經(jīng)濟與貿(mào)易外文翻譯-其他專業(yè)-文庫吧資料
2025-01-27 01:00本頁面
【正文】 ose same elites, mostly—argue that the only means of paying for Europe’s distinctive way of life is not to evade globalisation but to embrace it wholeheartedly. This is not some abstract philosophical choice. It is a fierce struggle for Europe’s future, being waged in Athens as Gee Papandreou loses power to a temporary government of national unity, in derelict factories in France and Belgium and in the wasted lives of millions of unemployed young Spaniards. This struggle will set the limits on Europe’s welfare state. It will determine how the unbalanced partnership between Germany and France, and an increasingly detached Britain, will shape the EU. It will define the high politics of Brussels and the low politics of European populism. And it will decide the fate of the device that Schumpeter would see as the embodiment of all this: the euro. Just now the euro zone is caught in a dismal downward spiral. Fears about whether the governments in Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain and, most alarmingly, Italy will honour their €3 trillion ($ trillion) or so of borrowing are wrecking European banks, which own their debt. Struggling banks undermine confidence and credit. Coming on top of fiscal austerity, this is bringing on recession, deepening fears that governments will be unable to pay back their debts, which further weakens the banks. And so the vice turns, down towards disaster. The euro zone still has the capacity to stop this run on its banks and governments. As a block, it is less indebted than America and its publicsector deficit is lower. It has the money to fortify its banks against the default of Greece—and Portugal and Ireland, if need be. And it is minded by the European Central Bank (ECB), which can in principle stand behind those vulnerable governments by buying their debt in unlimited
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