【正文】 . Moreover, petitors who have not incurred the costs of training and learning by doing can also acquire the new technologies embodied in the loan officers and other staff of the anization, by offering more attractive wages. Because of the nature of knowledge as a public good, these externalities discourage private innovation. State intervention in financial innovation, however, is problematic. Both the development and adoption of new financial technologies encounter significant difficulties. In effect, adaptation of a given practice to the features of a specific market segment is not a trivial task. First, this effort requires a flexible framework for experimentation. Indeed, it has been their vast flexibility in exploring alternative solutions to the problems of financial transactions that has allowed microfinance anizations and credit unions to develop their notable innovations. Continuity of efforts is also needed. Specific donor assistance, frequently delivered through internationally based anizations that possess parative advantages in institution building, have supported these innovations. Most likely, a multiplicity of experiments is needed, as the appropriate solutions to specific problems are not known ahead of time. If would be inappropriate, for example, to support only anizations that work with group credit or only those that offer individual loans. Second, financial development is intensive in local information and requires long learning processes. Donors can assist in several ways. One is to offer access to the international pool of knowledge about new financial technologies. A clear understanding of general principles, lessons, and best practices is a critical starting point, but it is not sufficient. Finance is essentially about the evaluation of risks, the management of information, and the creation of lender borrower relationships that carry incentives for the protection of the relationship. The exact nature of these risks and the precise structures of incentives that sustain these relationships vary from market segment to market segment. The accumulation of information needed to reduce costs occurs locally and gradually, as the anization learns about its clients, about the market where it operates, and about the sources of threats of default. The success of microfinance anizations has ensued only after long processes of learning by doing, usually acpanied by close interaction with an international provider of technical assistance. This usually requires a longterm donor mitment to the institutionbuilding exercise. Innovation is also required, moreover, with respect to the institutional design of rural financial anizations. In the end, policies will not be enacted, procedures will not be revised, technologies will not be adopted, if those who have to make the decisions do not find it in their interest to do so. The institutional design of anizations (ownership, control, governance) constrains individual behavior and creates the structures of incentives that guide the decisions that determine performance. The financial anizations that currently have a presence in the rural areas of developing countries have institutional designs that frequently do not promote outreach and sustainability. Unfortunately, the role of donors in influencing the institutional design of these anizations is not clearly and sufficiently understood. Donor choices about investing in, lending to, and making grants for technical assistance and other purposes to particular types of anizations will influence the course of institutional development. These issues will pose the greatest dilemmas and challenges to donors and governments in the development of rural financial markets. 譯 文： 主題 :宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)政策與現(xiàn)實(shí) —— 深化農(nóng)村金融市場(chǎng) : 宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)、政策和政治維度 一、深化 農(nóng)村金融政策 用發(fā)展的角度看待問(wèn)題，必須采用新政策，發(fā)展必要的物質(zhì)和制度基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施，改善和傳播新的金融技術(shù) ,設(shè)計(jì)和建造新組織 , 這將允許在發(fā)展中國(guó)家和轉(zhuǎn)型期經(jīng)濟(jì)中提供一個(gè)更有效率的、可持續(xù)的、廣泛的農(nóng)村金融服務(wù)業(yè)。 (p) the small size and low density of the clientele in local mar kets, which reduces the opportunities to dilute the fixed costs of any financial infrastructure。 (n) the high covariance of cash flows of potential rural depositors and borrowers