【正文】 理：機構(gòu)和宏觀經(jīng)濟的思考 中央政府在 透明的公共財政管理過程 中， 需要地方一級機構(gòu)的配合，這反映了 其職能 的需要， 同時為了能和地方政府創(chuàng)造更好的下放管理效率，確保良好的問責(zé)制和競爭機制是關(guān)鍵因素。 (3) administrative controls。 demands to maintain donor funds in extra budgetary or offbudget accounts have undermined the transparency and financial discipline of government operations (Premhang,1996),and often generated parallel and uncoordinated budget systems. The principle of unity requires that the budget includes all revenues and expenditures of all government agencies undertaking government operations. This principle is important to ensure that the budget is an effective instrument to impose a constraint on total and government expenditure, and promote higher efficiency in the allocation of resources. The principle of internal consistency between different ponents of the budget requires, in particular, hat current expenditure needed for the maintenance and operation of past investments be fully reflected in the budget. Moreover, this principle implies that there should be no dual budget systems involving a split between current and capital (or development) spending. The principles above translate in different ways in terms of information requirements for appropriations, accounting, controls and reporting, depending on the budgeting framework in useand we distinguish here between a continuumbased on traditional budgeting frameworks to those on the basis of performance or outes. These are discussed sequentially below. A. Government Accountability Government accountability is an essential principle of democracy through which elected and unelected public officials are obligated to explain their decisions and actions to the legislature and the broader public to ensure an appropriate use of public resources. The framework for government accountability usually includes a bination of political and administrative mechanisms designed to hold public officials responsible for their Performance. Fixed terms of office and fair elections are key political mechanisms to hold policy makers accountable. It these mechanisms, he electorate could remove elected government officials if their performance is not in line with public expectations. Legal mechanisms of accountability for both elected and unelected officials include all legislation proscribing actions that public officials can and cannot take and well as sanctions against officials with unsatisfactory conduct. Precondition legal accountability is an independent judicial system. Administrative accountability mechanisms entail independent auditors and ombudsmen, on sure that public officials do not transgress mandates or misuse public monies. A munitybased scheme for government accountability bining political, and administrative mechanisms has received increasing attention by international agencies. Particularly important under this scheme are the legal instruments that require input from the munities on certain government decisions or provide access to the press or the broader public to information on government activities. B. Traditional Budgeting Models The traditional cycle of budget appropriations, counting, control and reporting are described for both unitary and federal states. he recent experiences of developing countries in meeting the expenditure accountability requirements of the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative are summarized in sky and Floyd (2021). The typical stages of budgeting include decisions by the administration and authorized by the elative legislature on what to spend—this is the appropriation stage. This would increasingly place in a mediumterm framework to fully capture the effects of decisions that last for multiple periods. In a unitary state with subnational governments, the budget decisions would be made by the central government and approved by the national legislature. Such an arrangement would be perfectly patible with local munities reflecting their priorities to the agent