(lì)模型缺陷產(chǎn)生的原因 .................................................................... 4 相關(guān)概念 ........................................................................................................ 4 公司業(yè)績(jī) ............................................................................................ 4 股權(quán)激勵(lì) ............................................................................................ 5 薪酬激勵(lì) ............................................................................................ 5 3 高管激勵(lì)模型探究 .................................................................................................... 6 股權(quán)激勵(lì)模型 ................................................................................................ 6 探究設(shè) 計(jì) ........................................