【正文】
cants, which increase both the operating costs and the losses from default of lenders。 (b) high transaction (operating) costs incurred in mobilizing deposits, which increase the cost of funds for the financial intermediary well above the returns that must be offered to the depositors to attract their funds。 frequently in the past, interventionist policies actually repressed financial market development. Reforms of nonfinancial policies that constrain the profitability of client businesses and public investments and that reduce transaction costs for all market participants also contribute to an expansion of both the demand and the supply of rural financial services. The development of supporting institutional mechanisms (., property registries, credit bureaus and rating agencies) is also critical for rural financial market expansion. Because many of these supporting tools may be public goods, state intervention may be needed in order to accelerate their provision. Getting prices, policies and institutions right is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for rural financial deepening in developing countries and economies in transition. This goal will not be reached unless new, costeffective lending and deposittaking technologies are developed and implemented, in ways that allow an expansion of the supply of a broad range of financial services, delivered to wide segments of the rural population, at appropriate costs and risks for both the clients and the anizations that offer these services. That is, these costs would allow the clients to undertake projects that generate marginal rates of return at least as high as those being generated elsewhere in the economy and would allow the anizations to deliver those services in a sustainable and profitable manner. Because of externalities in the market for information and, in particular, in the market for innovations, private initiatives may not be sufficient to bring about the desired level of experimentation and adoption. Although state intervention may be needed to promote technological change, the choice of how to acplish this matters. Resources are scarce and successful loci of innovation are unknown before hand. Moreover, knowledge of appropriate financial technologies will not be sufficient, either, for the sustainable expansion of rural financial markets. The anizations that supply these services must possess the required resources (human capital, leadership, working, information capital, and access to funds), and they must implement business plans that successfully pursue a mission to serve this market segment in bination with a vocation for sustainability. Such anizations are in short supply in the rural areas of developing countries and economies in transition. They are key to the effort, however. Robust and creative anizations will undertake a major part of the innovation required and will be in better position to adopt and adapt knowledge and practices developed elsewhere. In contrast, the right policies and new technologies will be irrelevant, if the anizations that offer rural financial services are inefficient and not sustainable. Finally, assembling all of these ingredients in a coherent system requires that the structure of incentives engendered by the ownership structure and governance design of the anization be patible with its outreach and sustainability objectives. An inconsistent mission and inpatible incentives will be a recipe for failure. Moreover, the legal and regulatory framework within which these anizations operate influences their ownership and governance structures. These structures must also be wellmatched with the characteristics of the financial technologies adopted. The construction of this system and the acquisition of the resources needed will require deliberate institution building efforts, which may be facilitated by government and donor assistance. Promoting the Expansion of the Demand for Rural Financial Services Optimum intervention in the promotion of rural financial deepening calls for a precise diagnosis, namely the identification of actually binding constraints to rural financial transactions (what are the nature and extent of the problem?)